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Summary 
The study investigated the policing of service delivery protests in South Africa with specific 
reference to Free State province. Failure by local governments to provide basic services to the 
previously disadvantaged South Africans has led to a number of service delivery protests 
taking place. The manner in which these protests are managed by the police in South Africa 
more especially the Public Order Police who are specialists in this field, raises concerns. One 
would perceive that the police are losing the battle in dealing with protest action for they are 
criticised for their brutal tactics in quelling the violence. This brutal handling of protesters 
dates back to the apartheid era and not much has changed contrary to the expectations of a 
newly formed democratic country. This therefore led to the investigation as to why the police 
in South Africa fail to contain such protest actions. 
 
The South African Police Services (SAPS) as it is known in a democratic South Africa 
employed tactics from international countries in order to introduce more professionalism in 
the SAPS. Although better tactics have been introduced, this did not seem to improve the 
situation because not only are properties destroyed but many lives are also lost through police 
action. The researcher conducted his investigation in the central part of South Africa in the 
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Free State Province concentrating in the three main areas; namely Bloemfontein, Welkom 
and Bethlehem where the Public Order Police units are based. 
 
The investigation resulted in the researcher arriving at the conclusion that there are a number 
of challenges that are experienced by the SAPS when dealing with protests and the main 
problem identified was that of a shortage of manpower. This problem create challenges when 
it came to managing the number of protests taking place and exacerbated by not allowing the 
police to use the tactics that they were trained in.  
 
As much as we acknowledge these challenges, there are best practices that can be learnt from 
international countries. The crowd psychology strategies applied by the Swedish police as 
well as the high tolerance level of the British police, are the good practices that can be 
recommended in dealing with protests in South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL ORIENTATION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
People elect their government representatives and pay taxes in most countries to enable the 
government to provide certain basic services. This makes the provision of basic services by 
the government to be a realistic expectation that each citizen is entitled to and this should lead 
to the improvement of the people’s quality of life. In South Africa, the local government as 
the sphere of central government is closer to the communities; and in terms of Section 152 (1) 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, its duty   is to ensure the provision 
of good basic services to communities in a sustainable manner in order to provide a safe and 
healthy environment. The failure of  local government (municipal and provincial 
administrations)  to render these services - irrespective of the basis for such lack of service 
delivery  (e.g. lack of finances or capacity), invokes an angry reaction from the communities 
who use means such as the refusal to pay for municipal services  which most times manifests 
into violent protests. Mukadam, Herzenberg and Felton (2012: 05) state that in most cases, 
demonstrations and mass protests for services can be attributed to a state of paralysis in 
dysfunctional municipalities. 
 
South Africa has recently been adversely affected by service delivery protests which in most 
cases turn out to be violent and result in much damage to property and the loss of life. The 
nature of public protests in South Africa necessitates the deployment of police officers who 
are well-skilled in crowd management tactics. This is to ensure the protection of life and 
prevention of damage to property on the one hand, while on the other hand ensuring that the 
protesters can be able to exercise their democratic right to protest peacefully without 
violating the human rights of other people who choose not to protest but to continue with 
their normal daily- life routines.  Of concern though, is that some of the tactics of crowd 
management exhibited by police officers result in the loss of life; a classic case being the 
killing of Andries Tatane who was one of the service delivery protesters in Ficksburg - this in 
essence questions the ability and skilfulness of the police to carry out this task with extreme 
restraint in order to avoid the unnecessary loss of life. To understand the dynamics of the 
policing of the service delivery protests,   it is important to research the broader perspective 
of the policing of protests in South Africa. 
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The South African Police (SAP) was created after the Union of South Africa in 1913 and 
maintained a close relationship with the then South African Defence Force (SADF). They 
were fully responsible for domestic law in 1926 but in 1948 the National Party Government 
changed legislation to make them (SAP) to be more militant especially when faced with 
hostile crowds. The South African Police was mostly white-dominated and supported by 
kitskonstabels (instant constables), who were not given proper training but were armed with 
shotguns, whips, batons and handcuffs (William & Pruitt, 2010:117). 
 
Afrikanerisation of the South African Police took place in the late 20
th
 century (Mathews, 
Heymann & Mathews, 1993:25). Previously the majority of white policemen who were 
drawn from rural areas dominated the police force. During this time the public was subjected 
to harsh measures and brutal tactics by the police, more especially when dealing with 
protests. The municipal police was also used by the apartheid government to suppress the 
black communities in the townships during the 1980s. These police officers were faced with 
the challenge of poor training and under-resourced municipalities. They were also notorious 
for their drunken and violent behaviour (Rauch, Shaw& Louw, 2001).  
 
The manner in which the police dealt with protests in South Africa, has raised serious 
concerns in the public domain and in some cases their actions have left political authorities 
embarrassed, and the general public being of the view that the South African Police Service is 
not that different from the then South African Police. Research conducted by Faull and 
Newham (2011:01) has shown that the police in South Africa use paramilitary tactics that 
disregard human rights, much to the detriment of police-community relations. These 
paramilitary tactics include using excessive force that could be lethal - like using live 
ammunition on fleeing protesters. Also, they arrive on the scene with gear that seemed 
intimidating; as if they are going to war. This makes police actions during service delivery 
protests to not only anger communities and create a deep mistrust between the community 
and the police, but also to deeply dent the integrity and organisational image of the police.    
 
Current challenges in the policing of protests have further raised questions on the 
effectiveness of crowd management training, the quality of strategies employed, and whether 
the culture of the South African Police Service (SAPS) is appropriate in a modern 
democracy. The other concern that has been raised is the ability of police managers to lead 
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protest management operations, to recruit   suitable personnel into public order units, and to 
curb the brutal and excessive use of force by police personnel.  Traits and Marks (2011:15) 
share the same concerns but go further by asserting that in comparison to their global 
counterparts, the police in South Africa have failed to uphold the required crowd 
management standards. 
 
Van der Spuy and Rontsch (2008:01) state that many of the policing problems in South 
Africa are as a result of the violent nature of society that could be attributed to colonialism, 
slavery and apartheid. Matlala and Sinclair (2013:02) argue that dealing with these challenges 
requires a paradigm shift from the police that can encourage deeper understanding of the 
contemporary issues in society. They suggest the transformation of the police into research-
driven organisations, as one of the ways to strengthen the understanding of the contemporary 
issues in society. It was thus Matlala and Sinclair’s argument that inspired this research; to 
analyse the crowd management tactics used by the South African Police Service, particularly 
in the Free State Province.  
 
This chapter, as the introductory chapter of this dissertation,   will provide the background of 
the study and explain the research problem, research questions, research objectives, and the 
significance of the study including definitions of the key concepts that are used in this study. 
It will round off by providing the layout of this dissertation for the readers to have a preview 
of what the study entails. 
 
1.2 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
According to William (2009:5),   there are about thirty protests that occur on a daily basis in 
South Africa that the police have to handle. Most of these protests are peaceful but at times 
these protests can turn violent. The police need to do proper planning if they are aware of 
such protests, but at times police encounter spontaneous or “on-the-spot”  protests and these  
pose  major challenges  as they do not give them time to properly plan on how to manage  
such protests. 
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1.2.1 Various types of protests that the police deals with 
According to the Ministry of Police (2011:2),   marches and gatherings in the early 1990s 
were handled in a riot-controlled manner. The Sebokeng clashes of 1990 and the Daveyeton 
one of 1991 led to the transformation of the manner in which the police should deal with 
protest gatherings and marches. According to Tait and Marks (2011:15-20), the Internal 
Stability Unit that was primarily tasked to deal with crowd management encountered  some 
challenges such as the strong-arm tactics that were  used during protests, the high level of 
arrests of instigators, and the unit itself provoking violence during protest action. Thus it  was 
evident that the democratic right to peaceful protests was no longer guaranteed and that 
demonstrations and protests were treated as if they were criminal actions. 
 
The National Instruction document or policy on Crowd Management (South African Police 
Service, 2013) states that the role of the Public Order Police (POP) in South Africa is 
mandated by section 205 (3) of the Constitution. The mandate implies that POP maintains 
public order during public gatherings and demonstrations. Subsequently, many changes took 
place since the 1990s and the brutal actions by the police during crowd management 
situations raised many questions. This led to the Goldstone Commission of Enquiry which led 
to the coming into being of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 that shifted the 
focus from obtaining permission to hold a gathering to giving notice of intended gathering.  
 
The South African Police Service is expected to police or monitor different types of protests 
such as gatherings, marches, assemblies, mass meetings, demonstrations, processions, sit-ins, 
picketing, night vigils and roadblocks. The specialised unit that is supposed to do this 
function is the POP supported by the Tactical Response Team (TRT) and the National 
Intervention Unit (NIU). Although these units undergo specialised training to deal with 
crowd management situations, they are often faced with challenges of dealing with protest 
marches in a non-violent manner. 
 
According to Section 9 (3) of the National Instruction of 2013 on Crowd Management (South 
African Police Service, 2013), there are three levels of crowds that the police deal with; 
namely - level one, which are peaceful gatherings and less significant sports entertainment; 
level two being crowds where there are unconfirmed threats against persons and property; 
and level three involves confirmed information regarding a likely threat against lives and 
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property. Theoretically it is expected that the POP unit should deal with level three crowds 
and provide tactical reserves at major events. But practically they tend to deal with all these 
levels. This is generally as a result of police station officers being preoccupied by public 
complaints and crime prevention activities. The three types of protests which the police deal 
with on daily basis and the manner in which they are handled as well as their challenges will 
be dealt with below. 
 
1.2.1.1 Gatherings 
According to Lombardo (2008:347), a mass gathering is a pre-planned public event that is 
held for a limited period and attended by more than 25 000 people. The length of stay is for 
several hours or even days. The main reason is to demonstrate support for or opposition to 
policies or principals including the government officials. According to Tait and Marks 
(2011:15), the right of freedom to assembly is a significant victory in the democratic South 
Africa which is also protected by the Bill of Rights and the South African Constitution Act 
108 of 1996. The Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 which recognises freedom of 
assembly and protest as democratic rights and seeks to ensure that they are practised in a 
peaceful manner, defines a gathering as any assembly, concourse or procession of more than 
fifteen  persons in or on any public road. This gathering should have a specific purpose. 
 
The main reason gatherings were prohibited in South Africa was their propensity to turn 
violent. Various Acts of Parliament were used to ban gatherings in certain places in South 
Africa. These include   the Internal Security Act 44 of 1950 and the Public Safety Act 3 of 
1953 which prohibited gatherings and demonstrations in the precincts of Parliament. The 
Dangerous Weapons Act 71 of 1968, municipal by-laws and the Natal Code of Zulu Law 
eliminated the rights of citizens to assemble. In 1976 a blanket ban was imposed by the 
Minister of Justice prohibiting all outdoor gatherings. The onus then was on citizens to show 
why a gathering should not be prohibited (Raunch & Storey, 1998). The Internal Security Act 
74 of 1982 gave more powers to the Minister of Law and Order than the magistrate as section 
46 (1) of the Act gave the magistrate the right to prohibit all gatherings for a period of 48 
hours if they believed that the gathering will endanger public peace, whilst section 46 (3) 
gave the minister the power to prohibit any gathering if he deemed necessary. 
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Most gatherings in South Africa are politically motivated as they relate to service delivery or 
the lack thereof, and draw sympathy from the opposition political parties. As most of these 
gatherings turn violent, the police need to be made aware of them in advance in order to 
execute contingency planning and be ready for any eventuality. Most gatherings in South 
Africa take place in a confined space which makes it easier for the police to contain them, but 
it does happen at times that the gatherings do turn into marches, thus requiring more 
manpower from the police. 
 
1.2.1.2 Marches 
Protest marches are often held all over the world where protesters show their disagreement 
often to the government or employer. In South Africa most marches are undertaken by labour 
unions, political parties and people disgruntled by lack of service delivery. They often march 
in the Central Business Districts and to the main offices of their employers or the Local 
Government. These marches are also designed to attract the attention of the body that the 
march is directed towards as well as to garner   public sympathy - particularly if it is a wage 
strike or a complete failure to provide basic services. The disruptive and violent nature of 
most marches tends to receive most media coverage. 
 
The following are some of the most recent marches that turned violent which were covered 
by the media: A man was critical in hospital after police allegedly assaulted him following a 
protest of Mothutlung residents in the North West Province. These residents were protesting 
against the local municipality for failing to provide water (Mapumulo, Mkize & Magadala, 
2014:15). The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) was granted permission to march but 
caused havoc at Mohlakeng outside Randfontein in Gauteng. Protesters set alight municipal 
buildings, looted foreign-owned shops and barricaded parts of the N4 (SAPA, 2015:03).  
Residents of Bronkhorstpruit near Pretoria marched to the regional office of Tshwane Metro 
to deliver a memorandum of their service delivery demands. This later turned violent leading 
to the police dispersing crowds with rubber bullets (Kotlolo, 2014:6) 
 
Based on the analysis of various protests, the researcher is of the view that most marches turn 
violent due to the protesters not getting attention from local government and they therefore 
seek attention from the National Government through the media by committing such 
violence. According to Jain (2010:09), violent protests are those protests where participants 
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engage in physical acts that may cause harm to other people. It can also be the intentional 
injuring of the police, foreigners, government officials; or it may be a protest that leads to the 
burning down of houses or other structures, and the looting of shops. Violent protests also 
include the throwing of stones at passing motorists and the burning of tyres in order to block 
roads. 
 
These dynamics warrant that the policing of marches should be carefully and properly 
planned so that every eventuality is taken care of. The police have to ensure that all role-
players are part of this planning so that they can base their strategic plan on sufficient 
authentic information. Marches in the central business districts (CBDs) should be carefully 
monitored and policed as they normally expose more people to attacks; even most businesses 
were susceptible to destruction, vandalism and looting. South Africa uses a more scattered 
sporadic deployment approach as opposed to other countries such as Iceland, France and the 
United Kingdom that approach protests in a planned line-up formation. The line formation 
can be useful in the urban areas because it can block at each end an entire street lined with 
buildings. In so doing, the police protect the vulnerable areas that might be targeted by the 
protesters. At times, this formation will fail because it allows the protesters to target a weak 
point and thus   break the line formation. 
 
1.2.1.3 Picketing 
Despite the law regulating the right to assembly, a picket is authorised in terms of subsection 
69 (2) of the Labour Relations Act No 66 of 1995, which states that it might be held at any 
place to which the public has access but outside the premises of the employer; or with the 
permission of the employer, inside the employer’s premises. Picketing is a form of protest in 
which picketers congregate outside a place of work or location where an event is taking 
place. This is also done to draw public attention to a cause. Their intention is to harm or 
disadvantage business, through loss of customers and negative publicity, by discouraging or 
preventing workers from entering a site. They also try to persuade others not to enter during 
the strike. 
 
The protesters hold placards with slogans voicing their disagreements with business or 
government. Although persons have the right to picket, there are restrictions that are in place 
that they need to abide by. Picketing should be held at a reasonable distance from the office 
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that is being targeted, in so doing it prevents any sort of intimidation of workers or 
destruction to property. Picketers should not stop persons and compel them to listen to their 
demands. Vehicles entering or leaving such premises should not be interfered with (Delaney, 
2007: 7-8). 
 
Although most picketing ends peacefully, the police monitor a picketing very closely. 
Picketing has not been a major challenge to the South African Police Service because the 
picketers are normally fewer in numbers and in most cases there is proper communication 
between the police, convener and the business manager. The police also maintain close 
standby to react to any wrong doing by the picketers. However, police should be weary not to 
get involved on the views and merits of picketers. They (the police) need to uphold the law 
and take reasonable steps to ensure that peace prevails. They therefore have the responsibility 
to enforce the law, like arresting picketers who behave in a violent manner or those who are 
in possession of dangerous weapons in terms of Section 75 of the Dangerous Weapons Bill of 
2012. The police are also responsible to protect the public from any harm if they feel that the 
picket will lead to violence. 
 
The South African Government wants to move away from the militant style of policing the 
different forms of protests that are discussed above. That is why various units are sent on 
crowd management training so that the police can adapt to this new style of policing where 
people’s rights are respected. Unlike in the past where the police rushed to the scene and used 
excessive force to disperse the protests:  the police are now expected to do proper planning 
for these events taking into account the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 and the 
training that they have undergone to police such protests. 
 
1.2.2 The Process to Inform the Police on Planned and Unplanned Protests 
The Regulations of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 is guiding and assist  both the police and the 
public to coordinate a peaceful protest before it happens and provide guidelines that has to be 
followed, such as not protesting on  private property like shopping malls; not gathering closer 
than 100 metres from a magisterial court unless it is on a weekend or public holiday or unless 
there is a written permission from a  magistrate; not gathering in parliamentary buildings 
unless there is a written permission from the Chief Magistrate; and not gathering at the Union 
Buildings in Pretoria unless there is written permission from the Director General. 
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The Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 manifests section 17 of the Constitution, 
which states that everyone has the right to assemble, demonstrate, picket and to present 
petitions peacefully while being unarmed. When there are sixteen or more persons involved, 
then it is called a gathering, and the process of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 
should be followed which states that the convenor of such a gathering should within seven 
days notify the responsible officer at the local council of such a planned gathering.  If this 
cannot be done within seven days, then it must be done within forty eight hours; however, the 
convener should give reasons as to why this could not have been done earlier.   
 
This regulation is to allow the police and other role-players, adequate time to prepare in order 
to manage such a gathering effectively. It is prudent to point out that notification is not a 
request for permission to demonstrate or gather, but in terms of the legislation the convenor is 
only required to give notice to the municipality. The following details should be included in 
the notice: 
 names, address and contact details of the organisation and the convener; 
 reasons for such gathering; 
 duration of the gathering; 
 the anticipated number of persons participating in such a gathering and the number of 
marshals  appointed (there should be one marshal for every 10 persons);  
 whether a document or petition will be handed over;  and 
 route of the march and dispersal points.  
 
After the notice for the gathering is forwarded by the convenor, the responsible officer needs 
to liaise with the police on the policing of such a gathering as the police might have other 
protests to manage. The planned protest will only go ahead if all the responsible parties are 
convinced that there is enough capacity to manage it appropriately and the convenor will 
have to stick to the agreed plan as any deviations will result in contravention of the 
Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 and possible arrests. 
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Section 8 (1) of the National Instruction of 2013 on Crowd Management (South African 
Police Service, 2013) informs  the police when there is a need to call for a Section 4 meeting 
by the responsible officer with all the role players– this  is the platform where information is 
shared in order that the protest takes place peacefully. It is during this meeting where all 
parties sit together to work out the best possible way to police the protest. The main role- 
players in these meetings are the convener, the authorised members of the police and the 
responsible officer of the municipality who organise such a meeting. This is what is normally 
called a “golden triangle”. If the convener is not present then this meeting can go ahead and 
any decisions taken should be communicated to the convener of which he/she is expected to 
abide by. Section 5 of the National Instruction of 2013 on Crowd Management (South 
African Police Service, 2013) states that crime intelligence is required to assist the police 
with information on planned and unplanned protests, in order to identify any threats at such 
protests. 
 
According to the Ministry of Police (2011:12), most protests are due to poor service delivery 
thus protesters would normally target the local municipality. Although the police should 
always be ready to deal with any gathering at any time, the spontaneous (unplanned) protests 
make it difficult for proper planning and for contingency measures to be put in place. The 
South African Police Service can do a proper operational planning with planned protests by 
having the proper operational and deployment plans in place. Spontaneous protests on the 
other hand do not provide the luxury of planning and therefore calls for reactive measures 
which at times lead to some controversy. According to Trait and Marks (2011:19) 
contingency plans must be developed for spontaneous protests so that confrontation does not 
escalate between the police and protesters and that public order is maintained at all times. 
 
1.2.3 Prohibition of a Gathering  
Although every person has the right to protest, there are powers vested in the local council 
and the police to prohibit protests. The protest can be prohibited by the local council if it is 
believed that it might cause harm to persons or damage to property or traffic disturbance that 
is beyond the control of the police. However, when the affected convenor approaches the 
court to overturn the prohibition, a magistrate can overrule such a prohibition if he/she feels 
that the decision to prohibit such a protest is unfair. According to Section 5 (1) of the 
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Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993, the protest can be prohibited under the following 
circumstances: 
 that a meeting has taken place between the convenor, responsible officer, the police 
and that the convenor has not agreed to  the plans;  
 that information under oath is received that there will be disturbance of traffic, 
possible injury to persons, and damage to property;  and  
 a letter received from the police providing reasons why they will not be in a position 
to police such a march or protest. 
 
Section 5(1) of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 demands that when there is 
credible information that the proposed gathering will result in serious disruption of vehicular 
and/or pedestrian traffic, injury to persons and extreme damage to property and that the 
police and traffic officers will not be able to contain the situation, then the police must as 
soon as possible meet the convenor in order to prohibit such a gathering  and if this is 
unsuccessful the police can request the court to prohibit such a gathering. 
 
It is important to continue with intelligence gathering (even if the protest is prohibited) to 
ensure that the police are well-prepared should the gathering proceed without the required 
permission. It does happen at times that the conveners  do not brief the possible protesters 
that the permission for the protest has not being granted;  while on the other hand protesters 
at times ignore the prohibition and go ahead with the protest. The Crime Intelligence section 
plays an important role in ensuring that the police have the current information on the 
prohibited march so that they have the contingency plan to cater for any eventuality.  
 
1.2.4 Crowd Management Techniques 
Members of the Public Order Policing in South Africa undergo intensive training that 
involves various crowd management techniques to ensure that the marches are closely 
monitored and that there is no injury to persons or damage to property. Trait and Marks 
(2011:19) state that the South African Police Service prefers a French crowd management 
technique model as opposed to the crowd management technique model of countries like 
Spain and Germany. The French model is preferred because it allows for close contact 
between the police and the protesters thus providing for opportunity to restrain forward 
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movement of the protesters and the opportunity to pick on certain individuals who are 
thought to be most provocative within the protest. The police lead these marches from the 
front ensuring the free flow and diversion of traffic. The policing from the rear ensures that 
the march is not delayed by protesters sitting in the street and disrupting traffic.  
 
The most critical part are the flanks where police need to protect the businesses from being 
vandalised or looted. Video footage of gatherings and marches are also important to identify 
possible suspects if needed in court as evidence. The crowd management styles of Spain and 
Germany deploy strategic incapacitation using no protest zones that confines a crowd to a 
certain space (Chief Inspector of Constabulary, 2009: 42). This style prevents the crowd from 
demonstrating freely as compared with the South African situation. Although strategic 
incapacitation gives the police the psychological advantage over the protesters, this method 
can cause tensions leading to more violence. It will also infringe on a person’s right to 
demonstrate as stipulated in Section 17 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
Act 108 of 1996. South Africa adopted the French techniques which were regarded as highly 
professional in managing crowds. This style has also come under criticism for its rapid 
intervention, the saturation of space and the use of high police presence which is very 
intimidating. 
 
The researcher is of the view that in order to manage crowds properly the South African 
Police Service members should be professional and work systematically. This should be done 
with proper command and control using the techniques systematically in the way that they 
have been trained. 
 
The South African Police Division HRD (2014:26) mentions techniques that could be used 
by commanders based on their assessment of the prevailing situation. The first strategy   
before an operation the commander identifies a Forward Rendezvous (FRV). This is where 
vehicles are parked and briefing of members takes place. The FRV should be close to the area 
of operation, to allow for quick deployment and response, and members at the scene should 
have their equipment in their vehicle close to them to facilitate the quick response. Members 
are thereafter deployed to the relevant venues and some of the sections will be tasked to do 
patrols. 
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Secondly, patrols that can be used to make contact with participants during a gathering also 
help in getting information that can be of importance to the commander. They also serve as a 
deterrent when participants intend damaging property or blocking off thus making the general 
public feel safe. This method is useful especially when a gathering is not located in one area.  
 
Thirdly, members are also deployed to be physically present at the march so that the police 
could have control over the situation and be able to prevent any possible threat. According to 
the South African Police Division HRD (2014:32) the escort is made up of three parts; the 
first is the leading part which is in front and will determine the speed of the escort and it 
should have vehicles with bull bars to remove obstacles. The second is the flanks which are 
placed at one or more sides of the action zone; they can be vehicles or footpatrols and at 
times motorcyles which are much more effective because they can manoeuvre between small 
spaces. The final part of the escort is the rear where members and vehicles are positioned 
behind the action zone. This keeps participants together thus maintaining the speed of the 
escort. A reserve section is normally placed at the rear and can be used to reinforce, relieve 
and execute an action where the threat exists. It does happen at times that there are opposition 
parties going to the same rally and in this situation the police have to tactfully canalise these 
groups. This is useful to the commander when there is a need to split opposing participants 
thus eliminating possible violence during a protest action.  
 
The pushback method mentioned above is used in crowd management situations where the 
police lead the participants in a certain direction. When executing this style, members are 
armed with batons and shields. Pushback can also be done using horses. The pushback is 
done in a slow progressive manner keeping the participants moving. The sections execute this 
by moving along the limits of the operation in the direction of the participants. They move in 
co-ordinated lines keeping the participants together. In the possible event of participants 
being armed with dangerous weapons, the police will encircle these identified participants or 
groups (South African Police Division HRD, 2014:44) in order to deal with the situation in a 
more contained manner. 
 
Encircling is a defensive locking system that restricts an area to ensure the maintenance of 
public order. The encircling system enables members to look inwards in the direction of the 
action zone and move inwards towards the participants to be able to search, arrest, remove or 
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keep participants in a particular area for a specific period. This action is mostly executed by 
the overall commander who has to ensure that he/she has adequate manpower to perform this 
action because the participants who might escape would come and rescue their colleagues 
(South African Police Division HRD, 2014:51). 
 
The search method is one of the methods that is also used at crowd management and service 
delivery protests situations where the police intend disarming protesters off dangerous 
weapons. This also embodies the tactical option of isolation and encircling where the police 
isolate and encircle protesters and only allow those persons who are already searched to leave 
the encircled area (South African Police Division HRD, 2014:63). 
 
During major events it does happen that some participants evade the blocking line and enter 
the restricted zone. These participants become a threat and get evacuated by the police. Once 
evacuated, the building will be blocked from further entry to these people. This is done with 
shields and tonfas where protesters are pushed in a certain direction out of the building. In 
this process the operational commander has to consider the speed of the evacuation, any 
obstructions that would make the evacuation difficult and the safety of the protesters (South 
African Police Division HRD, 2014:64). 
 
In addition, the dispersal method which is the breaking up of a crowd into smaller 
manageable groups in order for the police for easier control may also be used in crowd 
management. This splitting of crowds destroys the morale of the protesters and allows the 
situation to return to normal. It is effective in situations   when participants block off roads, 
gather illegally,   or when   groups are involved in public disorder - this is managed by 
members on foot, and depending on the situation, vehicles and horses can also be used. The 
police also use stun grenades, tonfas, teargas and rubber-bullets. This tactical option is 
normally used as the last resort and any force applied must be in relation to the threat, and 
once the desired option is reached the use of force should cease (South African Police 
Division HRD, 2014:80). 
 
The researcher is of the view that although the police have adopted crowd management 
techniques from countries such as French and Belgium, SAPS needs to adjust these 
techniques to the South African situation, taking into consideration the different types of 
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protests and the terrain. Most of the techniques discussed above can be used in urban 
situations; however, most of the protest action in South Africa takes place in open areas 
where the police find it difficult to control. This could be one of the reasons why police resort 
to excessive force. 
 
1.2.5 Planning to Police the Protest 
According to Section 11 of the National Instruction of 2013 on Crowd Management (South 
African Police Service, 2013), the Commander of the Public Order Police is expected to 
implement an effective operational plan for a protest. By doing so he/she has to be proactive 
in the gathering of information involving all the relevant role players. The plan should entail 
the following: equipment to be utilised for crowd management; prohibitions that should be 
put in place; personnel deployment; powers to be dispersed; and the use of force 
 
This process is first initiated by a briefing session where internal and external role players get 
involved. The internal role players include all the police departments like the public order 
police, visible policing, and specialised units such as the air-wing, K9, flying squad, and 
crime intelligence. The external role players include the traffic department, disaster 
management, and the municipal police. In this briefing session all these role players are 
afforded an opportunity to give their inputs and the predictable challenges are also addressed. 
It is also during these sessions where tasks are allocated. The Regulations of Gatherings Act 
205 of1993 places the responsibility on the organisers and conveners to comply with the Act 
and ensure that the gathering proceeds in a peaceful manner. It is the responsibility of the 
organisers to indicate during their initial session (section 4 meeting) with the authorities  that 
they have arranged for sufficient capacity of people to be deployed as marshals and provide 
names of such persons who the police commanders will liaise with during the manifestation 
of such a gathering or protest (Ministry of Police, 2011:13). 
 
The National Instruction on Crowd Management 2013 (South African Police Service, 2013) 
states some of the information that is vital for the planned protest: the route that the 
participants will take; the possibility of violence; whether the participants are aggressive; the 
possibility of the presence of firearms and other dangerous weapons; the intention of the 
participants; the expected number of participants; and any other information that is of 
importance for proper planning. The above information helps the police and all other role 
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players to do proper planning of the human and logistical resources that will be required for 
such protests and how it will be effectively policed to prevent injury, loss of life and the 
destruction of property.  
 
1.2.5.1 Three phases of planning 
After the initial planning session (section 4 meeting) which is inclusive in nature, the police 
organise their own meeting where they unpack all the issues related to the planned protest. As 
this meeting considers all the available information including intelligence reports that could 
be dealing with potential threats that are not made public, it becomes the meeting for the 
police only. The police then use this information that indicates the threat level to determine 
the resources that will be required and the policing strategy that will be used. To prepare for 
any eventualities, the police should be fully armed during the policing of the protest. Media 
reports have constantly shown that the police are at times not properly armed during the 
policing of protests as echoed in some reports. In his article, Watson (2014:3)   states that  
after the death of Andries Tatane in Ficksburg  in 2012,  the South African Human Rights 
Commission (SAHRC) reported that the SAPS used excessive force and that they were not 
properly trained and equipped to manage  violent crowd  situations. According to Sefara 
(2014:12), following the announcement by the then National Commissioner Riah Phiyega 
stating that the police had to handle 1 800 protests which are increasingly becoming violent, 
he believes that although police are stretched to the limit they are ill-equipped and unskilled. 
Moreover,  Professor Rudolph Zinn from the Department of Police Practice at Unisa, also 
disagrees with the comments made by the then - Minister of Police, Nathi Mthethwa who said 
that police are well trained and equipped when dealing with crowd management situations 
(Bailey, 2014:09). 
 
The failure to be properly armed, enhances the propensity to resort to more excessive force 
which is contrary to the use of commensurate force that is expected from any professional 
police agency. The successful policing of the protest is also dependent on the utilisation of 
members who fully understand their mandate. This makes the briefing of members on the 
planning and the strategy to be used to be of the utmost importance; this places the 
responsibility on the commanders to ensure that operational officers are properly briefed in 
terms of section 12 of the National Instruction of 2013 on Crowd Management (South 
African Police Service, 2013). 
17 
 
 
1.2.5.2 Command and Control 
The successful policing of the protest is mainly grounded in a sound command and control 
structure of skilled and disciplined police officers who understand fully what is expected of 
them. That is why it is not only important that police officers undergo intensive crowd 
management training, but it is equally important that the commanders are also fully trained 
and knowledgeable in assessing the situation and giving appropriate commands. This is 
important to contain the crowd and prevent injuries and death to the rank and file members of 
the police force. The training that both the police officers and their commanders undergo 
equips them to respond spontaneously to the prevailing situation. The operational commander 
takes charge of the scene and gives instructions to the platoon commander who ultimately 
gives instructions to section members. When arriving at a scene it is expected that POP takes 
over the control of the scene without interference from other policing structures. Negotiation 
skills are thus imperative for the POP commanders as this is also critical to defuse the tense 
situation (Ministry of Police, 2011:18). 
 
1.2.5.3 Police Powers in Crowd Management 
The police may also be in a situation where all attempts to avert disruption and violence fails, 
and paragraph 14(2) of the National Instruction of 2013 on Crowd Management (South 
African Police Service, (2013) guides police on the necessary actions that needs to be taken 
in this regard. They need to firstly put defensive measures in place and revert to their 
contingency planning, which will involve all role players to keep them prepared in a worst 
case scenario. In order to disperse the crowd the police should give warnings in at least two 
official languages. This should be done in languages understood by most participants. The 
police should also warn the participants on what actions (taken by the police) will follow if 
they (protesters) do not comply and taking into consideration  a reasonable time period for 
them to leave -  but if the violence has already started the time frame should be immediate. 
On the second warning the innocent bystanders are also informed to leave. Failure of the 
participants to comply may warrant the police to bring in their reserve platoon that will be 
responsible for the offensive measures and this measure is embarked upon as a deterrent to 
prevent further violence. 
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When dispersing a crowd the police need to consider various factors to ensure the safety and 
security of all involved, among others allowing participants adequate time to disperse, in 
order to avoid stampedes or injuries. In their response to the prevailing threat, the police 
should implement a gradual response to ensure the use of proportional force that is warranted 
under the circumstances. It is important to emphasise that minimum force should be used in 
order to accomplish this goal, and such force should be discontinued once that objective has 
been achieved. 
 
The researcher is of the view that the National Instruction of 2013 on Crowd Management 
(South African Police Service, 2013) was developed to address the gross human rights abuses 
during protest management. But this did very little to bring about the required change as the 
use of excessive force by the police is still very evident during  various protests that are 
covered by the media. The killing of two people and the injuring of many others at 
Mothutlung where the police were accused of using deadly force barely after the Marikana 
massacre, being a classic example (Mosombuka, 2014:01). 
 
1.2.6 The Public Order Police 
The policing of service delivery protests is largely done by the Public Order Police. There 
were various name changes to the police units that are dealing with the policing of public 
order from the Riot Squads, Internal Stability Units, Public Order Policing, Area Crime 
Combating Units, and then back to Public Order Policing. The Riot Unit was established by 
the apartheid government to deal with protests and riots by the majority of people who were 
opposing the apartheid regime. These officers who are expected to do crowd management 
were once trained to combat bush wars. According to Cawthra (1992:2), the culture of 
violence was deeply entrenched in the South African Security Forces and a restructuring and 
re-orientation was needed.  
 
The Ministry of Police (2011: 2) states that the political activity of the early 1990s brought 
many challenges to the riot control units because marches and rallies were not properly 
managed. After the incidents of Sebokeng in 1990 and Daveyton in 1991 where the police 
clashed with protesters, the government realised that the role of the riot units in perpetrating 
violence had to be addressed. The police had to now confine their policing styles to be in line 
with the country’s new legislation and human rights. Training methods and policing styles 
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had to be researched from other countries to determine the best styles that suit the South 
African situation.  
 
According to the Ministry of Police (2011: 02), the policing of public protests in South Africa 
after 1994, underwent a major shift from that of the period prior to 1994 where the police 
supported by the army used force to suppress unrest that was emanating from political 
opposition. This made the police to lose the legitimacy and support in the eyes of many 
people who perceived them as the instrument of the then apartheid regime. Trait and Marks 
(2011:15) state that the policing of public protests in South Africa seemed to be headed to 
international acceptability in the mid-1990s but the ugly face of past methods of protest 
control have come to the fore in recent years. According to the Independent Police 
Investigative Directorate (IPID), there was an upsurge in police brutality since 2006, reaching 
its zenith in 2009.  Under the new legislation the Independent Police Investigative Directorate 
is mandated to investigate deaths as a result of police action, and complaints of torture and 
assault against police officials (Faull, 2011:37). 
 
1.2.7 Trend of Police Brutality during Public Protests and Measures Designed to           
          Curb it 
The re-emergence of police brutality in the policing of public protests surfaced by the recent 
killings of   Andries Tatane – a protester in Ficksburg,  and thirty four  miners who were shot 
dead by the police in Marikana (Sosibo, 2011; Pauw, 2012). Previous incidents which 
occured include the killing of a seventeen year old boy by the police who opened fire on the 
protesting crowd on the N3 near Harrismith in the Free State on 30 August 2004. In this case 
thirty seven school children were also arrested when 4 500 people took part in an illegal 
march to protest against poor service delivery (Anon, 2004).   
 
On 2
nd
 May 2012, residents of Mokwallo, in Vredefort held a protest due to the lack of 
service delivery as they were particularly unhappy with the disruption of water and 
electricity. Residents attempted to set fire to the municipal buildings in Mokwallo. At the 
same time residents of Zastron in the Southern Free State protested about poor service 
delivery that turned violent as they started looting shops owned by foreign nationals (Anon, 
2012b). More than 100 people were also arrested in Botshabelo after residents who were 
unhappy with the removal of hawkers from the shopping centre started to loot and destroy 
foreign-owned shops. Police had to help foreigners to evacuate their shops but unfortunately 
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three shops were burnt down (SAPA, 2012). Despite the atrocious effect on the affected 
people, the use of excessive force by the police during protests denies the public their 
constitutional rights to assemble, demonstrate and picket. The increase of protest incidents 
from 8 907 in 2009/10 to 12 651 in 2010/11 as indicated by the Annual Reports of the South 
African Police Service accentuates the need to look closely on how these protests are policed 
(South African Police Service, 2011:2). 
 
According to Anon (2013), South Africa has been dubbed “the protest capital of the world” 
as it has one of the highest rates of   public protest in the world. This keeps the Public Order 
Police (POP) pre-occupied with the policing of these protests for most of their time. The 
manner in which the police deals with these protests continuously place them under the 
public’s scrutiny, particularly when considering the abovementioned incidents of police 
brutality that shocked the nation. In 2002, Standing Order 262 on Crowd Management during 
gatherings and demonstrations was introduced. This was to regulate crowd management in 
accordance with the principles of the Constitution in order to focus more on a community-
orientated approach (Omar, 2006:9). 
 
Policing of crowds is now done in terms of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993. 
According to Omar (2007a:7), the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 was developed 
in response to the findings of the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry which was established in 
October 1991 to investigate and expose the background and reasons for violence and 
intimidation in South Africa. This Commission found that violence and police brutality were 
widely prevalent at mass marches and demonstrations in the early 1990s. The Commission 
recommended that citizens be accorded the right to participate in peaceful public gatherings, 
and that the role of police at these gatherings be re-assessed. Omar (2006:8) states that the 
Goldstone Commission also recommended that urgent steps be taken to prohibit the carrying 
of dangerous weapons and to improve the relationship between the police and the 
community. 
 
The Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 should be understood in the context of the 
objectives of the South African Police Service, as set out in section 205 (3) of the South 
African Constitution Act 108 of 1996. These objectives are stated as being, to prevent; 
combat and investigate crime; to maintain public order; and to protect and secure South 
Africa’s inhabitants and their property and to uphold and enforce the law. The Public Order 
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Police are trained in crowd management and they are deployed to assist local police stations 
in managing public protests in their respective jurisdictions.  
 
The competency of these members in managing crowd situations raise many concerns today 
if one considers some of the unfortunate incidents that are mentioned above. In the same 
breath, it also has to be understood that managing an angry crowd during a service-delivery 
protest cannot be easy due to the mindset of protesters. Most actions taken by the police are 
often criticised by the general public and the media, and in some instances we do not 
understand that the police have to work under considerable pressure. Some of the criticism 
and counter criticism can be detected from the following incidents: 
 Police spokesperson blamed negative media reporting on the then worsening violence 
in the public protests in Mpumalanga (Sebola, 2010);  
 The community spokesperson of Mashisheng in Mpumalanga alleged that the police 
were making the situation worse by shooting at the protesters with rubber bullets 
(Masinga, 2009:4). According to Sege (2011:2), the police were responding with 
rubber bullets because the protesters were stoning them and barricading roads with the 
burning of tyres, so their action were justified in terms of the Regulation of 
Gatherings Act No 205 of 1993.  
 
The researcher is of view that there might be cases where police used the force required to 
overcome the prevailing situation and there might also be cases where the police overstepped 
the bounds. According to Trait and Marks (2011:16), there are cases where police response to 
public protests led to an escalation of confrontation resulting in street battles. 
 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Due to the nature of their work, the police are amongst the institutions and occupations in 
which the public expects the highest confidence and trust. But Stephen (1999:3) states that 
various police studies indicate that bad manners are the frequent complaints that the citizens 
have against the police. This sentiment is also echoed by Traits and Marks (2011:15) who are 
of the view that the South African public feels that the police are lacking in various standards 
that are expected of them particularly when policing public protests.  
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According to Faull and Newham (2011) the use of paramilitary tactics like high-handedness 
in dealing with the public exacerbates the tension between the police and the public. The use 
of the high-handedness should also be understood against the high crime levels, rampant 
strikes and the increased service delivery demonstrations. Mukadam, Herzenberg and Felton 
(2012:5) state that these demonstrations and protests are largely attributed to the state of 
paralysis and dysfunctional status   of most municipalities in the country as alluded to by the 
then Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, Mr Sicelo Shiceka. 
Shiceka confirmed that many of these protests have turned violent and there are indications 
that criminals are exploiting the situation. This has also been coupled by incidents of 
xenophobia where groups of foreigners have from time-to-time seek shelter at police stations 
(Burger, 2009). 
 
It is significant to investigate the manner in which the police deal with public protests to 
determine whether there are obstacles that might make it difficult for them to handle such 
situations differently. The capability of the police to handle the protests as well as the violent 
nature of the South African protesters will be analysed.  
 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION 
Santiago (2009) states that a research question focuses   the investigation on a research topic 
and guides the research project. It helps in the design of the study, data collection, data 
analysis, and the interpretation of results. It is important that the research question is clearly 
formulated before the research is undertaken.  
 
In line with this understanding, the question that this research is designed to answer is: are 
public protests policed appropriately in the Free State? To unbundle this question, the 
researcher will investigate the use of force by the police in the policing of public protests to 
establish whether the police do comply with the principle of minimum force and the respect 
for human rights. 
 
1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Anon (2012a) states that the research objective is what needs to be achieved in a study. The 
objective is closely related to the research problem and can be broken down into specific 
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objectives which will help to answer the research question. It helps the researcher to focus on 
the study, avoid the collection of unnecessary data and to organise the study better.  
 
The main objective of this research is to determine whether the force used by the police in the 
policing of public protests is commensurate or proportional with the amount of threat and 
resistance that they encounter for them to achieve their objective of restoring order.   
 
The sub-objectives that will be used in order to assist this study to achieve its main objective 
are: 
 to investigate whether the use of force during the service delivery protest is justified;  
 to establish whether the police have  proper training to deal with protests; 
 to establish whether there are proper policy guidelines on how the police should deal 
with public protests; and  
 to determine how the policing of  protests is monitored by the police themselves. 
 
1.6   SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
According to Kothari (2009: 05), progress is born out of the inquiry that basically emanates 
from the doubt about a certain phenomenon. The inquiry to ascertain this doubt bears the 
significance of the research because it essentially indicates the value that the study will have, 
thus providing justification on why such a study should be conducted. 
 
This study could reveal the challenges of dealing with public protests and possible solutions 
that could help the police in managing these differently. The study could be a resource that 
could be useful to the public as well - by indicating how they can exercise their right to 
protest without behaving in a manner that attracts police attention which invariably curtails 
this right.  
 
1.7 DEFINTION OF CONCEPTS 
Protest: Protest is an organised public dissent or manifestation of that dissent (Hanks, 1986: 
1229). It is normally a group phenomenon where people indicate their dissatisfaction about a 
certain aspect or aspects.  
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Violent protest: Violent protest is the protest where some participants engage in physical 
acts that either cause immediate physical harm to a person or are more likely to result in such 
harm (Jain, 2010:14). 
Demonstration: A demonstration is the manifestation of grievance or support by the public 
that could be displayed in the form of rallies, protests, parades, and so forth. (Hanks, 1986: 
412).  
 
1.8 ORGANISATION OF THE DISSERTATION  
The study is laid out as follows:  
Chapter 2 to chapter 3: Literature review– Chapter 2 deals with the policing of public 
protests in other countries and Chapter 3 deals with the policing of service delivery protests 
in South Africa. 
Chapter 4: Research design and methodology – Discusses the research design, the research 
methods, the sampling, the population, the data collection methods, as well as the data 
analysis. It concludes by addressing the ethical considerations of the study, as well as 
trustworthiness of the study.  
Chapter 5: Research Findings – Presents, interprets, analyses and discusses the empirical 
and literature findings of the study. 
Chapter 6: Recommendations and Conclusion - Is the last chapter of the study. It makes 
the recommendations based on the findings of the study. Included in this chapter is the 
conclusion that gives finality to the entire study.  
 
1.9 CONCLUSION 
South Africa is going through various challenges in the policing of public protests which are 
largely influenced in recent years by the failure of the municipalities to provide residents with 
the required services. This is different from the protests that were taking place during 
apartheid which were largely caused by racial discrimination and subjugation. Recent 
incidents of police brutality in dealing with public protests is contrary to how people thought  
it will be under democracy and invokes huge public outcry on how the police are seen to be 
dealing with these protests. The new democratic government took office in 1994 and people 
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were expecting a better form of policing but the policing styles during service delivery 
protests bears remnants of the apartheid past. The Constitution that is there to protect its 
people is now being infringed upon by the state itself especially when innocent persons are 
dying at the hands of their protectors. 
 
There is a need to take a closer look at the styles that are being taught and implemented by 
the SAPS to manage these protests. We must determine whether some of these styles that the 
South African Police Service members are being trained in while incorporating various 
methods adopted from other countries,  are really effective enough to yield the required 
results in terms of catering for  imminent protests that South Africa may experience. There 
are a number of factors to consider because South Africa has its unique situation and its own 
challenges. The crux of this research is to establish whether Public Order Police members are 
being trained according to the prevailing situation in South Africa, with the ultimate aim of 
determining the gaps that might be existing. 
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CHAPTER 2: POLICING OF PUBLIC PROTESTS IN OTHER COUNTRIES 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on the policing of crowds in other countries to determine how they are 
managed during marches and protests. Closer scrutiny of this aspect  will be on the manner in 
which these situations are policed and the guidelines that the police have in doing this; 
various techniques that are used; the nature and the level of force used; the training that the 
police who do crowd management undergo; and the challenges that they face in fulfilling this 
role.   
 
According to the Chief Inspector of Constabulary (2009:11), public protests are experienced 
all over the world on a daily basis. The police as the law enforcement agency has to strike a 
sensitive balance by allowing those who protest to be able to do so freely and without any 
harm, while on the other hand they have to ensure that the rights and freedom of the general 
public are not unnecessarily curtailed by such protests - as well as preventing the destruction 
and damage to property. Police agencies in democratic countries where protests and marches 
are allowed have to be very skilled in doing this and have to abide by clear given prescribed 
guidelines. Donnelly and Scott (2005: 07) reiterate this by referring to section 17(1) of the 
Scotland Act of 1967 which states that it is the duty of the police to maintain order, prevent 
the commission of offences, and to protect life and property.  
 
2.2 THE NEED TO POLICE PROTESTS 
The police are fundamentally responsible for the maintenance of law and order in society and 
they need to ensure that every crowd disturbance or protest is policed using principles that are   
grounded in ensuring the safety and security of the protesters and the general public. This   is 
also done with the understanding that crowd disturbances or protests have the potential for 
violence. It is with this understanding that the police should approach crowd management 
situations with extreme care and sensitivity because the use of unnecessary stringent 
measures against protesters could be construed as denying them their right to protest. 
Managing crowds cannot be easy because it involves the management of the emotions that 
protesters display as well. Strickland and Taylor (2011:1), cite the Tottenham Riots that 
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began as a peaceful protest against the shooting by the police of a black male, Mark Duggan, 
but turned into a serious violent situation that needed the intervention of the army.  
 
2.2.1 Notice to Hold Gatherings and Planning 
Due to the profound implications and challenges of policing protests, King and Brearly 
(1996:01) state that planning should begin long before the actual protest. This includes 
strategic planning on crowd control, the responsibilities, training, organisation, operation 
procedures and rule of engagement. This is to ensure the safety and security of the general 
public, while on the other hand enabling those who protest to freely do so without being 
unnecessarily restrained. 
 
As detected from Narr, Toliver, Murphy, Mcfarland and Ederheimer (2006:11), a formal 
meeting need to take place with the organisers before the actual protest, and it is during this 
meeting where possible protest groups will be identified. These identified groups eventually 
form part of the planning team as well as other stakeholders who could be identified during 
this process. This helps to ensure that the planning group is as all-encompassing as possible 
for it to be able to have as much facts as possible at hand about the impending protest. This 
form of intelligence helps the planning committee to identify the intention and the tactics of 
the protesters in order to adopt a more effective and efficient policing approach. 
 
According to the Chief Inspector of Constabulary (2009:45), the Police, Public Order and 
Criminal Justice Act 2006 of Scotland require twenty eight days’ notice to hold a public 
gathering or protest. This Act also gives the local authority the powers to prohibit or impose 
conditions. The local authority has to consider the following: public safety, public order, 
safety to property, disruption of the life of the community, the risks involved and whether 
previous protest orders have been breached.  
 
In comparison, the Public Processions Act of 1998 of Northern Ireland established the 
Parades Commission which imposes conditions before granting permission to hold a 
gathering or protest. These include prohibiting a procession from entering a certain place 
whilst limiting the number of participants in a given place. Consideration is also given to the 
following: public disorder or damage to property which may result from the procession or 
protest meeting; the disruption to orderly life of the community which the procession or 
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protest may cause; the impact which the protest may have on relationships within the 
community; failure to comply with the code of conduct and the desirability of allowing a 
protest customarily held along a particular route to be held along that same route. It is 
therefore the responsibility of the police to enforce conditions made by the Parades 
Commission to ensure a peaceful protest (Chief Inspector of Constabulary, 2009:45). 
 
The Scottish and Northern Irish models are similar to that of Spain in that people who want to 
hold a protest have to give prior notice to the local Authority. A meeting is then organised 
between local authority, the organiser and the police. They then delegate a police negotiator 
who will be on the ground on the day of the event, and the organisers are properly warned of 
action that will be taken should the violence erupt. What is important here is that on the day 
of the protest the police maintain constant communication with the organisers before, during 
and after the procession (Chief Inspector of Constabulary, 2009:47). In England and Wales 
the police act as the independent body that uses its discretion to uphold the law. It does not 
rely on an arbiter but takes full responsibility in facilitating the management of protests and 
gatherings (Chief Inspector of Constabulary, 2009:45).  
 
The researcher is of the view that for the effective and efficient policing of the protests, 
countries should demand that the protesters submit well in advance the notice for such 
protest. The notice will enable the police to prepare well for the event and take care of any 
eventualities through contingency planning, assisted by the organisers and local authorities. 
Proper planning is essential to ensure that the police maintain public peace during such event 
while at the same time upholding the rights of citizens who are at times emotional about the 
disruptive nature of the protests when it affects their normal routine.  
 
2.3 TRAINING FOR PUBLIC ORDER POLICING  
Most police agencies around the world are trained in the baton and shield as well as vehicle 
and foot movements for the purpose of maintaining public order. Police should be specialists 
in this field as they undergo various training styles. A protest action can turn ugly if police 
lose focus and they take actions based on individual decisions. The reason for the police to 
lose focus and act in an uncoordinated manner could be a lack of training or not undergoing 
continuous refresher courses. Training in a coordinated manner helps the police to understand 
one another as well as the unit commander, during the execution of their tasks.  
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Narr et al (2006:23) state that when performing duties for mass demonstrations, it is of 
paramount importance that all agencies act in concert. This stresses the importance of pre-
event training for all police agencies that will be involved in the policing of the protest on 
aspects such as squad formation, response techniques, mass movement exercises, protester 
extraction methods and other field exercises. The training should also include supervisory 
roles and responsibilities and these include taking control of the situation, evaluating and 
decision-making. Joint exercises with the other agencies are also important to familiarise 
everyone with the methods of approach during mass gatherings.  
 
It is therefore the view of the researcher that as much as the police are trained, it would not 
help if there are no persons to give direction. Unlike most training exercises that police 
undergo, commanders are given separate training from their subordinates, whereas in public 
order training exercises the commander is given training with his/her members. The reason 
for this is that commanders in the execution of their duties need to give the proper command 
so that members act in concert, and in doing so display professionalism. Waddington 
(1991:325) states that the commanders undergo most of these courses in order to appreciate 
the tactics used by their members. This makes commanders to spend most of the time with 
their members because the training for crowd management duties needs a lot of time and 
practice. The trainees need to rehearse movements and techniques a number of times in order 
for them to be responsive and at the same time be professional. The following Free Trade 
Event and the Democratic Convention in America are good examples of early preparation for 
any eventualities. 
 
According to Narr et al (2006:24), the training for the 2003 Free Trade Area of America took 
place a year in advance, where various plans were tested. Two weeks prior 167 
representatives who were part of the event were brought in to perform table-top exercises in 
order to test their capability in addressing threat incidents. The rules of engagement and legal 
training were given to ensure everyone has a common understanding. Training included the 
following: discipline, group action, demonstrator tactics, protection of first amendment rights, 
rapid deployment, line formations, verbal and hand commands, squad movements, equipment 
familiarity, arrest technique and use of the baton. 
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The Boston Police Department had eighteen months to prepare for the Democratic National 
Convention.  Based on the anticipated size of the event it was planned that six to eight public- 
order platoons comprising of 100-150 officers - who were also reinforced by the 
Massachusetts police - should be ready for this event. These teams were well-trained for this 
event. In the end the event went well without any disastrous effect (Narr et al., 2006:24). 
 
One gets the sense that in most cases the training of the Public Order Policing is taken 
seriously as most countries have special training camps for this purpose. This is the training 
that normally takes place in special training camps where there are prototype models of 
streets and buildings. The environment of this nature simulates the realisation of real-life 
situations.    
 
King and Brearley (1996:93) state that the training methods in different metropolitan regions 
in the United Kingdom vary. Most cities do run a number of training courses in Public Order 
Policing at their training units such as the one in Hounslow, London. The Kent County 
training ranges from the Silver and Bronze Commander’s course and a public awareness 
course, to a police support unit commander’s course and Public Order Training for junior 
officers. 
 
Waddington (1991:323) describes the training camp layout in Hounslow which comprises of 
streets, buildings, shops, residential layouts and pedestrian-only passages, with an aim to 
present officers with various situations that they might encounter. During training exercises 
officers are exposed to similar conditions as they would encounter on the field when missiles 
and fire bombs are thrown at them. Wood is used instead of bricks in order to prevent 
injuries. Fire bombs are used but only under controlled conditions with the aim of achieving 
the training objective. This helps to perfect the shield tactics. 
 
The researcher supports this type of training because it covers most of the real-life situations. 
The layout of the training ground and the debris normally thrown at the police is very similar 
to that of what is encountered on the ground. However, the layout of the streets will differ in 
some countries especially concerning those protests that take place in an open environment. 
No matter how intense and close to the reality the training could be, one should not underplay 
the unforeseen and emotionally-charged challenges that they will experience in real life. 
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Although one can argue that the British police are well trained to deal with public protests, 
they also face criticisms in the actual manner in which they deal with the protests as indicated 
by the Scarman Commission of Enquiry that is dealt with below. 
 
The Scarman Inquiry that was appointed by the Home Secretary to investigate the serious 
disorder which occurred in Brixton (South-East London) between 10 and 12 April 1981, 
made the following recommendations to change the policing of protests (King & Brearly, 
1996:54-57):  
 Properly trained and well equipped officers must be available for rapid deployment. 
This could be achieved by ensuring that there is a large number of trained police 
officials;  
 More effective protective equipment such as better helmets, fireproof clothing and 
lighter shields should be made available to police officers;  
 The types of vehicle that the police use should have some form of protection from 
missiles; and  
 There should be improved communication between officers and operational 
commanders, and the police tactics during public disorders should be reviewed. 
 
There are three levels of training that the British police undergo as explained in Waddington 
(1991:323). The basic familiarisation, called shield training is initially given to recruits to 
familiarise them with the handling of the shield and this takes about two days. The Broadway 
serials are conducted for two days annually and emphasis is placed on basic long-shield 
tactics, but these officers are also given training on short-shield manoeuvres. The territorial 
short group officers undergo a more intense training. These officers train at least one day a 
month on how to respond to civil disorder and how to respond to complicated situations. The 
baton gunners are required to train at least four times a year. Their aim is to fire at their 
targets whilst avoiding shooting innocent persons. Videotapes of actual riots scattered with 
burning cars and debris are played on a large screen giving the effect of a real-life situation 
presently taking place. The officers are then given the opportunity to take cover at various 
points and fire at the screen (a kind of real-life simulation). The video is then stopped in order 
to assess the officers on their accuracy. 
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2.4 CROWD POLICING TACTICS 
As indicated earlier the policing of protests are executed by police with specialised training 
due to the propensity of these protests to violence and loss of life. This emphasises the need 
for the police to continuously evaluate the effectiveness of the techniques that they are using. 
The researcher will now draw comparisons to the tactics used by different countries and how 
they have been implemented.  
 
By utilising appropriate tactics the police can outwit the protesters and counteract any threats 
that they might encounter. The police can also use tactics in order to accomplish a desired 
objective, like pushback, dispersal and the execution of arrests. In 2009 a report by Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) gave comparisons of the different policing 
styles and tactics that are used in other countries (Chief Inspector of Constabulary, 2009: 42). 
The United States of America, Germany and Sweden use the coercive style whereas France 
and Spain do not. The United States of America, France, Canada and Sweden use 
negotiations whereas Germany and Spain do not. Notably, in most of these countries the 
“Ring of Steel” method which is a high wire fence that encircles the perimeter of the target 
which the police intend protecting is used.  
 
All of these countries use no protest zones in order to control space by placing a barrier 
between protesters and the police. This give police the psychological advantage over the 
protesters although some may argue that this could create tensions. The above findings reveal 
that the police level of tolerance impact both on the police tactics and rights of individuals to 
protest. The majority of these countries use the style of strategic incapacitation, creating an 
obstacle to participation in demonstration. A comparative review shows that none of the 
above jurisdictions is fully resolving the challenges of the large-scale protests. The British 
model therefore stand out for its flexibility and accountability in policing protests (Chief 
Inspector of Constabulary, 2009: 42). 
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Chief Inspector of Constabulary (2009: 40) indicates the following tactics that are used in 
different countries:  
Description of Tactic Country in which used 
Negotiated Management - cooperation and 
communication between police and protesters 
USA, France, Canada & Sweden 
Level of force determined by level of threat assessed USA, Germany, Canada & 
Sweden 
Ring of Steel Method - this is a high wire fence which 
encircles the perimeter of the target that the police 
intend protecting 
USA, Germany, France, Spain, 
Canada & Sweden 
No Protest zones - these areas are close to the protest 
site and are protected by the police  as being off limits to 
protesters 
USA, France, Germany, Spain, 
Canada, Sweden 
Containment - this tactic is used to keep protesters in a 
confined area for long periods of time. The protesters 
are not permitted to leave this area or the numbers 
leaving are restricted 
USA, France, Germany, Spain, 
Canada & Sweden 
Pre-emptive arrest - ring leaders or other troublesome 
protesters are arrested at an early point to prevent their 
further participation in the protest  
USA, Spain, Canada & Sweden 
Dispersal - is a tactic designed to move protesters away 
from a certain area in order to break up the protest group 
USA, France, Germany, Spain & 
Sweden  
Border Control - is used to prevent individuals and 
groups from entering another country 
USA, France, Germany, Spain, 
Canada & Sweden 
Zero tolerance – this method is used where police 
respond to every minor incident 
USA, France, Germany, Canada & 
Sweden 
 
2.4.1 Communication 
Communication is an important element used in modern day policing, when considering 
upholding the rights of citizens. With the latest technologies, police have the opportunity to 
make use of instant communication. At the same time police must also be wary that instant 
communication places the police under scrutiny. It is therefore recommended that the police 
use this form of communication properly to reach their target community so that the 
community understand the police better. The police communication with the crowd is vital in 
a sense that the police must inform the crowd about how they are going to facilitate the 
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legitimate aims, and how any illegitimate aims will impede the set objectives (Masterson, 
2012:01). 
 
According to Masterson (2012:2), police management in Vancouver recognised the success 
of the British “meet and greet” method when it came to the management of crowds. The 
trainers from Vancouver were sent to study the model which was subsequently implemented 
for the 2010 Winter Olympics. Instead of deploying the riot police in menacing gear, officers 
in standard police uniform engaged the crowds. They shook hands with the people and 
assured them of their safety. This creates a psychological bond and leads the crowd to believe 
that the police are on their side and therefore they cooperate with them. 
 
The Madison Method is a method that protects the public’s right to free speech and assembly 
and ensures that these rights are not infringed during a protest. It has been evident from the 
Los Angeles Police Department’s (LAPD) approach during the Occupy Los Angeles 
gathering that the police response is gradual. The police officers’   objective is to facilitate a 
peaceful event after which the dispersal order is given and then arresting those refusing to 
comply. Officers are encouraged to use constructive engagement which is the soft approach 
as referred to by the British Law Enforcement Agency (Masterson 2012:3). 
 
King and Brearley (1996: 92) are of the view that it is important for the local police 
commander to be hands-on concerning the activities of the community, who sometimes vent 
their anger and discontent through protest action. In so doing the local police commander 
ensures the safety of the protesters and the public. In order to avoid tensions and riots, there 
should be a joint police and community initiative to mediate (King & Brearley, 1996: 16). 
 
Research found that the use of dialogue by the police in Sweden had remarkable success 
during public order policing. More countries are adopting this form of approach, which 
involves communication with the crowds at all times as constant communication yields better 
cooperation (Chief Inspector of Constabulary, 2009: 74). 
 
Dialogue Police: According to Chief Inspector of Constabulary (2009:74), Sweden 
developed a new method of communication called “Dialogue Police” in 2001.  This is the 
method that is responsible for communication link between the protesters and the police 
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commanders with the goal of facilitating protester’s intentions, avoiding public disorder and 
confrontation. It is used before, during and after the event. This communication style 
emanated from the incident that took place in Gothenburg in June 2001, in which a crowd of 
25 000 persons were part of a protest. During the violence 459 persons were arrested and 150 
persons including 50 police officers were hospitalised. The report of the inquiry that was held 
subsequent to this protest emphasised the importance of dialogue, which ultimately became 
the national concept in the policing of protests.   
 
Advantages of Dialogue Police: The core function of the dialogue police is to negotiate as 
this helps to facilitate the goals and objectives of both the police and the protesters. It 
involves mediation by avoiding stereotyping, by way of explaining the police point of view to 
the demonstrators and the demonstrators’ view to the police. In this way it increases mutual 
understanding. The dialogue police also find a possible solution through initiation, in order to 
avoid or minimise the risk for conflicts and confrontations. Communication is enhanced by 
this way due to the exchange of information between commanders and demonstrators -  like 
sensing the mood of the demonstrators and informing commanders accordingly (Chief 
Inspector of Constabulary, 2009:75). According to Menzies (2012:09), for the purposes of 
dialogue policing, individuals must possess good communication skills and be able to deal 
with individuals face-to-face in an open and honest manner but at the same time the member 
must have knowledge of Public Order Policing. 
 
Phases of the Dialogue Police: According to Menzies (2012:09), Dialogue Police was built 
on a concept of dialogue, de-escalation and non-confrontation, which allowed for a more 
dynamic approach to crowd management that includes pre-event prevention and de-escalation 
of conflict. It is imperative that this form of communication be used from the very beginning 
until the end when information is received for an event or protest action. This enables the 
police to act on early warning signals and also look at any good practices and shortcomings 
after the event.  
 
Menzies (2012:09) states that the dialogue police is mainly used in the following three 
circumstances: Pre-event dialogue - where police know what to expect and puts preventative 
measure in place. They allow the police to put restrictions on the event and facilitate 
legitimate objectives; during event dialogue - communication is enhanced between the police 
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and the protesting group. The dialogue police do not wear uniform but identifiable vests, and 
they are close to the protesters where they can sense the mood of the protesters and keep 
police informed. At the same time they can inform the protesters better of their possible 
actions; and after event dialogue - reviews the event between police and protesters. They can 
identify where the police have looked more provocative. This also allows officers to express 
the difficulties experienced.  
 
According to Menzies (2012: 06), the Joint Committee on Human Rights published its report 
in 2009 expressing its views on the protest indicating factors that the police and protesters 
need to focus on improving dialogue. The fact that was emphasised in this report is that the 
police should aim for “no surprise policing” ’, no surprise for the police, no surprise for the 
protesters, and no surprise for the protest targets. They should also review how they foster 
effective dialogue with protesters.  
 
The researcher is of the view that for the police to command respect the public needs to be 
respected and this form of communication can go a long way in achieving this. When 
properly used, the dialogue police can avoid police and protester confrontations as it creates 
rapport between the police and the protesters. Disorder can be avoided through mediation and 
the police very easily win the trust of the protesters hence they will co-operate with the 
police. Although Dialogue Police does not necessarily prevent violence, it can certainly 
reduce it and have positive effects.  
 
2.4.2 Role of the Media  
According to Narr et al (2006:11), a media strategy also needs to be put in place where the 
public is kept informed about the intentions of the police so that the public can understand the 
reasons for the police actions. If the media as the major source of information to the public 
does not have the correct information, it could publish distorted information that could 
mislead the public. Leggett (2003:11) states that general surveys indicate that there is 
prejudice against the police which may be informed by media reports. The police therefore 
have to develop a better media strategy and be tactful when reporting incidents of protests 
and how they are dealing with them.  
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According to Narr et al (2006:64), it is very important for the police to have a media strategy 
where they keep the public informed. It will also be advisable that the police meet with the 
media prior to any event and have a press briefing. This will inform the public that the police 
are ready to police the event and assure the public’s safety as this could also deter people 
with criminal intentions. The Boston Police Department initiated a media subcommittee for 
the 2004 Democratic National Convention a year in advance. This committee was 
spearheaded by the Boston police and the Secret Service and shared the information with the 
media and all stakeholders on this event. The Police Public Information Officer - who is the 
communication line between the police and media – was also used. This led to the 
communication of better information to the public on the current situation such as  the place, 
date and time of the event; the possible routes to avoid; and the briefing about the police 
actions if the law is broken. This process eliminates media and public criticism.  
 
Narr et al (2006:65) attribute the success of the Democratic National Convention to the 
extensive system that was in place to deal with this, such as the following: a  Joint 
Information Centre that was situated inside the police headquarters which had fourteen  
representatives from  various agencies who  were deployed from 08:00 to midnight; and a   
large screen that was set up in the Joint Information Centre to monitor specific incidents like 
protests as it had cameras that were placed at strategic points. This enabled operational 
commanders to view live feeds of the Democratic National Convention from Massachusetts 
State Helicopters.    
 
Narr et al (2006:67) states that the monitoring of a similar nature was also done during the 
Free Trade Area of America by the Miami Police Department that arranged with the US 
Coast Guard to be given access to a computer programme through which they posted news 
updates. This revealed the information about the protesters and their location. Due to the fact 
that the police could also face criticism after the event if people are not informed that the 
situation has now been dealt with and normality has returned to the area, it is important that 
the media is also used after the event as this restores calm to the public. This information 
facilitates normality; for example, the streets that were once inaccessible, are now open (Narr 
et al., 2006:68). 
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2.5 EQUIPMENT FOR POLICING PROTESTS 
The use of the right type of equipment is essential in crowd management situations as riot 
control equipment has evolved over the years. Due to the police treatment of crowds and 
questions being raised from Human Rights groups, the police had to move away from using 
more brutal equipment (Kenny, Mcphail, Waddington, Heal, Ijames, Farrer, Taylor & 
Odenthal, 2001:32). More non-lethal equipment that resonates with minimal use of force 
should be used rather than lethal weapons that could result in serious injuries and deaths.  
 
The type of the equipment used by the police tends to be similar worldwide and this could be 
attributed to the perceived effectiveness of the equipment and the fact that the type and nature 
of crowds also happen to be the same internationally. A study conducted by the Omega 
Foundation (2000:iv) found that at least 110 countries worldwide deploy riot control weapons 
such as chemical irritants, kinetic energy weapons, water cannons and electric shock devices. 
 
The common equipment used by most countries as indicated in Waddington (1991:399) are 
armoured vehicles with reinforced glass protected by mesh wire which is suitable for most 
crowd management situations, especially with a volatile crowd and it can also be used for 
storing crowd management equipment which can be used when the need arises. Horses, due 
their strength, play a much greater role in the management of crowds as they can be used to 
charge forward with the aim of dispersing the crowd. Their height makes police officers to 
have a better view of the crowd. The use of reinforced helmet and shield with a visor protects 
the police officer when thrown at   with missiles. According to Waddington (1991:157), the 
shields that are used protect from head to toe, does not give protection from the sides; hence 
the police need to move tactfully in order to protect members from being attacked by 
protesters from the sides. 
 
The police should also be wary in the manner they approach a crowd management situation 
and the equipment that they use during demonstrations. It may seem at times that the police 
are going to war, due to the manner in which they are dressed and armed. Although the 
Robocop image serves as a deterrent and maintains public confidence in the ability of the 
police to deal with the situation, it can also have a negative effect when the media and public 
view it as the police who use heavy-handed tactics, more especially when it is a peaceful 
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demonstration. Thus in these situations the public will have a different perception of the 
police and would probably react more defensively (Narr et al., 2006:58). 
 
Stun grenades are generally used in hostage situations, but several states including Poland 
and Russia use them to terrify protesters:  this is a softening tactic used before the actual riot 
tactic (Omega Foundation, 2000: xxv). The researcher is of the view that although effective 
in a crowd management situation, stun grenades should be used with caution because the loud 
blast can cause temporary loss of hearing and it also disturbs fluid in the ear causing loss of 
balance exacerbated by temporarily disturbing one’s vision. Therefore, the possibility of old 
persons or children being part of the protest should be taken into consideration. 
 
King and Brearley (1996:94-96) also indicate that most countries prefer to use the long arm 
baton as compared to the short arm baton used by the police in the United States, arguing that 
the short arm baton is preferred more for personal protection. Firearms are generally not 
utilised in England and Wales, but only used in armed response vehicles in special 
circumstances. Gas and sprays are used to disperse crowds or ward off individuals, but this 
was found to be harmful to patients with asthma and those who are pregnant. Armadillo 
shields that are utilised have corrugated edges that can form a link with other shields so that 
they can be effectively used to push back crowds, whereas the round shields are used for 
arrest purposes. In addition to this, flame-resistant clothing and NATO-style helmets with 
visors and bullet resistant vests are also commonly used.  
 
The police need to have constant training in the use of different equipment so that they can be 
able to use them effectively and efficiently when the need arises. The emphasis should 
always be the appropriateness of the instrument to counteract the prevailing situation 
grounded in the principle of minimum force. The misuse or excessive use of any equipment 
during the policing of protests could be interpreted as abuse of police powers. 
 
As previously indicated that different countries use different tactics and equipment based on 
their prevailing situation, the assessment of the appropriateness of the tactics and equipment 
used is also based on the prevailing situation. That is why, for example, the media is now and 
again lambasting the highhandedness that the Israeli forces are seen to be using when dealing 
with the Palestinian protesters in the occupied West Bank. Michaeli (2013:05) states that 
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although the forces are guided by a gradual response to a situation, the misuse of weapons by 
the Israeli forces, in particular the use of rubber-coated metal bullets, result in the deaths of 
many protesters. The Israeli forces are expected to use different stages in their approach. The 
level 3 stage includes the use of batons, mounted police, then water cannons; and the level 4 
stage involves   the use of water cannons, tear gas, then stun grenades, then the firing of 
warning shots into the air, and as a last resort the firing of rubber-coated bullets are permitted. 
 
According to Newham, Dissel and Lodge (2010:11), military style policing differs from the 
concept of democratic policing which is orientated towards upholding human rights.  When 
comparing the types of equipment used by Britain and the USA, one notices a vast difference 
as compared to the ones used by Israeli forces more especially on the West Bank. One may 
also argue that the challenges faced by the Israelis are different from that of most developed 
countries. 
 
Michaeli (2013:13- 49) indicates the types of heavy-handed weapons used by giving an 
example of the following: a  venom system mounted on a jeep that has three 10 barrel 
groupings that fires aluminium canisters (salvos) within a  radius of 100 metres which creates 
a thick cloud of smoke that is intended to disperse demonstrators;  special extended tear-gas 
grenades that result in serious injuries to demonstrators due to its high velocity and weight, 
combined with the unlawful practice of firing directly at protesters. Live ammunition used in 
the West Bank is prohibited and only permitted to be used in the event of extreme danger. 
The Rugger Rifle that can fire two-two bullets is a sports rifle used by snipers and it can be 
very lethal when fired at the demonstrators. The skunk and water cannon is composed of 
water, yeast and sodium bicarbonate (baking soda) which exposes demonstrators to heavy 
odour and can cause pain, redness in the eye and skin irritation. The sponge rounds which 
were introduced after the banning of metal-coated rounds is highly accurate and can be fired 
directly at agitators within the crowd. The scream is a long range acoustic device which acts 
as a loudspeaker that can cause pain and discomfort to demonstrators with unprotected ears, 
which results in the demonstrators naturally moving away. The laser gun is like a handgun 
that fires two dart-shaped electrodes within a distance of eight metres and dislodges an 
electric pulse that can cause temporary paralysis and pain. According to Michaeli (2013), 
security forces who use these weapons unlawfully are backed by their senior officers, stating 
that this violation is often ignored by the local law enforcement authorities. 
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According to the Omega Foundation (2000: xi) the wedges, shields, batons, horses and riot 
weapons are used by the GrenzShutzGruppe in Germany, the Caribiniere  in Italy, the 
Gendamerie in France, the special patrols and tactical groups in the UK and the FBI in USA. 
Their tactical training is a mirror image of their military counterparts. The Heckler and Koch 
riot gun was used by Northern Ireland. This weapon has front and rear sights for different 
ranges and its cause of injury when correctly used is debatable. The electric batons used in 
Tembisa, South Africa in 1996 for crowd control purposes led to sixteen railway passengers 
being crushed to death in ensuing panic. The use of these batons was thereafter banned. The 
Swedish authorities rejected the use of OC (pepper spray) because of its potential for causing 
eye damage. Evidence of human rights violation in the use of handheld electro-shock 
weapons was  noted in countries like Austria, Bulgaria, China, Egypt, Russia, Greece, and 
South Africa,  to name a few. Chinese police do not carry firearms, as gun-related crime is 
rare in China. 
 
Boring (2014:60-75) further indicates that the police in Netherlands are equipped with 
truncheon, pepper spray, long electric baton, smoke and stun grenades. While New Zealand 
police are equipped with armoured vehicles, OC sprays, taser, batons, tear gas, stun grenades 
and sponge rounds.  Russian police make use of  rubber batons, teargas, paint dispenses, 
sound and light as a means of distraction, shot guns and water throwing cannons for the 
policing of crowds.  
 
It is noted that in most countries the types of equipment like the shield baton and pepper 
spray are the familiar crowd management equipment. However, these countries may differ in 
the use of other types of weapons, like in China where no firearms are carried. There are 
differences - the use of electric shock weapons in some countries and the use of heavy-
handed weapons like in Israel. The researcher is of the view that although these countries use 
these weapons in accordance with the threats that they may experience, these weapons should 
only be used when the real need arises. They should be used as per situational 
appropriateness and within the ambits of the law. 
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2.6 USE OF FORCE 
The police are tasked with the maintenance of law and order in the country and to this end 
they are empowered to use force. The use of force during protests has been scrutinised by 
many sectors including the public, media and human rights groups and at times the 
politicians. Little attention is given to the fact that the police are placed in difficult 
circumstances more so during a volatile situation. This volatile situation gives the police little 
time to think and decide on the proportional force to be used. Some police officers are of the 
view that the manner in which the police deal with protests will always be questioned and 
criticised  by people who do not understand the challenges and pressures that the police had 
to deal with in the policing of protests. The statement often expressed by police officials in 
this regard is, “When we act we are criticised and when we don’t act we are still criticised.” 
 
To indicate the need to monitor the use of force, Thompson (2011:08) makes reference to the 
Rodney King incident indicating that there is lack of information on the use of force and that 
constant monitoring will determine why police use excessive force. The use of force by the 
police is one of the reasons that makes police actions to attract media attention and they get 
broadcasted all around the world - this is something that the police should be wary of.  Police 
should also be careful of the fact that the crowd could provoke violence in order to attract 
media attention to their course. Kenny et al (2001:23) are of the view that crowd situations 
are unpredictable and confrontations should be avoided, because it can cause crowd 
resistance. It is recommended that the law enforcement agencies should help crowds 
accomplish their goals within the law for the sake of avoiding confrontation. 
 
According to the Chief Inspector of Constabulary (2009: 32), the police have the authority to 
use force under certain circumstances but the use of force must be in proportion to the 
prevailing threat. It has to be acknowledged that when police use excessive force it 
undermines the legitimacy of the police action and therefore reduces the public’s confidence 
in the police. This emphasises the need for the police to understand the use of force and what 
is expected of them during protests while taking into account the rights of the public and the 
protesters.  
 
According to Strickland and Taylor (2011:04), the police may use such force as is reasonable 
under the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting arrest of offenders. In 
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support of the above the author also makes reference to Chapter 42 of the Human Rights Act 
of 1998 of the United Kingdom and the European Convention on Human Rights that are 
taken into consideration when determining the lawfulness of police action.   
 
A profound implication in the use of force is exemplified by a classic example   of   crowd 
management that emanated out of the G20 Summit. Following the G20 Summit, the 
Independent Police Commission received 283 complaints, 136 being the alleged use of 
excessive force. One of the complainants, a 23 year old woman who attended the Climate 
Camp at Bishopsgate on April 2009 who was kicked and struck with shields and batons 
without warning suffered a miscarriage. Based on the findings of the investigation it was 
concluded that the metropolitan police should review their training and their policing styles 
(Chief Inspector of Constabulary, 2009: 110). 
 
Menzies (2012:05) indicates that crowd behaviour at times tends to be influenced by the 
manner in which they are being policed because when police obstruct the crowd’s right to 
protest the crowd can unite in a more aggressive way towards the police. This can in turn lead 
to the use of excessive force by the police. Proper training of the police that deals with crowd 
management will enable them to read the situation correctly and respond in a way that will 
not exacerbate the situation. 
 
Police should also effect arrest with caution as mass arrest is also a form of excessive force 
that could be employed by the police and if not use cautiously it could expose the police to 
civil claims. A typical example being the mass arrest of people in Washington D.C and New 
York City in 2004 where innocent bystanders were rounded up by the police during their 
broad sweeps. Only a few of them were found guilty and prosecuted but those who were 
wrongfully arrested instituted claims against the police (Narr et al., 2006:55). Police in 
Estonia were not accused of excessive force when they fired rubber bullets and water cannons 
at hundreds of protesters in a mass rally in 2007 where three hundred people were arrested 
whilst ten people suffered minor injuries (Boring, 2014:37). The use of live ammunition is 
not allowed in most countries during the management of a protest action. This is a sign of 
excessive force and when used it is often criticised by human rights groups, the general 
public and the media. Live ammunition is mostly used in certain circumstances, like self-
defence due to imminent danger. 
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According to Boring (2014:05) police are required to give a warning before using a firearm, 
except if there is no time and when giving such warning might result in serious or dangerous 
consequences. Most countries use force in proportion to the threat. In countries such as 
Brazil, France and Spain officers may use firearms in self-defence, or in the defence   of 
others but in proportion to the threat, whilst Australia allows deadly force in this case. 
Strickland and Taylor (2011:06) state that the army used Attenuating Energy Projectiles in 
Northern Ireland in 2006 and this raised human rights concerns. It was recommended that 
these rounds can only be used in the case of protecting one’s life when in danger.  
 
According to Boring (2014:45), Greek police may use a firearm to instil fear amongst crowds 
by firing warning shots. The use of firearm is permitted when measures such as warnings, 
barriers, physical force, batons or permitted chemical weapons have been exhausted. The 
Greek police were accused of human rights violations after their action resulted in the 
shooting of a fifteen year old girl in the 2008 demonstrations. They were also accused of 
wearing their identification on the back of the helmet instead of the front which is expected 
by law.  
 
In light of the above, King and Brearly (1996:29) stress that the police should refrain from 
taking a conditional attitude towards violence by threatening the crowd with weapons and 
force. Like in the case of Israel as expressed in Boring (2014:52), the firing of live 
ammunition into the air is prohibited unless authorised by the Inspector General who is in 
charge of the police.  
 
Narr et al (2006:56) state that the Miami Police Department use the pepper ball round as a 
less lethal force against individuals disturbing the peace. The pepper ball is designed to strike 
the target and deliver an irritating blast of pepper spray which temporarily hampers the 
target’s breathing and vision without causing long-term negative effects. In Boston it was 
reported that police fired a plastic, pepperspray-filled projectile that killed a young woman in 
2005. This FN303 is a firing device that is designed in such a manner that it avoids causing 
bodily injury if used properly. This young woman was killed when she was unintentionally 
struck in the eye due to the negligence of the police.  This emphasises the need for more 
police training in this regard. 
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Her Majesty Inspectorate of Constabulary (2011:117) made the following recommendations 
on the use of force: When carrying out their duties the police should have a nonviolent 
approach; force should only be used when necessary, that is after all other methods of 
maintaining law and order have failed; use of force should be minimal  and appropriate; 
lethal force may be used when it’s absolutely necessary to protect lives; operations should be 
planned and coordinated in a manner that the lethal force does not become an option; and 
lastly, individual members must be able to justify their action when using force. 
 
It is the view of the researcher that although these countries are aware of the policies that are 
in place and the level of force that needs to be used, it may happen that in some cases the 
level of force is unavoidable. As much as critics have the time to digest and criticise the 
actions of the police, one can argue that when the police are placed under difficult 
circumstances they only have seconds to make a decision which they might later regret. The 
researcher would therefore suggest that in order to avoid a difficult situation resulting in the 
excessive use of force in crowd management, better planning, and better communication with 
role players - more importantly the convenor - as a form of progressive dialogue, is 
paramount. 
 
2.7 AN OVERVIEW ON THE POLICING OF CROWDS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES 
Douglas (2004:31) highlights that most democratic countries are signatory to the 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights that provides a degree of protection to 
demonstrators and protesters. Article 21 of the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights (United Nations, 1966:178) protects freedom of assembly, where no 
restrictions are placed on the exercise of these rights other than those imposed in conformity 
with the law, national security, public safety, and public order which should be taken into 
consideration. This is complemented by Article 19 (2) of the same Convention that protects 
freedom of expression which is only restricted by the respect for the rights and reputation of 
others.  
 
Police agencies of different countries use different methods of dealing with protests or 
crowds. According to Masterson (2012:04), the Stockholm police in Sweden use high 
visibility and identifiable dialogue, while the Boise Police Department in the United States of 
America uses a fully equipped tactical approach with police deployed out of sight but close to 
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the demonstrations and only engage them  when the need arises. This is based on their view 
that soft policing tactics are effective in the policing of crowds. Hamilton, Jarmin, and Bryan 
(2001:49) state that the introduction of the Public Processions Act of 1998 in Northern 
Ireland removed the power of the police to re-route or impose conditions on parades. But the 
police are still able to strike a balance between the public’s rights to protests and the 
maintenance of social order.  
 
Trait and Marks (2011:18) state that the Belgium style of policing crowds was introduced to 
South Africa in 1994. The Belgium style focuses more on management of crowds where 
minimal force is used and negotiations with conveners are embarked upon. More tolerance 
had to be demonstrated and the Shield and Tonfa (Baton) are the primary equipment for 
managing these crowds. Subsequently the French Model of Public Order Police was 
introduced to the South African Police Service in 2011 (Trait & Marks, 2011:19). The 
Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup could have been the 
main reason for the introduction of this style to the South African Police Service. This style 
involves closer contact between the police and the participants which makes the restraining of 
perpetrators within the crowd easier and effective. This style that involves confining the 
crowd in a certain direction and space was criticised by the communities in France because of 
the tendency for the Gendamaries to resort to strong-arm tactics. 
 
The researcher’s contention about this style of policing is that it is more suitable to urban 
situations unlike in open areas where it becomes difficult to confine the crowd. The Marikana 
incident where the protesting workers were in an open field on the hill when thirty four of 
them were shot and killed serves as a typical example of strong-arm police tactics in South 
Africa.  
 
There were jurisdictions in countries like Canada, Germany, Spain and the USA where the 
approach of strategic incapacitation was adopted by creating obstacles preventing persons 
from freely demonstrating. It was only more recently that a negotiated approach was taken. 
The British police are criticised for their robust tactics but at times have shown the negotiated 
approach during some of the events that they have policed. The in-depth discussion to unpack 
the policing of crowds in different countries will now be dealt with. 
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2.7.1 The Policing of Crowds in the United Kingdom 
The Chief Inspector of Constabulary (2009:5) states that the British approach in dealing with 
public protests is that of having tolerance in order to win the confidence of the public by 
mediation. This model is attributed to Sir Robert Peel’s assertion that the police should be 
approachable, impartial, and accountable. They deploy a number of police officers on the 
streets as a deterrent with the intention of using minimum force. This method is used to avoid 
the crowd dominating the police, which could lead to looting, arson and violent attacks. The 
shortcomings experienced by the British police when dealing with disorders during the 
Birmingham Riots included insufficient training and equipment. This insufficiency of   
Forces in England and Wales were exposed when it was found that they did not have water 
cannons; their vehicles were not fitted with reinforced glass, steel grills or run-flat tyres with 
which they could drive over sharp objects like glass (Her Majesty Inspectorate of 
Constabulary, 2011:5). 
 
Gilbert and Jones (2011) cite Constable Chris who expressed his experience on the policing 
of the Birmingham Riots of 2011 as follows: “It was chaos followed by the looters running 
and dispersing like rats. We were easily outnumbered. There was an air of unease after the 
mention of the shooting in the crowd.” This indicates the importance of the number of police 
officers that are deployed in crowd management. 
 
Masterson (2012:03) mentions the two theories on crime reduction that emanated from a 
research conducted on hooliganism at British soccer games; namely - Elaborated Social 
Identity Model and Procedural Justice Theory. The Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) 
refers to the escalation of crowd violence where people think that the police are treating them 
unfairly. The Procedural Justice Theory (PSJ) on the other hand, refers to where the crowd 
observe the law because they feel that the police are acting justly and legitimately. This 
indicates that when police officers act with legitimacy, disorders become less likely because 
people trust the officers and support the law enforcement.  
 
The United Kingdom is comprised of England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales and it 
introduced its first Public Order Police Act in 1936 when violent clashes took place between 
the fascist and the anti-fascist protesters. Although its history of riots dates back to 1208 
when some events led to the use of force by the police which was often criticised thus 
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creating enormous challenges to the police. Some of the riots that the United Kingdom had to 
deal with recently included the Trafalgar Square- Poll Tax riots of March 1990, London riots 
on  May Day  2000, and London, Birmingham, Nottingham, Liverpool, Bristol and West 
Midlands Riots of August 2011 (Chief Inspector of Constabulary, 2009: 27). 
 
Strickland and Taylor (2011:8-9) state that the breach of peace – that is often referred to as 
Queen’s Peace – led  to the arrest of the protesters as the police have powers to act when 
these offences are committed. Chapter 64 of the Public Order Act of 1986 and Chapter 38 
Section 30 of the Anti-Social Behaviour Act of 2003 give the police powers to disperse 
groups or confine them to a designated area when they believe (on reasonable grounds) that 
members of the public are being intimidated, harassed, alarmed or distressed by such groups. 
The police are required to be circumspect in dealing with the protesters to ensure that they 
strike a balance between the rights of the protesters to protest on the one hand, and the right 
to public safety on the other hand. According to the Chief Inspector of Constabulary (2009: 
29), they should do this by being approachable, impartial, accountable and adhering to the 
principle of the use of minimal force. Considerable discretion should be used to demonstrate 
impartiality and the upholding of the rule of law.  
 
Tolerance of minor infringements during the policing of protests, at times leads to a better 
understanding between the police and protesters.  In support of this sentiment, Almagor 
(2000:48), identified the following four factors: the conditions for tolerance must prevail in 
the interest of citizens to ensure that their basic human rights are upheld; when applying the 
law it must  to be ensured that democracy and freedom are not threatened; the work of setting 
and policing the boundaries of the required tolerance must be allocated to bodies that are 
properly accountable for their decisions; and officials at courts should ensure that democracy 
prevails in their judgement which should also be subjected to review. This level of tolerance 
can be impeded when police feel that they would be protected if they abuse their powers.  
 
Although public satisfaction with the police is at the heart of the British political agenda for 
policing as indicated in Bradford, Jonathan, and Elizabeth (2009:03), Britain does not allow a 
culture of lawlessness as deduced from the following words uttered by the then British Prime 
Minister - David Cameron - on 10 August 2011: “This continued violence is simply not 
acceptable and it will be stopped. We will not put up with this in our country. We will not 
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allow a culture of fear to exist on our streets. Let me be clear. At Cabinet Office Briefing 
Room A (COBRA) this morning we agreed that full contingency planning is going ahead. 
Whatever resources the police need, they will get it. Whatever tactics the police feel that they 
need to employ, they will have legal backing to do so. We will do whatever necessary to 
restore law and order on our streets. Police are authorised to use batons and water cannons 
that will be available in the next 24 hours” (Strickland & Taylor, 2011:3). 
 
It is the researcher’s view that these sentiments expressed by the Prime Minister will not help 
a volatile situation; one may argue that when the police feel that they are being protected by 
the powers that be, they would probably abuse their powers. The police should therefore be 
sensitised that these kinds of expressions should not hoodwink them from carrying out their 
duties properly and sticking to their training and guiding policies. The key approach here 
being the tolerance that the police should display to manifest the principle of Sir Robert Peel 
that whilst exercising the independent discretion and judgement, they should remain the 
servant of the people (Chief Inspector of Constabulary, 2009:11). This emphasises the 
importance of police tolerance during protests to ensure that they remain the servant of the 
people as they need the support and cooperation of the public for them to be effective and 
efficient in policing.  
 
Chief Inspector of Constabulary (2009: 5-11) states that an independent body was tasked to 
inspect all aspects of policing across England and Wales in 2009 and to advise the police and 
make recommendations that could improve their performance. It reported that the policing of 
crowds have changed over years due to political, socio-economic and the public awareness 
and sensitivity on policing in the country. These warranted a change in police policies and the 
improvement of their training standards. The efficacy of this model was based on tolerance 
and trust which can be disregarded when the police are faced with a bigger event that has 
high levels of threat (Chief Inspector of Constabulary, 2009: 21). Moreover,  people are 
becoming better  aware of their rights and their freedom of expression and they want to put 
these rights to use hence the police had to review its policing of public protests in 2009, 
specifically due to the concerns raised regarding protests during the London G20 summit. 
The investigation on the policing of protests revealed a number of inconsistencies in the 
command structure, planning methods, preparedness, training and tactics as well as the 
uncertainty of the law and the use of force. The conclusion was that the introduction of more 
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legislation will not improve policing of public order because police officers understand the 
existing framework of public order powers and duties (Chief Inspector of Constabulary, 
2009: 11).  
 
This leads the researcher to believe that the policing of crowds needs to be handled by the 
police who specialise in this field. Their training should be done taking into consideration 
various situations such as the number of people protesting and the possible level of threats.  
This could make the police to be more knowledgeable of their policies and lead to the 
upholding of citizens’ rights and safety during protests and crowd management.   
 
2.7.1.1 British Police Tactics 
As reflected on the training and deduced from the Scarman Inquiry - that was dealt with 
above - a conclusion can be drawn that the British police are well organised when they 
conduct their training exercise. What the researcher needs to investigate is whether these 
training methods are effective, and in order to determine this, the researcher needs to look 
closely at the tactics employed by the British police and the approach and challenges faced in 
real situations that they have encountered. 
 
The operations Climate Action Drax, Kingsnorth Climate Camp and the Tamil Protest that 
took place between England and Wales showed the difference in the approach to public order 
policing and the use of public order legislation. There were also variations in operational 
command structure, planning methodologies training and tactics. In the Camp for Climate 
Action Drax, the Drax Power Station being the largest coal-burning power station in Europe, 
was targeted by protesters due to its production of carbon emissions. This took place between 
August-September 2006 where protesters displayed opposition to the production of high 
carbon emissions by the power station. In this protest thirty eight people were arrested by the 
police for a number of offences. The success in the policing of this protest was attributed to 
the engaging tactics of the police where they interacted with all concerned and kept the public 
informed of the developments. From the management of this protest the following were 
identified as measures that could enhance the effective and efficient policing of public 
protests (Chief Inspector of Constabulary, 2009:53): the need for the core objectives and a 
tactical plan in the policing of the public protests; a better command structure with clearly 
identified roles and responsibilities; more trained police officers who focus on operational 
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planning; and there should be a comprehensive operational plan that covers all aspects to 
ensure that police officers understand their roles and responsibilities.  
 
The Kingsnorth Climate Camp protest that took place between July and August 2008 was 
about the construction of a coal power station. This operation involved 1 400 police officers 
from 26 police agencies and there were serious injuries reported. However, there were some 
complaints received from Local MPs that police had used heavy- handed tactics; they (police) 
seized 600 items from protesters and made 100 arrests. Although the police were effective in 
managing their resources, some shortfalls such as the proper risk assessment, a better search 
strategy, properly trained commanders, planning teams, proper operational briefing to 
understand law and police powers,  were identified (Chief Inspector of Constabulary, 2009: 
54). 
 
In the Tamil protest that took place in Parliament Square in London between April and June 
2009, a hundred thousand (100 000) protesters began gathering in the streets around the 
palace of Westminster on 6 April 2009. The policing of this posed a major challenge for the 
police due to the number of protesters which also involved a sit-in. The protesters also used 
women and children as a buffer preventing police from forcefully moving them. During the 
early hours of the morning when crowd numbers were reduced, police were able to push back 
protesters towards Bridge Street where protesters remained for seventy three days. The 
protest ended with no major incident. It was noted from this event that a significant amount 
of time was spent on negotiations by the police. The police also deployed Tamil police 
officers and Reassurance Units to engage and communicate directly with the protesters. 
Police were also concerned about inaccurate media reports, such as - the police are going to 
disperse the crowds. But police had counteracted this negative reporting by using blue tooth 
messages to reassure the protesters that this was not the case and that their rights were 
protected. Police had the marine unit on standby due to the threat that protesters were going 
to jump into the Thames River. Contingencies were also put in place due to the possibility of 
hunger strikes (Chief Inspector of Constabulary, 2009: 56). 
 
It is evident that pre-planning for the event is paramount because it allows for the proper 
analysis and preparation for any eventual threat. Some degree of success in the policing of the 
above mentioned protests indicates how the approach adopted by the police, and public 
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cooperation in such an event can make a difference. In the Drax Kingsnorth climate protests 
for example, the number of police used yielded success to a certain extent. In cases where 
police are more visible in their numbers there are fewer incidents, whereas in the third world 
countries where there are challenges in the number of police officials employed, there are 
huge challenges. Due to their poor economy it would be difficult to employ a large force to 
police their protests. Baker (2006:26) cites Sierra Leone that has 7 000 police officials to 
police a population of over five million citizens.  
 
Indiscretion on the part of the police has at times been blamed for the violence and loss of life 
during protests. For example, King and Brearly (1996:40) cite a Poll Tax demonstration in 
Trafalgar Square where the police charged the protesters with horses, although protesters 
were barricaded and had nowhere to go. This resulted in a chaotic situation where protesters 
ended up throwing missiles at the police and stoned the South Africa House and almost set it 
alight. The outcome of this event led to the reassessment of Command Band Training. 
 
It can be seen from the above that although the British Police are professional, they at times 
also have to contend with the general challenges that compound the policing of protests. As 
much as Chief Inspector of Constabulary concluded that the British style of police stands out 
as being the more flexible and approachable one, it can be argued that in all service delivery 
protests no matter how prepared the police might be for any event as indicated earlier, there 
will always be unforeseen challenges. More so because crowds tend to be emotional and the 
police have to ensure that they do not enflame these emotions. 
 
The tactic of Classic Crowd Psychology as indicated in Chief Inspector of Constabulary 
(2009: 85) is used by Public Order Policing in England and Wales. The basis of this approach 
is to decontextualize crowd behaviour as it is based on the understanding that crowds are 
irrational, dangerous and open to easy exploitation by agitators. This can neutralise the crowd 
behaviour when it is discovered that a certain type of crowd can be easily influenced by 
agitators and become more unpredictable and violent. Indiscriminate action by the police can 
unite the crowd and make it to team up against any police action. 
 
However, according to Stott (2009:06) this Classic Theory is outdated and is now replaced by 
the leading model of crowd psychology known as Elaborated Social Identity Model of crowd 
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behaviour (ESIM). This determines human social behaviour of the police and demonstrators 
and can determine who and what can become influential in the crowd and what interventions 
can be used to prevent unruly crowd behaviour and to support police action. The researcher 
believes that this model enhances the cooperation between the police and the crowd thus 
facilitating the policing of a peaceful protest. 
 
Waddington (1991:163) states that taking control of the area by the police before the crowd 
arrives enables them to make certain decisions such as demarcating control of participants 
and enabling the non-participants to move freely. The protesting crowd will always want a 
vantage point during the protest and they will also attempt to occupy certain places which 
will make it difficult for the police to remove them, like getting inside demarcated premises. 
 
King and Brearly (1996:37) state that the Snooker Ball Wedge method is modified to the 
Trudge & Wedge or linking of arms to form various kinds of cordons. This method involves 
a number of officers shoving themselves right up to the crowd in order to contain them or 
form human wedges in order to break up the crowd. The danger of this model is that it could 
cause injuries to police officers and the protesters during this process of trying to break up the 
crowd. 
 
The British police are also using the trudging and wedging method which is the concerted 
side-stepping of a police cordon that allows for the gradual pushback of a crowd, whilst the 
wedge is a chevron formation that is used to split the crowd in halves. When shield cordons 
are used the officers do not form a complete line, but they are formed in sections leaving gaps 
in between. The advantage of this is that the crowd will be undecided when throwing of 
missiles as compared to the full line formation (Waddington, 1991:313)  
 
The push-and-shove  method as described in King and Brearly (1996:72-73) is a technique  
involving the linking of arms coupled  with the use of heavy vehicles, but this also requires a 
number of police officials to execute it. This tactic could also result in serious injuries to the 
police and protesters due to its close contact nature. While the cordon – where the police 
cordon off the scene with tape or interlocking metal barriers - as indicated in Waddington 
(1991:313) is used when disorder escalates. It has to be noted that the police standing in a line 
without contact with protesters as well as police vehicles parked in a line formation can also 
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be a form of a cordon. This can be used on either side of the crowd with gaps to allow for 
people to pass through or it can be used to form a complete barrier. The Loose Cordon 
involves a line of police officers standing next to each other leaving spaces in between where 
police officers hold the belt of each other standing in front and keeping one arm free (King & 
Brearly, 1996:73).  
 
Waddington (1991:164) indicates that armoured vehicles also serve various purposes such as 
to disperse the crowd, and protecting police officers when the crowd is throwing stones and 
missiles. They are also used to carry equipment that will be utilised for crowd management 
purposes and most of them are equipped with a loud public address system which can be used 
to communicate with the crowds. They are also used to secure the arrested persons and 
protect injured officers. The author is also of the view that although the dispersal of the 
crowd would assist the police in getting access to the perpetrators, the better strategy is to 
encourage the crowd to stick together in order to limit the crowd collecting debris and 
missiles that they can throw at the police.  
 
Waddington (1991:161) describes the arrest tactics used by the British police which involve a 
small squad of officers known as the “snatch squad” that moves through the police cordon 
and isolates their subjects. They then bring their subjects (the protesters) behind the police 
line and half of the “snatch squad” protects the arresting officers with the use of small 
shields. Waddington further asserts that the style of strategic incapacitation is also a tactic 
used by the British police. It involves the use of a projectile which inflicts injury, although 
not lethal. 
 
From the various tactics used by the British police one can conclude that they undergo 
advanced training and they are in most cases prepared for threats that are experienced during 
protests. Having indicated that most countries adopt this similar tactic but only under a 
different name,   the researcher would look at the tactics used by the American police during 
the policing of protests. 
 
2.7.2 Public Order Policing in the United States of America 
Like the British, the police in the USA had a long history of managing mass demonstrations, 
and they have been put to the test on a number of occasions. According to Narr, Toliver, 
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Murphy, Mcfarland and Ederheimer (2006:4), during the 1999 Seattle World Trade 
Organisation, protesters went on a rampage destroying property and inciting violence against 
the police. The police were criticised for the management of this situation where they fired 
pepper spray, tear gas canisters, stun grenades and rubber bullets to disperse crowds and 
arrested 500 protesters. Following these major incidents that hit the country, USA had to 
rethink its strategy when managing protests, major events and mass demonstrations. This led 
to discussions at the International Forum in San Diego in 2004.  
 
The following key issues regarding the policing of mass demonstrations were identified at 
this forum (Narr et al., 2006:4): mass demonstrations cannot be handled by a single agency, 
therefore cooperation and communication from all departments are  important; critical issues 
must be discussed prior to an event and worst case scenarios must be part of the plan; it was 
further emphasised that a balance must be struck between a  person’s rights during police 
interventions when protecting public safety and property, and that officers’ safety needs to be 
taken into account, and the proper policies need to be put in place to guide officers on the 
degree of force to be used when responding to potential threats; the wearing of special 
equipment such as body armour and special weapons needs to be considered in some 
incidents, taking into account the negative impact they might have when appearing before the 
crowd; the importance of the proper use of intelligence and the media; and  the need to 
educate the public on police professionalism and response. It was stated that all these should 
be taken into account during planning. 
 
When comparing the policing in the United Kingdom and that of United States of America 
two aspects stands out namely, that of training and planning which is of importance. The 
emphasis being not to approach volatile situations with untrained officers and poor planning. 
It has to be taken into account that the majority of the service delivery protests policing are 
viewed over the media. It is therefore important that the police display professionalism and 
fine skills during the policing of protests and it has to be reiterated that spontaneous protests 
pose a peculiar challenge as they do not allow the police to plan for such events well in 
advance.  
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2.7.2.1 American police tactics  
The police in the United States have a long history of handling mass demonstrations. The 
1999 World Trade Organisation protests in Seattle was a defining moment in policing of 
mass demonstrations in the United States of America (Narr et al., 2006:01). As stated above, 
one of the tactics that the police in the USA use is setting up physical barriers during major 
events. This is where barriers in the form of an interlocking fence is erected which can assist 
in the control of crowds more effectively. The police can use this to keep a certain number of 
participants in a certain area or channel participants in a certain direction. The use of physical 
barriers is very effective when the police are operating with limited manpower (Narr et al., 
2006:56).  
 
Physical barriers have proved to be effective in mass events in Savannah, Boston, and New 
York. The Miami Police Department erected the fixed barrier a day before the Free Trade 
Area of America Conference, which could only be accessed by individuals having proper 
credentials. This fence was interlocked and designed so that protesters cannot dismantle it 
easily. This was a very effective feature in maintaining the crowd, which was strengthened by   
the police adopting a mobile field concept which provided a rapid response to crowd control 
and civil disturbance in urban areas. This encouraged team movement rather than individual 
action and actions that are under the direct supervision of the field force commander. The 
field force approach can be used to restore order, move crowds, rescue victims and isolate 
problem areas. The mobile field force has been successfully adopted worldwide (Narr et al., 
2006:25). 
 
The most practical tactics used in USA that are similar to that of the British police are 
indicated in Narr et al (2006:54) and this includes columns, skirmish lines, wedges, half step 
movements and controlled rushes. They are effective in urban situations allowing the police 
to split the crowd into smaller groups. This makes the policing of the crowd manageable. The 
officers on the ground during these formations are given protection by other officers who are 
placed at a vantage point to observe any blindsided attack. These police officers who are 
giving protection are placed at rooftops and in helicopters.   
 
The USA police are also noted for their use of specialised units. These specialised units 
undergo intense training for them to understand their tactic and also to look professional 
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(Narr et al., 2006:45). Specialised units tend to be very effective because they practise their 
tactics more often than units that are multi-tasked. By multi-tasking police do not concentrate 
or spend time mastering tactics. 
 
Specialised units as indicated by Narr et al (2006:46) are part of the crowd policing units in 
USA and are used in deployments during protests and mass demonstrations such as the 
following:  the bicycle units were used by the Miami Police Department to help escort major 
parades and rallies - this improved rapid response and impedes less on traffic, and is also 
non-threatening to protesters;  The Seattle Police Department used the Chemical Agent 
Response Team when chemical irritants are needed to disperse crowds; the mounted teams 
were used by the Boston and Miami Police Departments as they establish high visibility - this 
is a good tactic of policing crowds because crowds normally were quick to move when horses 
that were deployed directed them to a certain area;  the Violence Abatement Team was 
mainly used in Seattle and they are comprised of thirty strong personnel, dressed in both 
uniform and plain clothes and are used to observe criminal misconducts and arrests of  the 
perpetrators;  the Cut Team is  used in instances where protesters intended to disrupt traffic or 
create a diversion where by the protesters link themselves together by placing their hands into 
hollow piping -  This requires the cutting of the pipe in order to separate the protesters;  the 
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team is a team of experts with specialised training - 
they are deployed during mass demonstrations and events and respond to any critical event, 
and are deployed at key points. During the Seattle WTO Conference the SWAT team’s role 
was for the management of demonstrations and being on standby for the response in the event 
of the use of weapons of mass demonstration. 
 
From the above it can be concluded that the British and the USA police apply tactics that are 
best suited for the prevailing threats. The British police pay more attention in overcoming 
situations, like splitting of crowds, pushing back and dispersing it; whilst the USA police 
used more of a preventative action, like their bicycles units and mounted police teams. One 
may ask the question then, as to why South Africa has employed the tactics from Belgium 
and France although South Africa faces its unique challenges? This is a crucial part of this 
research that the researcher will investigate and analyse. 
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2.8 CONCLUSION 
We can therefore agree that public protests affect most countries daily. Most democratic 
countries are faced with a challenge of maintaining public order whilst at the same time 
upholding the rights of their citizens as democratic countries are signatory to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It is however noted that most democratic countries 
face a number of challenges due to them being placed under situations that are unexpected. 
As much as some countries are noted for the heavy-handed tactics, other countries are noted 
for their good practices. 
 
The researcher has noted that the high level of tolerance by the British police proved 
successful. This was noted in the Tamil protests where the protesters remained on the Bridge 
for seventy three days. The Parades Commission used by Northern Ireland has the 
opportunity to do an assessment of the threats and impose conditions. In this way the police 
are more aware of the given situation and can prepare in advance. 
 
The Dialogue Police system utilised in Sweden proves to be a very interesting factor in this 
research. This helps in facilitating the goals and objectives of the police and the protesters. 
The dialogue policing approach keeps the police well informed giving notice in advance on 
the possible intentions of the crowd. Crowd Psychology and Dialogue Police can work hand-
in-hand in order to promote better policing of crowds. 
 
The researcher has noted that the USA makes use of their specialised units, which are well 
trained and given specific roles and they can therefore be called in to execute a specific task. 
It may happen that the police who are trained in public order policing and due to their skills 
will be called to execute dangerous tasks like arresting and escorting of dangerous criminals. 
It is therefore the view of the researcher that having specialised units is important because the 
normal police personnel are not disturbed in the execution of their day-to-day duties.  
 
The mobile field concept which entails rapid response and team movement was successful in 
Miami and this concept is adopted worldwide. Washington DC prefers the non-arrest method 
in crowd control and any use of force is communicated to the Joint Operations Command 
Centre where the information is documented and reviewed. The use of physical barriers 
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restricting the crowd to a certain area proved very effective when managing crowds, 
especially when police are understaffed.  
 
The American police also see the media as an important role player and therefore use them 
effectively. The information about possible protests is therefore communicated in advance so 
that the public is made aware of the date, time and place. A public information officer is used 
as a communication line between the police and the media. The effective use of the media 
eliminates undue criticism and it is very important that the police use it to their utmost 
because it is very influential and can easily sway public opinion.  
 
The researcher further concludes that it would be difficult for police to uphold the law if they 
don’t know how it should be applied. Training and workshops are therefore critical for them 
to execute their duties effectively and efficiently. Thus the heavy-handed tactics used by the 
Israeli forces can be eliminated with proper intelligence gathering and planning so that they 
can be more proactive in they approach.  
 
The use of force during protests should not lead to death or injuries of persons. The use of 
force must be in proportion to the threat. The British police also had their shortcomings when 
it comes to the use of force, like in the G20 Summit where complaints were received about 
the use of excessive force against difficult protesters and this was declared as unjustified. One 
of the visible best practice strategy is the “meet and greet” strategy where officers in standard 
police uniform shake hands with the crowds assuring them that they were on their side 
therefore winning their cooperation. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE POLICING OF PROTESTS IN SOUTH AFRICA FROM 1910 TO 
                         TODAY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter will focus on the policing of protests in South Africa since 1910 until today. The 
study will examine the types of protests that the police encountered/encounter and how they 
are policed, the different policing tactics used, the training undergone by police officers, and 
the specialised units involved. The researcher will also investigate whether the police 
were/are effective and efficient when managing these protests and the reaction received from 
the public. The media has criticised the Public Order Police for their approach when carrying 
out their duties and this unit has made news headlines more for the wrong reasons. In the 
final part of this chapter the researcher will discuss the Public Order Police in more detail 
together with all the changes that have taken place within this unit and the number of protests 
that they face annually. 
 
3.2 THE POLICING OF PROTESTS FROM 1910 TO 1960 
South Africa is situated in the southern part of the African continent and shares boundaries 
with Swaziland, Mozambique, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho and Zimbabwe. South Africans 
in general have witnessed a number of changes with regard to the protests and the policing 
thereof, evolving from colonial to apartheid eras up to the current democratic policing. These 
changes were indeed expected, but one begs the question whether the policing of protests has 
improved or has gotten worse. In order to establish this, the researcher will investigate the 
history of policing in South Africa in an attempt to understand the fundamental role of the 
police when managing protest actions since 1910.  
 
Protests in the early 1990s painted a picture of violence by the majority against the unfair 
system of the government that deprived the people of basic services (Managa, 2012:2). It also 
painted a picture that these protesters were violent in nature and the police had little option 
but to retaliate with excessive force. As much as any form of violence is not justified, the 
researcher is of the view that what should be taken into account is what leads to such violence 
and whether the protesters had any other option instead of responding with violence.  
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Although there are many challenges in the policing of protests, South Africa is not unique to 
this. Mathew, Heyman and Mathew (1993:24) identify countries such as Israel and Northern 
Ireland as having the same challenges. They indicate that there is selective law enforcement 
in favour of the dominant group (who are a minority with more power and influence) and that 
the police penetrate into everyday life of subordinate groups (who are disadvantaged, 
powerless and given little or no respect) thus criminalising their ordinary practices. The 
disadvantaged groups therefore saw the police as the oppressors whilst the dominant group 
saw the police as its own.  
 
From the period 1910 to 1960 many protests were rooted in the opposition of the laws of the 
then government while others were emanating from labour disputes. The majority of South 
Africans set out to challenge white supremacy and embarked on a campaign of mass civil 
disobedience. Many protests during this time reflect the dark days of the South African 
history of discrimination and exploitation against the majority of the population who were   
faced with police brutality when they were opposing unjust laws that were encroaching on 
their basic human rights. Some of the examples of the protests are the following:  
 Charlotte Maxeke - a science graduate - led a successful campaign against the 
carrying of Identity Documents by African women in the Free State in 1913 
(Davenport & Saunders, 2000: 275). 
 The African National Congress and the South African Indian Congress launched a 
defiance campaign against unjust laws that got people from all race groups involved 
in 1952 (Karis & Gerhart, 2013:229).  
 
Although protests need not necessarily be of a violent nature, the police should at all times be 
prepared to respond appropriately to any eventuality. The Passive Resistance Movement that 
was led by Mahatma Gandhi is an example of peaceful protesting; even though 2000 people 
were arrested after they crossed the Transvaal border in breach of law relating to the entry of 
Indians into the Transvaal. The manner in which this protest was carried out impressed 
General Smuts who later decided to negotiate with Gandhi and subsequent protests were 
called off (Dippenaar, 1998:19).  
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This begs the question once again, as to why protesters today do not follow the principles of 
Gandhi by demonstrating peacefully. It may happen that protesters act violently due to 
frustration as their non-violent actions are not taken seriously or they are provoked to act 
violently. Jain (2010: 09) defines violent protests as situations where protesters engage in 
physical acts of violent behaviour. This is commonly characterised by attacking innocent 
persons, police, foreigners, government officials, the burning of buildings, looting of shops, 
blockading of roads and the burning of tyres.       
 
3.2.1 Types of Protests 
There is a need to identify the protests that are inherently violent and protests whose violence 
is precipitated by aggressive police response. An analysis of the following protests could give 
an indication on the cause of violent protests:  
 
The mine-workers’ strike of Witwatersrand - Dippenaar (1998:17) mentions the 1913 
mine-workers strike in the Witwatersrand where miners refused to obey the police instruction 
to disperse and charged the mounted police with stones, bottles and firearms. This protest 
spread all over Johannesburg involving the burning of buildings. These battles continued on 
the streets for another 48 hours until General Botha and Smuts, acting on behalf of the 
government, conceded to the strikers’ demand after negotiations. At the end of this protest 
twenty two people were killed; eighty eight admitted to hospitals with gunshot wounds; and 
numerous policemen were either killed or seriously injured.  
 
Port Elizabeth strike – Mr Masabalala who was the leader of the striking workers was 
arrested during the wage strike in Port Elizabeth in October 1920. About 2 000 black and 
coloured protesters gathered around the Central Police Station demanding the release of its 
leader, charging the building and hurling axes and other objects. Although no command was 
given to shoot, the police opened fire killing twenty five people and wounding sixty six.  
Colonel Truter defended the police action stating that they were defending themselves against 
the immediate danger (Dippenaar, 1998:47).  
 
Springs miners’ strike - According to Dippenaar (1998:196) 5 000 of the 61 000 Springs’ 
mine-workers who went on strike on 11 August 1946 marched to Johannesburg on 14 August 
1946. They were armed with dangerous weapons and refused the instruction from the police 
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that they should return to their compound. The police who were only armed with batons were 
obliged to use force injuring fifty three of them in the process. On the very same day another 
5 000 miners from Simmer and Jack Mines in Germiston also marched to Johannesburg. 
They were dispersed by the police who were armed with batons even though the miners were 
armed with dangerous weapons. After the Communist Party declared a general strike the 
government was concerned about this situation and decided to arm the police with firearms. 
Numerous clashes that took place during this period led to the death of six miners and 600 
were injured. 
 
Sharpeville massacre – According to Martin (2007:07) the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) 
organised a protest march to Sharpeville Police Station against the carrying of the pass 
documents on 21 March 1960. About 400 heavily armed policemen were deployed outside 
the police station to protect the police station that was already protected by a wire barrier and 
to deal with the protests. When chaos erupted, 4 000 live ammunition rounds were fired 
killing and injuring dozens of protesters. Poor intelligence led the police to believe that they 
(the police) were going to be attacked and this coupled with the lack of proper command by 
the police officers resulted in sustained firing and high casualties. It was later discovered that 
the police also used soft-nosed bullets called “dumdums” which were already banned in 1899 
due to the horrific exit wounds that they cause.  
 
Karis and Gerhart (2013:139) state that there were about ten thousand protesters who were 
armed with sticks and outnumbered the deployed police officers. Some witnesses who 
testified stated that there was a hostile and volatile mood. After this sustained firing, sixty 
nine people died and 186 were wounded. As compared to those dealt with above, this 
indicates that some peaceful protests were met with police brutality.  
 
The Revolt in Pondoland - In November 1960 after the eruption of violence against the 
application of Bantu Authority System by Chief Botha Sigcau, the government declared a 
state of emergency in Pondoland in Transkei. Violent protests that was generally against the 
Bantu Authority System, compulsory stock culling, soil rehabilitation, Bantu education, tax 
increases and other government policies that was coordinated by rebel Pondo tribesmen 
called Intaba (mountain) continued unabated. In June 1960 the police launched an attack on a 
large public meeting that was taking place in Ngquza Hill in Lusikisiki District. They 
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dropped tear gas canisters from the helicopter and fired into the throng killing eleven people 
and wounding many others. The findings of the subsequent commission of inquiry that was 
appointed by the government to investigate this incident was rejected by the Pondo leaders 
(Karis & Gerhart, 2013: 160). 
 
These incidents indicate that there have always been some casualties in the policing of public 
protests and there is an underlying threat to suggest that the use of force by the police was 
normally protected by the authorities. This poses questions that this study will later attempt to 
address such as: were the police concerned about the loss of lives due to their actions during 
these incidents; were they properly trained to deal with protests; was intelligence used to 
inform the police about these protests and what they could possibly expect? 
 
3.2.2 The Policing of Protests 
According to Steinburg (2005:01), the commandos had been in existence in South Africa 
since 1715 and they were used by the Dutch East India Company (DEIC) to protect white 
farmers and their property. They had the power to shoot, take prisoners and act as they saw fit 
whilst protecting such property. Seegers (1996:23) states that the DEIC later established a 
police force that initially consisted of former soldiers, later joined by civilians and was 
mainly functional in rural areas.  
 
The policing of Cape Town was entrusted to the Cape Constabulary that was introduced in 
1835 inspired by the London Metropolitan Police. Other towns were policed by various 
police forces such as borough police, local board police force, magisterial native police, 
messengers and convict guards and water police. Zululand was policed by the Reserve 
Territory Carbineers and the Orange Free State was policed by the border police. These 
police forces consisted of volunteers and never attained professional footing leading to the 
then government recommending the formation of the national police modelled on the 
Transvaal Police (Seegers, 1996:23). 
 
Mathew, Heyman and Mathew (1993:24) state that until the late twenties, the South African 
Police was perceived as an instrument of the British control that was repressing the Afrikaner 
rebellion. The rise of Afrikaner domination on the white political scene was accompanied by 
“Afrikanerism” of the South African Police in the late twenties. Most white policemen were 
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subsequently drawn from the rural Afrikaners and this led to resentment by the white 
English-speaking South Africans. Under the British rule, the Royal Irish Constabulary in 
Natal and the Cape had the primary role of policing the territory and suppressing resistance to 
colonial rule since the 19
th
 century. In 1910 the police force in South Africa consisted of the 
mounted regiments, special force for key infrastructure, railway police, private police for the 
mines, native administration police and town police.  
 
After the unification of South Africa in 1910, there was a need to merge the then provincial, 
municipal and rural police forces into a National Police Force. The South African Police then 
came into being on 1
st
 April 1913 based on the Police Act that was promulgated in 1912 
(Dippenaar, 1998:6). Colonel T. G.  Truter who was appointed the Commissioner of Police 
centralised the police command to Pretoria and by 1913 the South African Police absorbed 
the internal security tasks which included the quelling of protests (Hornberger, 2014:19).  
 
The newly established South African Police had its first test of dealing with protests on 27
th
 
May 1913 when 19 000 miners in Witwatersrand went on strike. The government wanted to 
avoid violence and Colonel Truter who realised that the then deployed 993 police officers 
were not enough to deal with this, especially if it spreads to other mines as well; thus he 
ordered another 981 police officers that included Rifleman and Imperial forces that were used 
during the Boer War to supplement the current staff in Johannesburg. These withdrawals of 
personnel from Cape Province, Orange Free State and Transvaal left only few police officers 
responsible for policing in these areas (Dippenaar, (1998:16).   
 
Seegers (1996:36) states that the ranks of the South African Police were filled by the army 
who when called for duties, left half of the country unpoliced. It is under this condition that 
the police would rely on special constables and police reservists. The police were not 
properly trained to deal with protests by then and they used to resort to ultimate force that 
cost lives when placed in precarious situations. The effective and efficient policing of protests 
does not only depend on the training and skills of the officers who are deployed in such 
situations, but also on the support that they get from the secondary units.  
 
Dippenaar (1998:96-101) elaborates on some of the supporting units that were within the 
South African Police during this period. Mobile units that were based in Pietermaritzburg in 
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Natal were used in black townships during raids and unrest-related incidents. On 1 April 
1929 the Veterinary Division that was mainly concerned with the caring for police animals 
and shoeing of police horses was established at the training depot. It also gave training to new 
recruits to induct them into the veterinary section. The inspectorate division that served as the 
eyes and ears of the commissioner for conducting inspections of buildings, livestock, 
transport, equipment, supplies, official registers, books and documents, was also established 
at the police head office. As the horses and mules belonging to the police were gradually 
decreasing, there was a high investment on mechanical transport to ensure that the police 
were effective in their work. In early 1931, they had 106 cars, 29 Lorries, 280 motor cycles, 
and some side cars.  
 
In 1947 the government felt that there were internal threats by communists and therefore saw 
the need to establish a Special Branch that could carry out secret missions (Dippenaar, 
1998:211).  Major du Plooy was then tasked by Major-General Palmer to establish this 
Special Branch that consisted of detectives and uniform members, and it was called the 
Security Branch. This branch was seen as the third leg of the police, with its members who 
were trained overseas under the pretext of investigating policing methods but they returned 
with firm ideas on how the Security Branch should operate (Dippenaar, 1998:211). 
 
Nancy and William (2011:84) state that Government increased police powers throughout the 
1960s due to the resistance and unrest within the country but it became evident in the 1970s 
that neither the implementation of apartheid nor police intimidation was successful in halting 
continued resistance. The government then established the Bureau for State Security to 
support the Security Branch with military intelligence. This Bureau for State Security 
reported directly to the Prime Minister and their activities were kept secret. With well-known 
infiltrations of political and civil movement by these agencies, one wonders whether there 
was an improvement of how protests were policed or the acquired intelligence was solely 
used to identify and eliminate those who were seen to be causing such unrests 
 
3.2.3 Training and Tactics 
The police were dealing with riots and protests based on the Riotous Assemblies Act 27 of 
1914. There is a need to investigate whether the Riotous Assemblies Act 27 of 1914 gave the 
police excessive powers in order to protect the government or whether this Act enhanced the 
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policing of protests. Seegers (1996:27) states that the Riotous Assemblies Act of 1914 
provided severe sanctions for those found guilty of public violence as it was accepted by  
parliament that it was not concerned about native uprising but about a third Boer War. 
 
The commission of inquiry that was set after the killing of twenty five protesters in Port 
Elizabeth in 1920 revealed that the police shot at the crowd without the order to shoot being 
given. This made the police management to realise the need for military discipline in crowd 
management and led to the establishment of a training depot in 1928 (Seegers, 1996:46). 
Dippenaar (1998:91) states that Colonel De Villiers who was commander of police training 
introduced a policy that made the police to be given a militaristic training and discipline. 
Police were then trained to be better in drill, marksmanship and horsemanship while little 
attention was given to training in law due to the belief that these other competencies were 
essential in producing a good policeman and thus  the knowledge of law was considered to be 
of secondary importance. Lt.Colonel T.J. Byrne who was the new commanding officer at the 
Pretoria West training centre where police training was being conducted, subsequently 
introduced strict discipline and physical exercises. This transformed the training centre into a 
semi-military camp that emphasised physical training, which included training police in 
gymnastics to improve their agility.  
 
This military style of training was exposed by the press in 1930 when a number of ex-police 
officers mentioned the iron-fisted approach in the training centre. There were also allegations 
that senior police officers were also not treated with respect as they were often belittled in the 
presence of recruits. The standardised training that did not take into account the age of some 
police officers led older police officers to feel that they were not respected because they were 
expected to perform the same physical training as the young recruits. Commissioned officers 
were no longer treated like gentlemen as was previously the case but they were addressed in 
abusive language that was used when addressing the recruits as well. Bringing up police 
officers who were trained in military style fashion was later seen as highhanded; similar to 
the manner in which they were dealing with protests and strikes such as the Rebellion World 
War 1 and Bulhoek protest that was mentioned above (Dippenaar, 1998:94). 
 
Prior to the amalgamation of the different forces to form the South African Police force, there 
were four police training institutions in Pretoria West, Pietermaritzburg, Kroonstad and 
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Maitland in Cape Town. The Cape Town institution had no training facilities and recruits 
were given on-the-job training at the stations where they were deployed. After amalgamation 
the Pretoria West training centre was used as the central training centre and Colonel Truter 
prioritised the training of white constables who were tested after three months (Dippenaar, 
1998:14). 
 
Due to the then racial policies that assumed that blacks were inferior to whites, blacks were 
trained separately and given inferior training as compared to that which was given to whites. 
This included crowd management training (Dippenaar, 1998:200). As apartheid intensified 
and the initial Umtata training centre that was training black police officers was becoming 
small, blacks were again categorised into three racial groups and trained in different training 
centres in 1952. Coloureds were trained in Woltemade; Indians at Wentworth in Durban; and 
blacks in New Modderfontein (Dippenaar, 1998:248). 
 
To equip the police to deal with protests and crowds effectively there was more and more a 
need to deal with protests based on the prevailing political situation in the country.  
Dippenaar (1998:288) states that there was a reorganisation of the training of the police in 
1960, especially in the method of anti-riot drill. A total of eighty two police officers were 
trained in anti-riot drill and 16 police officers were trained in the usage of the Browning 
machine gun. The railway police who were responsible for policing in railways precincts also 
had their twenty five police officers trained in anti-riot drill.  
 
In 1959 the police purchased forty seven Saracen armoured vehicles that they used for riot 
situations. These vehicles were effective as they provided safety to the police because they 
were able to operate from inside the vehicle without physically leaving the safety of the 
vehicle. These menacing vehicles displayed the military nature of the police which seemed 
very threatening to the public (Dippenaar, 1998:243). 
 
The facts above indicate that the police were trained in anti-riot drills using heavy calibre 
weapons with no emphasis on tolerance, negotiations and gradual response to the threat. It 
depicted the police as the enemy of the people whom they were expected to serve. This was 
exacerbated by the protesters who perceived the police as an obstacle in the removal of the 
apartheid laws.   
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3.2.4 Reaction from Civil Society 
The Landsdown Commission of Inquiry of 1929 that investigated relations between the 
police and the public indicates, among others, that although the police were expected to be 
helpful, polite and tactful, they tend to be violent when they are faced with volatile situations. 
It further found that there was a good relationship between the police and the Indian and 
Coloured communities but largely because these communities were not discriminated to the 
extent as the black community; hence their clash with police was minimal. They were more 
likely acting passively unlike the blacks who suffered extreme discrimination and as a result 
they tend to be more violent in their opposition to unjust laws. It concluded by emphasising 
that strict military discipline was one of the main reasons for dissatisfaction in the manner in 
which the police were dealing with protests; thus the Commission concluded that the spirit of 
militarism enforced by the top structure of the police was not compatible with the spirit of 
policing in the world at large (Dippenaar, 1998:127).  
 
Dippenaar (1998:273) cites the Cato Manor protests of 1960 where residents who were 
opposed to forced removals had an altercation with the police that led to a major riot that 
culminated in the death of nine other police officials. Of the thirty one rioters who were 
arrested for these riots ten of them received the death sentence. The white community in 
general reacted by venting their anger against the black community. They armed themselves 
by buying firearms and seeking official protection from the government, while farmers took 
the law into their own hands by acting as if they were empowered to use force.  
 
Although the police are tasked with the maintenance of law and order, it can be seen during 
this period that there were a number of incidents in which they had struggled to contain 
violence thus failing to maintain law and order. There were also those incidents where they 
managed to quell the violence but this was done using excessive force which resulted in 
many deaths and injuries; and in almost all cases their actions were justified by authorities. 
 
3.3 POLICING OF PROTESTS FROM 1961 TO 1993 
The National Party came into power in 1948 and instituted the apartheid system that led to 
the discrimination of people of colour. Any protests or resistance by those who opposed 
apartheid were quelled by brutal force from the security forces (Le Roux, 1998:237). The 
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analysis of policing during this period indicates the types of protests that took place and how 
the protests were dealt with. It indicates whether the police were acting within the prescripts 
of the law, whether the tactics that they were employing due to their training that they were 
receiving was legal, and the public’s reaction to all this.  
 
The 1976 Soweto Uprisings and the 1985 State of Emergency indicate how the police had to 
deal with public protests; largely executed by using batons, guns, and shooting from 
armoured vehicles. Dippenaar (1998:500) states that the police were fully aware of the threat 
against the security of the country and to be ready for this, they reorganised the riot section in 
February 1976. This led to the presentation of riot and crowd control courses in Maleoskop 
outside Grobblersdal. The security branch was well aware of the brewing dissatisfaction 
concerning the introduction of Afrikaans as the medium of instruction in non-Afrikaans 
speaking community schools which ultimately led to the 1976 riots. When this started the 
initial attempts were made by the police to disperse the crowd, but without any success and 
thus the police were forced to use their firearms as they felt their lives were in imminent 
danger.  
 
Vigilante groups that were supported by the police due to their counter attacks on anti-
apartheid groups became prevalent in the 1980s. The police used them to their own advantage 
as they saw them as counter revolutionary measures. These vigilante groups mushroomed 
throughout the country and they were as follows: the Phakati operated in Thabong in the 
Orange Free State; the Amabutho were in Umlazi in Natal; the Mbokotha in KwaNdebele; 
Ama-Africa operated in Uitenhage in the Eastern Cape and their targets were the African 
National Congress (ANC) and the United Democratic Front (UDF) supporters. The Witdoeke 
(white headbands) were the most notorious vigilante group for the torching of the settlements 
at Crossroads outside Cape Town in 1986 when residents defied state attempts to remove 
them. This resulted in the deaths of fifty three persons and 70 000 being homeless (Cawthra, 
1998:9-12). 
 
In the late 1984 and early 1985 government offices and beer halls in the townships were 
burned during protest actions against rent hikes, inferior schools and harsh treatment of shack 
dwellers. The Vaal Uprising of 1984 due to the new tricameral parliament affected Sebokeng, 
Sharpeville, Boipatong, Bophelong and Zamdela townships. During this uprising transport 
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was disrupted and protesters set up barricades to prevent police from entering the townships. 
Most shops and homes belonging to councillors were burnt. The police responded by using 
tear gas, rubber bullets, and live ammunition to disperse crowds (Gerhart & Glaser, 2013: 
58). 
 
During the worst political violence that engulfed the country in 1986, sixteen people died 
while a number of people were injured: the police shot two people in George, one at 
Lawaaikamp near Oudtshoorn and one at Tinus near Fort Beaufort not far from Port 
Elizabeth. In addition, Soweto people who were thought to be working with the police were 
burnt to death by putting a tyre around their necks in what was commonly called 
“necklacing”; in Mbekweni outside Paarl a woman was injured when a bus was petrol-
bombed. In the Northern Free State fifty four people were arrested for protesting - thirty of 
these were under the age of eighteen. In Alexandra troops carrying semi-automatic rifles 
lined the outskirts of the township and three youths were shot dead by the police; and ten 
people also died in the violence that erupted after the funeral of the members of the Azanian 
People’s Organisation- AZAPO (SAPA, 1986:02). 
 
The labour unions also contributed to the violent protests as on 10
th
 August 1989, 500 
members of Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) protested against the arrest of 
27 of its members for singing freedom songs. Police used batons and sjamboks in dispensing 
the crowds and in this process eighteen people were injured. Cosatu and the National Council 
of Trade Unions (Nactu) protested from 5 to 6 September, in favour of the newly enacted 
Labour Relations Act to cover all workers. This was the biggest stay-away in the history of 
South Africa that consisted of 2.5 to 3 million participants. The police arrested thirty seven 
protesters who participated in this protest (Jarvis, 1990:27). The South African Health 
Workers Committee held a protest against racist hospital tariffs on 18 September 1989 in 
Soweto and 5 000 union members were dispersed by the police with teargas. On 29 
November 1989 the Labour Federation held a protest in Johannesburg to show solidarity with 
SA Health Workers protesting against racist hospital tariffs, and about 2 000 marchers were 
dispersed by police using dogs and teargas (Jarvis, 1990:82). 
 
According to Cawthra (1998:15) some of the major challenge that the police had to deal with 
just before the dawn of democracy was the “civil war” in Kwa-Zulu Natal between the 
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African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkahta Freedom Party (IFP) supporters which 
began in 1987. This left thousands of people dead and the South African Police and the Zulu 
Police were accused of siding with Inkatha. There were allegations that complaints by the 
ANC were not taken seriously and for every one Inkatha supporter detained there was fifty 
ANC supporters detained. The report on the violence that engulfed South Africa during this 
period revealed that of the 3 699 people who were killed in South Africa in 1990 nearly half 
of them was killed in Kwa-Zulu Natal.  
 
3.3.1 Police Dealing with Protests  
As it can be seen from the above, prior to 1960 the police did not have a clear strategy of 
dealing with protests because they operated on an ad hoc basis by deploying station officers 
thus sometimes leaving police stations unattended. There might have been a perception that 
managing protests does not require any specialised skills and therefore the police utilised 
ordinary police officers to do this. In an attempt to address this, Dippenaar (1998:305) states 
that in 1962 Mr John Vorster (then Justice Minister) established mobile units that were 
deployed to unrest areas. These units consisted of thirty two motor vehicles, a mobile 
workshop, mobile radio station, water carts and trailers, and ten additional trailers to carry 
supplies; these units were located in Witwatersrand, Northern Transvaal, Western Cape and 
Port Natal. This arose as a result of an increase in political violence in the 1970s  and by 1980 
South Africa had a fully-fledged riot squad capable of controlling and dispersing crowds 
(Dawson, 2008:105).  
 
According to Cawthra (1998: 18), the Division Visible Policing of the South African Police 
controlled the two auxiliary forces formed in 1986, that is, the special constables and the 
municipal police. The Municipal Police were under the direct control and employment of the 
Black Local Authorities and they were mostly blacks with little education, who were poorly 
trained. They were used to guard installations and were the first line of defence during 
protests - as long as they could hold a shotgun and they could contain resistance in many 
areas. The kitskonstabels (“instant constables”) were directly recruited by the South African 
Police during the 1980s to deal with rampant riots particularly in black townships. These 
kitskonstabels were given six weeks of training and although they were granted full police 
powers, they were not granted full police membership such as medical allowances and other 
employment benefits. At the end of their training they were armed with a shotgun, baton, 
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whip and handcuffs; and they were later merged into the South African Police Service 
(William & Pruitt, 2010:117).  
 
Cawthra (1998: 15-20) also mentions the Bantustans Police which were four forces attached 
to the TBVC states that included Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei. Other police 
officers were from the self-governing territories which were Lebowa, Qwaqwa, KwaNdabele, 
Kangwane, Gazankulu and KwaZulu. They were the clones of the SAPS in terms of their 
structures and comprised of 10 000 police officials. The KwaZulu police was very powerful 
with 4 500 members under the control of Chief Mangosuto Buthelezi, and commanded by a 
second white SAPS officer, Major General Jacques Buchner, a veteran of the security branch.  
Although the ZP, as the KwaZulu Police were commonly known, had their own training 
institutions, they replicated that of the SAP in many ways.   
 
President F.W. De Klerk’s administration realised the need for efficiency in the unit that 
contained unrest situations, and thus introduced dialogue with the protesters. Although this 
was the case it had to be evident from the police side that the police were still in authority. 
This led to the growth of the members of the riot units from 2 000 to 5 000 and later reaching 
the full strength of 17 000 members with their own uniform and menacing gear tasked to 
concentrate on political conflicts and demonstrations. According to Lieutenant-General Johan 
Swart, who was the commander of this division, the riot unit was to adopt a more conciliatory 
role where they will help in negotiations in order to end conflict. But the unit was still to 
maintain a paramilitary style using teargas, birdshots and sharp ammunition while the 
armoured caspirs were replaced with a Nyalas which looked less menacing (Cawthra, 1998: 
18). 
 
According to Cawthra (1998: 17), the Visible Policing Division was set up in 1991 and it 
consisted of Uniform and Operational branches. The uniform branch was responsible for day-
to-day police activities whilst the operational branch was a semi-military branch that was 
responsible for riot policing and countering insurgence. The operational branch had an 
explicit political function and had specially trained and ordinary policeman who served on 
the border, and also quelled riots, uprisings and strike activities. The specialised Internal 
Stability Units (ISU) which used heavy-handed tactics, was deployed all over the country and 
was supported by a rapid response team known as Unit 19 as well as the Task force which 
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was based in Pretoria. The police then were not armed with crowd management equipment 
like shields, batons, water cannons and rubber rounds; however, they took to the streets in 
their camouflage uniforms and used automatic rifles even on school children who protested 
against the inferior “bantu education system”. 
 
The question still remains as to whether the police could have used any other method other 
than lethal force in the situation that they were faced with. The researcher is of the view that 
it would be difficult to use shields and tonfas in riot situations when faced with live 
ammunition from the protesters. With this in mind there is a need to analyse the training 
methods employed by the police during this period. 
 
3.3.2 Training and Tactics 
Police are trained in accordance with the current threats that they are faced with. The analysis 
of the types of protests that took place during this period reveals that the government had a 
serious concern about the intention of the opposition political forces to overthrow it (the 
government). The police underwent riot-control training, refresher courses on riot-control and 
counter insurgency tactics at the Maleoskop Police Training Base (Dippenaar 1998:557). Riot 
units were criticised for their actions which were often brutal, but they had the support from 
some law-abiding community and political leaders stating that the police were there to serve. 
Police were also sent abroad to keep abreast with the latest training and techniques, getting to 
know the aerosol cans and sneeze machines used to deal with rioters. They also used 
cameras, tape-recording and video equipment to record riot situations to refute unwarranted 
criticism at a later stage. Further, the riot training courses at Maleoskop were becoming more 
popular amongst young trainees (Dippenaar, 1998:612). 
 
Cawthra (1998:10) states that although the police were trained and equipped with anti-riot 
weapons such as shields and tonfas in the 1980s, they were reluctant to use them as they 
argued that such armaments were only effective in urban settings. This made them to 
continue to use heavy-handed armaments such as teargas and other heavy weapons that were 
used in the 1976 uprisings. This indicates that the police were given Carte Blanche as they 
were mostly exonerated from any prosecution as long as they acted in good faith and pleased 
their masters. This can be seen from the 1 000 deaths as a result of police actions that were 
reported between September 1984 to the end of 1988. As discussed above, due to the then 
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apartheid system the South African Police had separate training colleges for different race 
groups, but they started to integrate them from 1992 (Cawthra, 1998: 15). 
 
3.3.3 Reaction from Civil Society 
The type of reaction from civil society and how they felt about the police was no different 
from those discussed in the previous section. The community continued to perceive the police 
as the agent of the state who were obstacles against the realisation of their freedom. Gerhart 
and Glaser (2013:80) state that there was a popular anger over rent, poor education, and lack 
of housing in the mid-1985 that led to protests, rioting and the destruction of property. These 
were in turn met by police brutality and detentions that reached boiling point which 
ultimately culminated into the declaration of a State of Emergency in July 1985. This gave 
the security forces unrestrained powers to arrest, interrogate, prevent gatherings, declare 
curfews and restrict access to certain areas. It is during this period where 10 000 people were 
detained without being charged. 
 
The report on the damage to property during this period indicates that 3 254 police vehicles 
were damaged from September 1984 to July 1986; 937 homes of the members of the South 
African Police were either damaged or destroyed; 8 773 delivery vehicles were damaged; 
there was also damage to 6 850 buses, 1 272 schools, 985 business premises, and 3 920 
private homes. There were also 2 500 attacks on security forces from January to May 1986 
but after the declaration of the State of Emergency these figures declined drastically (SAPA, 
1986:09).  
 
According to Dippenaar (1998:512), although the police were dealing with the protests and 
riots brutally, they had challenges of their own as they were working under heavy stress. 
Some riot unit members were working for more than eighteen hours a day and at times did 
not have time to take off their uniforms, before being called for duty once more. They were 
constantly faced by rebellious youth and disobedient adults who will not obey their 
commands and this was compounded by general provocation by different communities. They 
had to constantly deal with agitators, inciters and stone-throwers who were determined to 
overthrow the apartheid system.  
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3.3.4 The Effectiveness and the Efficiency of Policing  
As indicated above, the effectiveness and efficiency of the police were perceived differently 
by different communities. The white community saw the police as their protectors and as 
being effective and efficient as they protected the apartheid government that had their interest 
at heart. But the majority of disadvantaged black communities saw them as brutal and 
protecting the interests of the apartheid government.  
 
Cawthra (1998:31) states that as time progressed there was pressure on the police to change 
their anti-democratic behaviour to a more democratic form of policing. This campaign 
intensified when Lieutenant Gregory Rockman broke ranks with the police culture and 
publicly accused the riot police of acting like ‘wild dogs’, due to the manner in which they 
treated black policemen and the non-white community. He was dismissed from the police and 
he formed the Police and Prisons Civil Rights Organization (POPCRU) which drew support 
amongst black prison warders and black police officers. 
 
The question on whether the police were efficient and effective was answered during the 
Goldstone Commission of Inquiry that was established in October 1991 to investigate and 
expose the background and reasons for violence and intimidation in South Africa. The 
Commission found that violence and police brutality were rife during marches and 
demonstrations in the early 1990s (Omar, 2007a:07). It revealed that demonstrations and 
protests will become more political until blacks have been politically empowered. It was also 
found that the police had a callous attitude when giving evidence on how live ammunitions 
were used at the expense of human life and that a new level of tolerance is needed not only 
from white policemen but from all racial groups.  
 
It was asserted that local authority, the police, the magistrate, and relevant government 
agencies should play a role in the planning and management of mass demonstrations. This 
was based on the discovery that mass demonstrations are sometimes used for criminal 
activities or tends to be infiltrated by people with criminal intentions thus contributing to the 
violent nature of the protests. The Commission also highlighted questions such as whether 
police should keep a low profile instead of showing force during the protests; the 
appropriateness of the equipment used by the police; precautions that the police should take; 
and so forth (Mathew et al., 1993:131). Omar (2007a:07) asserts that as a result of the 
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Goldstone Commission, policing of crowds is now done in terms of the Regulation of the 
Gatherings Act No 205 of 1993. 
 
One can therefore accept that the police operated in almost the same manner in dealing with 
crowds and protests from 1960 to the early 1990s, hence the establishment of the Goldstone 
Commission of Inquiry which indicated challenges and made suggestions on how the 
government should manage these incidents. It has to be noted that the government was also 
under pressure locally and internationally in the early 1990s to change the manner in which 
they conduct their daily activities regarding policing. According to William and Pruitt 
(2010:116), the dawn of democracy in South Africa led to various policy changes such as 
Batho Pele Principles and Community Policing to transform the police in terms of their duties 
and responsibilities in the new democratic South Africa. The sections below will determine 
whether policing tactics from 1994 to today are really living up to the expectation of 
democratic policing. 
 
3.4 THE POLICING OF PROTESTS FROM 1994 TO 2015 
In 1994 South Africa transitioned to become a democratic state that changed the nature of 
policing and dealing with public protests. Cawthra (1992:18) states that under the previous 
administration of President F.W. de Klerk, the riot units were boosted to a full strength 
division and had a capacity of 17 000 men and women with their own distinctive uniform and 
equipment. This unit that deals with protests in South Africa went through various changes 
from the riot unit to the Public Order Police. According to Omar (2007b:14), a  number of 
structural changes took place in the Public Order Policing in 2001 when it changed to the 
Area Crime Combating Units. This had a major effect on the members with regard to the 
selection process and criteria, because they were trained and experienced members who were 
of the view that they are now not made to practise in their field of expertise. This 
restructuring resulted in the loss of the public policing expertise as fifty percent (50%) of the 
personnel were deployed to stations and other units (Newman, Dissel & Lodge, 2010). This 
affected the Area Crime Combating Units negatively as many experienced members resigned 
because they were frustrated with the process.  
 
Realising that they have lost the expertise of dealing with the protests and demonstrations that 
were increasing as a result of people’s dissatisfaction with the quality of service delivery by 
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the municipalities or lack of such deliveries thereof, the South African Police Service 
regrouped again. According to data gathered by the Municipal IQ, an independent local 
government monitoring agency, there was a 289% increase in the number of violent public 
protests against municipalities, from 27 protests in 2008, to 105 in 2009. This had decreased 
slightly in 2011, but increased in 2012 to 113 incidents. Figures show that there were more 
protests against local government during this period than in any other year since 2004 (Jain, 
2010:5). 
 
Newman et al (2010:18) maintain that the police have a pivotal role in maintaining public 
order by having a rapid response capability to intervene in dangerous situations. However, 
Tamukamoyo (2012), argues that the Marikana incident could have been handled differently; 
and he questions the effectiveness of South Africa’s domestic intelligence service in 
gathering credible information on the events leading to this tragedy. He adds that police were 
concerned that there was a possibility of violence and this led them to deploy their elite units, 
the Special Task Force and the National Intervention Unit. This indicates that there was 
leadership and coordination of the different roles that were played by various units that were 
tasked with this protest.  
 
According to Davids (2012), the year 2012 can go down in history as the time when service 
delivery protests exploded in South Africa because it was during this period that the figures 
doubled as compared to the number of such protests of the previous years. With a shortage of 
manpower the POP had their work cut out. When protest action in the country doubles, one 
needs to ask whether there are any backup plans that are in place by the SAPS, because they 
cannot recruit and train members overnight. Police responding to protests will in most cases 
respond with excessive force and in some cases use brutal tactics because of the shortage of 
reinforcements. This can also place the police in precarious situations like in the report of 
Tromp (2010:06), where the police narrowly escaped death in Siyathemba in Mpumalanga 
during a protest. In this case a handful of policemen were left at this hotspot when they were 
attacked by a mob who was throwing rocks at them. These officers had to retreat fearing for 
their lives when they were almost overpowered by the crowd.  
 
According to Regulation of the Gatherings Act 205 of 1993, the convenor of the march or 
gathering must give notice in writing of any intended gathering. This is done in order for the 
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role players to properly prepare themselves for such a gathering because most unplanned 
protests lead to confrontation between the protesters and the police. The giving of prior notice 
also provides the police with the opportunity to meet and agree on certain operational aspects 
with the organisers. 
 
The need for dialogue is expressed by the National Police spokesperson - Superintendent 
Sebola – who mentioned the frustration of the police who were dealing with protesters who 
were pelting them with stones in Mpumalanga and there was no visible leadership in that 
march that the police could talk to. He further states that in cases like this the Public Order 
Policing tends to stamp its authority in order to restore order (Sebola, 2010:18). 
 
It becomes even more difficult to deal with service delivery protests when protesters use 
children to promote violence and at times use them as human shields. Cahill (2009:05) states 
that in Reivilo in the North West the residents were using children as shields in the standoff 
with police and this resulted in the police randomly opening fire, hitting women and children 
with rubber bullets.  
 
According to Burger and Omar (2009:09) South Africa experienced a wave of strikes and 
protests at the beginning of 2009. Most of the protests were in the Gauteng, Northwest, 
Mpumalanga and Western Cape. They mostly related to service delivery and they had to be 
addressed quickly as the police had to be occupied with the hosting of the Soccer World Cup. 
The Public Order Policing entity was the key role player for the Soccer World Cup and 
needed time to train and prepare to be ready for this major event.  
 
3.4.1 Types of Protests 
Post 1994, the protests did not stop but the reason for the protests changed from politics to 
lack of service delivery. According to Alexander (2010:25), the poor people protested against 
poor service delivery from most municipalities since 2004. These protests were mostly 
fuelled by uncaring and corrupt leaders within the municipalities. Such protests were mostly 
organised by unemployed youth and students and they were characterised by toyi-toying 
(dancing and singing freedom songs), stayaways, election boycotts, blockading of roads, 
constructing of barricades, burning of tyres, looting, and destruction of buildings. Therefore, 
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the violent nature of the current protests is not different from those that were experienced 
during the apartheid years. 
 
The protesting community in Knysna was demanding proper electricity services; they burnt 
tyres and pelted the passing motor cars with stones from the overhead N2 Bridge. During this 
unrest five police vehicles were damaged and the police responded with stun grenades and 
rubber bullets to disperse the crowds (Bramford, 2009:01). On 05 September 2011, about 1 
500 protesters who were complaining about service delivery in Thembelihle blockaded roads, 
threw stones at motorists and damaged property. The situation turned worse with the arrival 
of the Public Order Police who fired rubber bullets and tear gas at protesters and arrested a 
number of them. It was further reported that police entered houses and physically and 
verbally abused residents and fired rubber bullets indiscriminately (Clark 2014:04).  
 
The response by police is further noted in the violent protest at Palm Ridge on the East Rand 
that led to the arrest of fifty one people and injuring sixteen. Residents from this undeveloped 
area gathered protesting at the lack of electricity and against corrupt leaders within the 
municipality who had allocated the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 
homes to people who did not qualify (Ndlovu, 2009:6).  
 
The researcher is of the view that it is not the intention of the community to fight the police, 
they merely vent their frustration whilst fighting for their basic human rights like in the 
protest in Mpumalanga where residents went on  protest  and demanded better sanitation, 
electricity and housing in their impoverished areas. They resorted to violence by burning 
tyres, littering the streets and overturning cars whilst marching to the municipal office. A 
community member stated that the mayor failed to deal with their problems; instead he 
disconnected their electricity and water supply (Raymond, 2009:04). The Zion Park 
community protested against the lack of services on the municipal land that they had invaded. 
Community leaders said that they felt angry and that their voices were not heard. The protest 
resorted to violence where the community clashed with police, burning tyres and littering 
streets with stones on the N1. Police responded with rubber bullets, tear gas and water 
cannons (John & Kruger, 2012:4). 
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There have been stern warnings against violent protests by the President in October 2009 
when he was addressing over 280 high-level municipal officials. The President stated that the 
government will not tolerate the destruction of property, the violence and the intimidation 
that often accompanies protests (Clark, 2014:51).  
 
The above situation indicates the frustrations that some communities have, mostly as a result 
of the following: lack of provision of services by the municipalities coupled with lack of 
response to the people’s plight; the empty promises made by the government; the self-
enrichment of corrupt leaders more especially within local municipalities. It is evident from 
the previous sections that previously the police had to deal with protesting people because of 
the opposition to apartheid laws and currently they are still dealing with protesting people 
who are being disadvantaged by the government in terms of providing the required resources 
and services. The police have been accused of highhandedness that most people equate to 
what the police used to do during the apartheid years when managing protests, alleging that 
the police are now using their old tactics. This is amply shown by what started as a labour 
dispute turned violent when the police massacred mineworkers at Marikana.  
 
3.4.2 The Marikana Massacre 
The Marikana wildcat strike for a pay rise in Rustenburg caught the eyes of the world when 
the police massacred thirty four mine workers and injuring a number of them. This was the 
most lethal force used in post-apartheid South Africa and images of this massacre reminded 
most people of the 1976 shootings as well as the Sharpeville massacre of 1960. 
Wehmhoerner (2012:02) states that a strike was brewing for some time as workers denounced 
the leadership of the National Union of Mineworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) and joined 
the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU). After the autopsy report 
of the thirty four miners who were killed on 16 August 2012, it emerged that most victims 
had been shot in the back and many were shot far from police lines. This made some people 
suspicious and to believe that the police were avenging the death of two policemen who were 
hacked to death by the miners before the 16
th
 of August 2012. 
 
According to Ncube, and Lukhele (2014:73), in the Farlam Commission that was appointed 
to inquire into the shootings, evidence was heard of extreme violence from all sides. There 
were also the allegations that the police planted weapons at the scene of the shooting (Kadali, 
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2013:12). The police were generally seen as not having used a strategic plan that could have 
minimised the loss of life. This was borne out by the following statement from a journalist 
who had just returned from Afghanistan who referred to the Marikana massacre as an 
Infantry Assault by stating that the number of people who were shot in a few minutes were 
equal to the number of people who were killed over a 12 weeks period in Afghanistan 
(Wende, 2012:34). 
 
According to the Farlam Commission of Inquiry (2012:195), the police’s initial plan to 
contain the situation was to encircle the strikers with barbed wire, but this provoked an 
aggressive response from strikers. The rationale in the use of the barbed wire was to channel 
strikers in the direction of Nkaneng Township and to serve as a protection for the SAPS 
members. This was to enable the crowds to be broken up into small groups that could be 
encircled and disarmed. From the intended plan above it could be seen that the SAPS are 
trained in various crowd management techniques 
 
3.4.3 The Public Order Police 
The key responsibility of the Public Order Policing (POP) is to maintain law and order by 
policing public protests and this unit had various name changes such as  Riot Unit, Internal 
Stability Unit, Public Order Police, Area Crime Combating Unit until it finally reverted to the 
name Public Order Police again (Omar, 2007b:1). It manages a number of service delivery 
protests in the country on a daily basis and as indicated above, it is often criticised by the 
public and the media by the manner in which it deals with protests. The restructuring that 
took place during these periods saw them reduced in numbers drastically. Prior to 
restructuring, the POP consisted of 7 227 members reporting to 43 units, but this was reduced 
to 2 595 members who were reporting to 23 units. Later, the xenophobic attacks prompted the 
SAPS to increase its capacity to 3 306 and by the end of 2009 there were 5 661 members 
reporting to 29 units (Burger & Omar, 2009:10). 
 
In 2002 the Public Order Policing unit was expected to play a reaction force role to serious 
and violent crimes such as bank robberies but in 2007 about two-thirds of the POP unit were 
transferred to the stations. This left the remainder of the POP understaffed and affected their 
continuous training (Hornberger, 2014:181). The unit played a major role during the FIFA 
World Cup as the government was concerned with the management of large crowds, strikes 
83 
 
and protest action leading to this occasion to assure the world of a peaceful World Cup event 
in South Africa. A study that was conducted in Gauteng to establish whether the POP will be 
able to manage the World Cup in 2010 by Omar (2007b:7), revealed the following: that the 
2006 restructuring led to members of Public Order Policing being decentralised to stations 
and the rest of the members were redeployed to the remaining three Crime Combating Units; 
consequently, there was a decrease in personnel in this unit.  
 
Based on some of the findings, Omar (2007a:10) recommended the following: the updating 
of the Regulation of the Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 that was found to be too old; the need to 
have clearly defined roles for marchers, organisers and marshals; the need for the new 
working document for the POP as Standing Order 262 was outdated; the need to reassess the 
accountability of the POP and make them to be accountable to the Provincial office where 
they could be dispatched to the stations for assistance as and when the need arises; and the 
need for a refresher course for POP members at least once every three years.  
 
3.4.4 Statistics on Protests 
According to Saba and Van de Merwe (2013:10) more than 3 000 protests took place in the 
past four years indicating that there is a service delivery protest in South Africa once every 
two days. The Municipal Intelligence Quotient recorded 410 major service delivery protests 
from 2009 to 2012 that were against municipalities alone, excluding the protests that were 
against other institutions. But police records showed that there were 3 258 service delivery 
protests between January 2009 and November 2012. Jain (2010:05) indicates the increase in 
service delivery protests per month from 2007 to 2011 as reflected in Figure 1 below: 
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Figure 1: Protests per month from 2007 to 2011 
 
Source: (Jain, 2010:5) 
 
As indicated previously, the Municipal IQ data indicated that there was a 289% increase in 
the number of violent public protests against municipalities from 27 protests in 2008 to 105 
in 2009. Although there had been a slight drop in 2011 this had increased slightly in 2012 to 
113 incidents. The police data are more detailed than that of the municipality because while 
the municipality relies more on media reports, the police rely more on actual incidents. The 
police did report that they had attended 1 214 incidents of public violence with a 25% 
increase compared to the previous year with the average of three incidents of violence per 
day across the country. An increase in public violence was recorded in seven of the nine 
provinces with a substantial increase in North West (76%), Eastern Cape (60%), Gauteng 
(38%) and Western Cape (31%). As a result, the Police Minister mentioned that police have 
diverted their attention in fighting crime to managing protests (Jain, 2010:5). 
 
Although protest actions take place daily in South Africa, the provincial statistics differ from 
province to province. There might be various factors that might contribute to this. Some 
provinces might have good governance in local government whilst others may not. The 
possibility of manipulating statistics cannot be ruled out. There might also be political 
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influence with certain motives where the community might engage in disruption of services. 
See Figure 2 to figure 8 on the indents of protests per province in different years. 
Figure 2: Protests per Province in 2007 
 
Source: (Jain, 2010:19) 
Figure 2 shows that in 2007 Gauteng Province accounted for most of the service delivery 
protests as compared to other provinces (Jain, 2010:19). 
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Figure 3: Protests per Province in 2008 
 
Source: (Jain, 2010:20) 
Figure 3 shows that service delivery protests in Gauteng and Western Cape had a slight 
increase as compared to the previous year while Free State, Limpopo and the Northern Cape 
experienced relatively low protests (Jain, 2010:20). 
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Figure 4: Protests per Province in 2009 
 
Source: (Jain, 2010:21) 
Figure 4 shows that in 2009 Gauteng continued to lead the pack with the highest number of 
service delivery protests followed by the Western Cape, Free State, Limpopo and the 
Northern Cape where protesting was still relatively low (Jain, 2010:21) 
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Figure 5: Protests per Province in 2010 
 
Source: (Jain, 2010:22) 
Figure 5 shows that the Gauteng Province continued its dominance in 2010 followed by the 
Western Cape whilst Free State, Limpopo and the Northern Cape were still the province with 
the lowest number of protests (Jain, 2010:22). 
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Figure 6: Protests per Province in 2011 
 
Source: (Jain, 2010:23) 
Figure 6 shows that for the first time the Western Cape featured as having the most 
community protests, accounting for 22.73% in the whole of South Africa. This could also be 
due to the decrease of protests in Gauteng. What can be noted here is the rise in the number 
of protests in Free State as well (Jain, 2010:23). 
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Figure 7: Protests per Province from February 2007 to May 2010 
 
Source: (Jain, 2010:24) 
Figure 7 compares the overall number of protests in provinces over a four-year period and 
this reveals that Gauteng accounts for most service delivery protests followed by the Western 
Cape. Free State, Limpopo and the Northern Cape were the minor contributors. The 
Municipal IQ found that most service delivery protests take place in the winter months. There 
are various reasons for this, but one of the main reasons contributing to this is that winter 
months are cold and the demand for electricity is high (Jain 2010:24). 
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Figure 8: Provincial Share of Protests from 2012 to 2014 
 
Source: (Jain, 2010:25) 
According to Powell and Visser (2015:04) between 2012 and 2014 Gauteng experienced 
more service delivery protests than any other province and had an increase from 20% in 2012 
to 36% in 2014; this was followed by Western Cape. The Northern Cape had the fewest 
service delivery protests and this could be attributed to the small population in this province. 
South Africa is faced with a huge number of protests with little police manpower in place to 
adequately manage the pressure put on police during protests.  
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
Despite various changes that took place in policing and the policing of protests in the country 
from the apartheid period to the current democratic state, there still remains a challenge in the 
policing of the public protests. It has been noted that in the early 1900s policing in South 
Africa was under British control and the police service only became centralised in 1913. 
However, the police still lacked a specialised unit to deal with protest actions that confronted 
the country. The notorious Special Branch unit was established in 1947 and they were 
mandated to carrying out secret operations to counteract any opposition to the then 
government.  
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The focus of this Special Branch was, among others, the monitoring of protest actions and 
gathering any intelligence in this regard. Although there were a number of strikes during this 
time there were also protest actions where people were fighting for their basic human rights. 
The incidents mentioned in this chapter identified the lack of proper training for the police to 
deal with protests as in most cases protests were quelled using military force. The Riotous 
Assemblies Act implemented then, was repressive as it imposed severe sentences on the 
protesters. 
 
The De Klerk’s administration saw the need to have more stability and established a unit to 
manage unrest situations. This unit had a full strength of 17 000 men and women and their 
uniform and vehicles were unique and menacing. This most certainly sent the wrong signal to 
the people who felt that the police were militant. Training was restructured and anti-riot drill 
was implemented in 1960 but the military training still took precedence. The violence 
regarding protest action continued and mostly took place in Soweto and Sharpeville. 
 
From 1994 onwards there was a change in government and with this came the expectation for 
better services, better policing and the upholding of people’s human rights. This was 
expected because they were the very same people who were previously protesting, who were 
now in government. This certainly hasn’t changed the violent nature of protests concerning 
service delivery and empty promises that were made by the ruling political party; this was   
coupled with self-enrichment and corrupt leaders who exacerbated the situation. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY      
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study was to establish whether the service delivery protests are 
effectively and efficiently policed in Free State, particularly based on the constant allegations 
of the unwarranted use of force by the police. Interviews were conducted with selected police 
respondents to get the first-hand information on how they manage the service delivery 
protests and the challenges that they are encountering. This study is solely based on 
qualitative research and covers the entire Free State that has three regions. The methodology 
used and the justification for adopting this methodology and the categories of people who 
were selected for the interviews are dealt with below.     
     
4.2.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
According to Rajasekar, Philominathan and Chinnathambi (2006:02), a research 
methodology is a systematic way of how the research is carried out to solve a problem. It 
essentially entails the procedures that the researcher follows to describe, explain and predict 
phenomena. The basic difference between the research design and the research methodology 
is that the research design is the framework for generating evidence that is required to answer 
the research question (Bryman, 2016:39). In other words, the research methodology is used 
within the broader parameters of a research design in order to achieve what the researcher set 
out to achieve.  
 
There are basically two research approaches that can be used within the research design in 
conducting research:  namely – qualitative and/or quantitative approach. Qualitative research 
deals with qualitative phenomena. It is non-numerical, descriptive, applies reasoning and uses 
words. Its main aim is to get the meaning, feeling and describe the situation (Rajasekar, 
Philominathan & Chinnathambi, 2006:04), while quantitative research deals mostly with 
numerical data. In short, quantitative research generally focuses on measuring social reality. 
Sukamolson (2016: 04) states that quantitative research searches for quantities in the research 
problem and regards it as a reality that can be objectively determined thus stressing rigid 
guidelines in data collection and analysis. 
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In this study, qualitative research was used as it is the most plausible approach to answer the 
research question and achieve the stated research objectives. Its probability is largely based 
on its ability to enable participants who have first-hand experience on the policing of public 
protests to narrate their experiences.  
 
4.3 RESEARCH DEMARCATION 
Goddard and Melville (2004:14) state demarcation as a process of setting boundaries on the 
scope of the research that is conducted. The study was conducted in South Africa as reflected 
by annexure “A” in the Free State Province as reflected by annexure “B” which consist of 
three regions, namely – Northern Free State, Eastern Free State, and Southern Free State. As 
indicated above there are Public Order Police units that are based in all these three regions to 
service the communities although they can also be deployed outside their regions to increase 
the manpower based on the nature of the unrest situation.  
 
The primary police units that deal with protests are station members, because they are the 
first to get to know and encounter the protests, largely the sporadic protests. To get to know 
the experiences of these members in the policing of public protests some cluster police 
stations were also included in this study. This ensured that the researcher was able to form a 
comprehensive understanding on the policing of protests by the police stations up to the stage 
where such policing is handed to the Public Order Policing units that specialises in such 
method of policing. 
 
4.4 RESEARCH SAMPLE 
Trochim (2006) states that sampling is a process of selecting units of study such as people 
and organisations, which comes from a population that is being studied. The rigour in the 
sampling process ensures that the studied sample reflects the characteristics of the population 
that is being studied. Purposeful sampling was used to select the category of the people who 
were interviewed to get first-hand information that contribute in understanding how protests 
are policed in Free State as well as the challenges that are encountered which precipitate  the 
use of excessive force. According to Suri (2011:66), purposeful sampling requires accessing 
key respondents in the field who help in identifying and providing information-rich cases and 
experiences. 
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The following persons were interviewed: 
 The Provincial Head of the Public Order Policing in Free State: The Provincial Head 
is in charge of the Public Order Policing units in the province. All information 
regarding service delivery protests in the Free State are communicated to this office 
and he is accountable for the policing of such protests in the province. Being 
responsible for all three Public Order Policing units in the entire Free State, he was in 
a position to provide valuable information on the nature of the policing in the 
province including its challenges.  
 
 The Public Order Police Unit Commanders: They are responsible for the utilisation 
and deployment of Public Order Policing in their respective areas. They are usually on 
the ground with their members and make operational decisions as per situational 
appropriateness. They were in a position to explain the operational policing 
formations that they are using during the policing of public protests and the 
challenges that they face.  
 
 Public Order Policing members: Fifteen operational Public Order Police members 
were chosen as respondents. Five members were interviewed in each region and they 
provided useful operational and protest dynamic information that affect the developed 
policing strategy. The implication of having to change the devised plan to counteract 
the evolving protest dynamics and how this affects the use of force was 
acknowledged. To ensure that every member of the unit had an equal opportunity to 
participate in the study, members were allocated numerical numbers that were mixed 
in a bowl and five were randomly picked for the interview. This process was done in 
all three regions of the province to select the Public Order Policing members for the 
interview.   
 
 Commanders of the Accounting Police Stations: One commander of the accounting 
station in each region was interviewed. Commanders of the accounting police stations 
are responsible for the initial policing of public protests in their respective police 
stations while waiting for the arrival of the Public Order Police members who take 
over from the police station members. They were able to give insightful account on 
96 
 
how they police the protests before the arrival of the Public Order Policing members 
and the challenges that they encounter particularly with the time taken by the Public 
Order Policing members due to the long distance they have to drive to get to areas 
where protests are taking place. To ensure that every accounting police station had an 
equal opportunity to participate in the study, accounting police stations were allocated 
numerical numbers that were mixed in a bowl and three were randomly picked for the 
interview. This process was done in all three regions of the province to select the 
commanders of the accounting police stations for the interview. 
 
4.5 DATA COLLECTION  
Data collection is the strategy of obtaining and analysing information (Hagan, 2006: 110). In 
this research the researcher used semi-structured questions to collect empirical data through 
interviews with the selected sample. As indicated above, they were the Provincial Head of 
Public Order Policing in Bloemfontein, the unit commanders and members of the three Public 
Order Policing units, and the commanders of the accounting police station in the three main 
areas in the Free State, namely - Bloemfontein, Welkom and Bethlehem.   
 
The interviews were conducted from the period 01 March 2016 to 08 March 2016. On 01 
March 2016 interviews were conducted in the Welkom region with the cluster commander, 
unit commander and members of Public Order Policing unit. On 02 March 2016 interviews 
were conducted in Bethlehem with the cluster commander, the unit commander of Bethlehem 
Public Order Police unit and members of the Public Order Policing in Bethlehem. On 06 
March 2016 the interview was conducted with the Provincial Head of the Public Order Police 
in Bloemfontein. On 07 March 2016 the unit commander and members of the Public Order 
Policing unit in Bloemfontein were interviewed and on 08 March 2016 the cluster 
commander of Bloemfontein was interviewed.  
 
In every interview session the purpose of the interview was explained to the interviewees 
before the start of the interview. There was a clear explanation given on the voluntariness of 
the interview and the fact that they are allowed to decide not to continue with the interview or 
stop it at any point when they feel uncomfortable. It was only after the detail explanation of 
this and assurance from the interviewees that they understand what is explained from them 
that they were given the consent forms to sign. The confidentiality principle was also 
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explained whereby each respondent would remain anonymous, that is, names would not be 
divulged. 
 
An audio recorder was used to record all the interviews and a notepad was used by the 
interviewer to transcribe important information that needed further probing in order to 
investigate further. This was to ensure that the interviewer did not interrupt the interviewees 
while talking but was able to note and follow up and probe further after they have answered a 
specific question. The questions that were asked are reflected as annexure “C”.  
 
4.6        DATA ANALYSIS 
The researcher transcribed data from the recordings and categorised it into important and 
manageable themes. The main themes that were probed further were the shortage of 
manpower and the use of force. Categorisation assisted the researcher in answering the 
research question and ensuring that the researcher objectives are achieved. The analysis 
assisted the researcher to interpret and unearth the critical aspects of this research topic.  
 
The researcher did not only transcribe what was said on the tape, but also took notes of the 
interviewees’ body language and emotions when answering questions. The researcher viewed 
supporting documents that were referred to during the interview before arriving at a 
conclusion. He also summarised all the interviews and this assisted in the identification of 
trends and correlations of the obtained information. 
 
4.7 TRUSTWORTHINESS OF THE STUDY 
LaBanca (2010) states that trustworthiness in a qualitative study can be increased by 
maintaining high credibility and objectivity, which could be achieved by ensuring the validity 
in the interpretation of data by emphasising truth value, applicability, consistency, and 
neutrality. In this study the researcher followed proper procedures in the selection of the 
sample by ensuring that participants have a clear knowledge of the topic being investigated. 
Relevant questions were posed and the researcher cleared up any misunderstanding or 
ambiguous response. The answers provided were written in the context of the question being 
asked to minimise misinterpretation. 
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4.8 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The researcher ensured that informed consent that is attached as annexure “D” was obtained 
and the participants knew the nature and purpose of the study, what was expected and 
whether there are any risks involved as per the content of this annexure. According to 
Singleton and Straits (1999:517), subjects should not be coerced into participating in social 
research, and not only must they understand that their participation is voluntary, they must 
also be given enough information about the research to make an informed decision about 
whether to participate or not. An approval was obtained as per annexure “E” from the South 
African Police Service for empirical research and all the instructions and procedures were 
cleared regarding the field work prior to execution in order to ensure high ethical standards. 
To ensure that the entire study complies with set norms, the required ethical standards as well 
as the ethical clearance was also obtained from the University of South Africa as per 
annexure “F”.  
  
4.9 CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this research was to determine whether the protests are effectively and 
efficiently policed in the Free State. Qualitative research was used and the identified police 
officers were interviewed to get their experiences when policing protests and what 
predisposes them to use what is regarded as excessive force. The research was conducted in 
all three areas that constitute the Free State province; namely, Bloemfontein, Welkom and 
Bethlehem. 
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CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the findings of the study based on the data collected through literature 
research and interviews. The purpose of this study was to establish how service delivery 
protests are policed in the Free State. Due to the centralised nature of policing in South 
Africa, the study investigated the history of the policing of the protests by the police in South 
Africa. This focused on the policing of protests during different periods juxtaposing it with 
the evolution that took place in policing itself.  
 
The results of this study are categorised into specific and general findings. Specific findings 
relate to the findings on the Research Question and Research Objectives of the study. The 
general research findings on the other hand relate to the findings on the general theme of the 
study. These findings are based on both the literature and empirical discoveries.  
 
5.2 SPECIFIC FINDINGS  
The findings on the main research question on whether the public protests are appropriately 
policed in Free State are explained hereunder:    
Policing of Unplanned Protests: When police are not prepared for eventualities, it could 
erupt in violence and serious disruption to daily activities and malicious damage to property. 
The Free State is no different from the rest of the country. In order to counteract this, police 
need to put contingency measures in place. 
 
In order to address this situation the Unit Commanders of Public Order Policing revealed that 
they have a reserve section that works on a twenty four hour standby basis and respond to any 
eventualities in respect of public violence. Care is also taken when placing members on 
different shifts where members living close to one another work on a particular shift which 
makes deployment more manageable because they can respond to protests that occur closer to 
them. The advantage of this is that it is cost effective and helps in achieving a quick response 
time. Members responding to protests locally take an average of twenty minutes to arrive at 
the scene. Protests that take place faraway from where the POP units are stationed pose a 
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challenge because it might take the POP members about two hours to arrive at that place and 
one respondent stressed this by stating that by then “the damage is already done.” 
 
According to Section 20 (1) of the National Instruction 4 of 2014 (South African Police 
Service, 2014) station commanders must acquaint themselves with the policing of public 
protests as first responders in any public unrest situation and POP commanders must ensure 
that first responders at station level are given the necessary training. Public Order Policing 
members are of the view that station members as the first respondents of the public protest 
complaints are not able to be mobilised effectively as they work shifts; they lack proper 
training in this regard; and there is a shortage of manpower in most stations. They further 
stated that police stations do not have public order policing vehicles such as the Nyalas and 
proper crowd management equipment. They concluded by stating that care should be taken 
not to confuse the mandate that police stations have when this is implemented because the 
mandate of the police stations is different from that of the Public Order Policing as their core 
business is to attend to complaints and prevent crime. 
 
Role of Crime Intelligence: Crime intelligence can play an important role in protest action 
by identifying perpetrators and analysing crime threats. Section 5 (1) of the National 
Instruction 4 of 2014 (South African Police Service, 2014) provides for the crime intelligence 
to assist in the gathering of the information, negotiating with role players, and implementing 
problem-solving initiatives in the policing of protests. The view of the members of the Public 
Order Policing in Welkom is that if Crime Intelligence is deployed on the ground they can be 
of assistance but this is not the case in most instances. The Commander of POP in 
Bloemfontein supports the above sentiment by stating that early warning signals are 
important in order to avoid violence escalating, but they receive information when the 
situation is already unfolding and this poses challenges as “prevention is better than cure”.  
 
Role of Tactical Response Team: The Unit Commanders of the Public Order Policing and 
members of Public Order Policing are of the view that the Tactical Response Team (TRT) 
that is  used for crowd management in the Free State is  trained for high-risk situations which 
has nothing to do with crowd management. They were, however, divided on whether the TRT 
should be used in crowd management. Some respondents are of the view that the TRT can be 
used for arrest when firearms are involved and gave the example of the Marikana unrest 
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where protesters were armed and TRT took over the control of the situation. These 
respondents are supported by the Provincial Head of the Public Order Policing who is of the 
view that TRT should not be used as a frontline unit in crowd management but rather for 
arrest if that need arises because they are trained differently. He also raised the concern about 
the command structure of the TRT where a sergeant or a constable who has little or no crowd 
management experience makes important decisions on how the protests should be policed. 
Opposing this, other respondents are of the view that members of POP are also trained in 
arrest tactics and there is no need therefore to deploy TRT.  
 
Communication: In support of Crime Intelligence the information manager plays a key role 
in the policing of protests. Section 4 (1) of the National Instruction 4 of 2014 (South African 
Police Service, 2014) provides for the tasking of information managers to gather information 
to assist in the proper policing of protests. According to the Unit Commander of the Public 
Order Policing in Welkom region the duties of the information manager is to collect 
information and plan for an event and therefore communicate constantly with the organisers. 
 
During an unplanned protest the information manager is dispatched by the unit commander. 
According to one of the members of the Public Order Policing Unit who is often used as the 
information manager in Welkom, he gives a situation report to the unit commander who 
confirms whether there is a need for more reinforcements – this happens immediately when 
he arrives on the scene. As the information manager, he plays the role of a negotiator during 
protest actions. He opens a line of communication with the leaders of the protest and informs 
them of the procedures that need to be followed in terms of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 
205 of 1993. This might be similar to the Dialogue Police (that was dealt with previously) but 
the only difference is that the Dialogue Police in Sweden works as a group but in the Free 
State there is one or two members deployed as information manager(s). This respondent also 
indicated that to be an information manager can be a challenge because they were not sent on 
any formal courses and there are no formal courses in this regard. The only training is the 
hostage negotiators’ course which only addresses hostage situations. He did indicate, 
however, that there is a new course which is at its advance stage where the warrant officer 
and above will be trained in conflict management. 
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The Public Order Policing members expressed general operational challenges such as the 
long distance that they have to travel when protests erupt far from where they are stationed 
making them to take longer to get to the affected area thus in  the meantime police station 
members have to deal with the protests. This leads to a situation where police station 
members who are not trained on this type of situation, consequently do not understand the 
policies on public violence so their actions might aggravate the situation prior to the arrival of 
the Public Order Policing members. According to Section 14 (1) of the National Instruction 4 
of 2014 (South Africa, 2014) members at police station level are expected to monitor and 
contain the situation until the arrival of POP. 
 
The objective of determining whether the police have proper skills to deal with protests is 
indicated in the findings below.  
Training: It emerged from the Provincial Head of the Public Order Policing that the Public 
Order Police members need specialised skills in dealing with crowds and there is a need for 
specialised training. It was expressed that there should be recruitment criteria for members 
involved in Public Order Policing. The 2008 intake of constables led to them policing crowds 
without the proper training. It was also established that there is no criteria at this stage and 
members are transferred directly from the Police College or police station level. According to 
the Provincial Head they are working on recruitment criteria and it will be soon implemented. 
 
The Provincial Head of the Public Order Policing reiterated that the South African Police 
Service employ crowd management training strategies of overseas countries like French and 
Belgium. The Belgium techniques were introduced in 1996-1997 and before 2010 the French 
techniques were implemented. After Marikana all members of Public Order Policing were 
called for refresher training using French techniques. The Unit Commanders and members of 
the Public Order Policing are of the view that French techniques are good if applied properly, 
and stated that the challenge of these techniques is that they need more manpower. The other 
challenge that they indicated relates to the settings in which protests are taking place and the 
threats that they posed in South Africa as compared to the overseas countries. For example, 
the Free State protests take place in the rural areas which is more open but the French style 
techniques apply more for combatting threats in urban areas. These techniques do not prepare 
police officers to disarm protesters who threaten to use their firearms although armed 
protesters are a common challenge that is experienced in the Free State and South Africa in 
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general. This warrants that the Public Order Policing members should adopt a more flexible 
operational approach and deal with the dictates of the situation at hand. It is also the view of 
the Public Order Policing members that commanders need to be trained properly otherwise it 
would be a challenge to give the appropriate commands. 
 
The National office of the South African Police Service is responsible for the training of the 
Public Order Policing officials. The courses that they are trained in include Operational 
Commanders Training (OCT); Platoon Commanders Course; Section Leaders’ Course; and 
Platoon Members’ Course. Although the training is sufficient, unit commanders and members 
of POP are of the view that there should be more refresher courses in this regard. 
 
Refresher Training: According to Section 20 (1) of the National Instruction 4 of 2014 
(South African Police Service, 2014), commanders must ensure that members undergo 
regular maintenance training in order for them to be operational ready. It emerged from the 
unit commanders of Public Order Policing that in order for the members to keep up with their 
acquired skills  derived from training, they need to do refresher training but this is not the 
case due to the demands placed on Public Order Policing. Refresher training can be 
conducted when there are no protests taking place, but during this time POP members are 
also expected to do crime prevention. The demand from National Office that POP members 
be utilised anywhere is also limiting measures in this regard.  
 
The Provincial Head of the Public Order Policing and Unit Commanders of Public Order 
Policing also raised a concern about the fitness of old Public Order Policing members. The 
average age of POP members is forty seven years and this pose a training challenge because 
the training of the Public Order Policing members involved a lot of physical and mental 
strength, thus making some members of the POP to be reluctant to attend refresher courses. It 
becomes difficult for some of these members to cope with operational demands of the 
protests that are more violent. This puts pressure on the younger Public Order Policing 
members as they have to do more in the fight between them and the protesters. The 
Provincial Head of the Public Order Policing also concurs with this and cited a study that was 
conducted by the Operational Response Service (ORS) head office which indicates that there 
is a lack of police members between the age group of twenty four and thirty five. In line with 
the study, they need to recruit this age group from station level. He further indicated that the 
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old members are not easy to transfer because their experience is needed in order to guide the 
younger members on the one hand, but on the other hand the older members are not ready to 
leave the unit where they spent their entire career so it is not easy to transfer them to other 
sections of the police force.  
 
According to the members of Public Order Policing, members of police stations are not 
trained in crowd management, but this was defended by the Provincial Head who confirmed 
that 700 members from police stations are trained by Public Order Policing trainers as they 
are the first responders to incidents of public protests in their respective police station areas.  
 
The finding on the justifiability of the use of force during the service delivery protests is as 
follows. 
Use of force: The police have been criticised on a regular basis as seen in the media for their 
strong arm tactics. It is possible that the public do not understand the situation that the police 
find themselves in and can therefore not relate the police fears. According to the Public Order 
Policing members, the violence of the crowds demand that the police use force to counteract 
them. They mentioned that the type of force to be used is dictated by the behaviour of the 
crowds. The minimum force used is verbal warnings, followed by push back techniques, 
water cannon and thereafter rubber bullets. Rubber bullets are used as a last resort, and then 
encircle techniques if possible in order to arrest. It was indicated that the stun grenade is not 
harmful but pregnant women and children need to be taken into consideration. The 
respondents also highlighted that there is only one water cannon for the entire province which 
is stationed in Bloemfontein and this takes about two to three hours to reach its destination; 
the challenge being that by not having the water cannon available the police might have to 
escalate the level of force. They indicated that there is no individual action from the police 
side unless their lives are in imminent danger, and they emphasised that in crowd 
management they work as a team. 
 
Questions arose on how the police could get the media more involved in protest situations. 
The suggestion was made to have them at section 4 meetings almost similar to what 
happened in Boston where the police shared information with the media during the 2004 
Boston Convention thus keeping the public more informed (Narr et al., 2006:64). The Unit 
Commanders and members of Public Order Policing were of the view that as much as the 
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media will be effective in informing the protesters better, it (media) might not change its view 
or attitude in sensationalising matters as they would want to sell their stories. They 
emphasised that the media thrives on sensation and that is why it expresses a lot of emotions 
by showing the police as being brutal through selective footage but when the police are killed 
the reporting is not the same.  
 
Unit Commanders indicated that the instruction to disperse the crowd is issued by operational 
commanders who set up the Venue Operational Centre (VOC) and all decisions and 
commands come from this VOC. They first start with negotiations and if the crowd is not 
violent they embark on monitoring. If there are any threats of violence, they warn protesters 
and give them a limited time to disperse. They give them a warning to disperse in the 
languages that the protesters understand. They then employ crowd management techniques 
like pushback methods and water cannons when the situation does not change. If the situation 
cannot be contained then they employ pyrotechnics like throwing stun grenades. There are 
factors that are taken into account when stun grenades are used such as being mindful of 
women and children and nearby hospitals. What this basically means is that the force used 
will proportionally be increased to overcome the prevailing situation. 
 
The researcher presented the example of the British police that monitored the Tamil protest in 
London which went on for over 73 days and no incidents took place due to the police 
tolerance and negotiations (Chief Inspector of Constabulary, 2009: 56). Responding to this 
the Public Order Policing members of Bloemfontein felt that they can only tolerate 
communication for about five hours while the Public Order Policing members of Bethlehem 
mentioned that as much as they would like to be tolerant there is also interference from 
persons in authority. Politicians having an agenda and senior police officials’ interference 
place police officers in a difficult situation where they are forced to use unwarranted force. 
 
Responding on how to curb the use of excessive force in the policing of protests the 
Provincial Head, Unit Commanders and members of Public Order Policing were unanimous 
in stating that the shortage of manpower is a critical matter that has to be addressed because it 
forces police to use excessive force when they are overpowered by the protesters. They are of 
the view that the techniques that they are trained in should be effective but they tend to be 
infective during protests due to the shortage of manpower. They also feel that better 
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intelligence and  pre-planning will assist, as one respondent put it that “people do not get up 
early in the morning and decide they are going to protest hence with better information one 
can be more prepared and even avoid this protests through early negotiations and involving 
departments for example the municipalities.” Some of them felt that the manifest display of 
force such as the type of uniform and equipment that portray them like soldiers should serve 
as deterrent to potential law breakers.  
 
The Provincial Head of Order Policing mentioned that they are currently testing the Elrat 
(screamer) that emits irritating sounds for implementation in future. This system is similar to 
the scream used by Israeli police which is a long range acoustic device which acts as a 
loudspeaker that can cause pain and discomfort to demonstrators with unprotected ears, 
which results in the demonstrators naturally moving away.  
 
On the establishment of the availability of proper guidelines on how the police should deal 
with public protests, the findings are as follows.  
Cooperation in planning the policing of the protests: Unlike in the past where the 
community saw the police as their enemy and were reluctant to assist them, the expectation 
nowadays is that the community including people who will plan the marches will cooperate 
with the police. This could promote a better understanding between police and the organisers 
of the marches. According to the Public Order Policing members and the Commanders of 
Accounting Stations there are consultations with the community during protests where the 
protesters are given an opportunity to air their grievances. In some instances the police do 
manage to get the support and cooperation of the affected community through continuous 
dialogue and this addresses the potential violence that might erupt. Some respondents 
indicated that the success of this strategy is at times negatively affected by the source of these 
concerns such as counsellors and other government officials who sometimes refuse to address 
or receive memoranda from protesters.  
 
Public Order Policing members from Bethlehem and Bloemfontein are of the view that the 
attitude of the conveners of the marches also contributes to the negative reaction of the 
community. The conveners representing the protesters at section 4 meetings do not stick to 
the agreements reached or at times mislead the protesters. In some instances the protesters are 
not properly briefed and the conveners deny having knowledge of certain things or reaching 
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agreements with the police on certain aspects. They are at times overwhelmed by the masses 
and disappear leaving the police in a difficult position where they do not have people to talk 
to. The respondents are of the view that to obviate this challenge Section 4 meetings should 
be video-recorded and there should be an opportunity for the police and the march conveners 
to jointly address the protesters before the actual march itself;  and to  explain what could and 
could not be done during the march.  
 
Members of Welkom mentioned the tendency of some communities using children as human 
shields during violent protests. This put a huge challenge on the police on how to effectively 
police the march in terms of using the minimum force required without harming children. 
 
Policies: Unit Commanders of Public Order Policing mentioned that some municipal officials 
believe that the public needs permission to hold a march whereas they only need to be given 
notice to march; meaning that these municipal officials do not fully understand the provisions 
of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993;  however, the Unit Commander of the 
Public Order Policing in Bloemfontein indicated that this problem is not that serious in his 
area because the municipal officers responsible for this function always calls and seek advice. 
 
The Unit Commander of the Public Order Policing in Welkom mentioned that there are 
sometimes external interferences from cluster commanders who give instruction to police 
officials to arrest. This is contrary to the need to maintain tolerance and ensure that the police 
can effectively and efficiently police the marches without using any force but still be able to 
arrest the law breakers at a later stage.   
 
Some of the Unit Commanders of Public Order Policing are of the view that the current 
Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 and the National Instruction 4 of 2014 are 
sufficient to deal with public protests if the provisions of the Act are adhered to and the 
National Instruction executed properly. Some of the Unit Commanders and Public Order 
Policing members mentioned that some police stations are not complying with the National 
Instruction and this poses a challenge to the members of the Public Order Policing as they 
take over the policing of the public protests from the station members.  
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5.3 GENERAL FINDINGS 
Effectiveness and efficiency: The Unit Commander of Public Order Policing and some 
Public Order Policing members from Bloemfontein stated that there is also the tendency of 
persons outside the police to dictate how the protests should be policed. They supported their 
sentiment by citing the request from the Rector of the University of Free State during the 
“Fees Must Fall” protest   that the situation should be handled by the campus security rather 
than the Public Order Policing members. This was despite the court interdict that was 
awarded to the university to prevent the protest.  
 
Public Order Policing members from Welkom and Bethlehem are of the view that the Public 
Order Policing lost experienced members during the 2008 restructuring and these members 
were now reluctant to return when they were needed because they were demoralised as they 
felt that they were not treated fairly. This led to the recruitment and utilisation of members 
who lack the necessary experience and pose a challenge in the effective and efficient policing 
of the service delivery protests.   
 
Shortage of manpower: The Provincial Head, Unit Commanders and members of Public 
Order Policing indicated the shortage of manpower as their critical challenge. The units do 
not have enough manpower to cope with the demand of protest action. Some Public Order 
Policing members also raised a concern that they work long hours and when it is time to rest 
they are tasked to do crime prevention. Their view is that in order to keep them motivated 
they should only work on intelligence-driven crime-prevention operations so that they could 
have time to do refresher training when there are no crowd management duties. Effectively 
this will give them time to attend refresher courses and have time to take leave or rest days 
when they are not policing protests.  
 
These sentiments were also echoed by the Unit Commander of Public Order Policing in 
Welkom who stated that at times protests erupt when members are off duty and they don’t 
have enough members to mobilise so they are forced to recall the same members who have 
just started their rest days. He further stated that they end up getting fewer members to 
manage big crowds and this does not enable them to use the techniques that they have been 
trained in but are forced to escalate the level of force like going for rubber bullets instead of 
specific tactical moves. One Public Order Policing member from Bethlehem mentioned an 
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incident where only six of them had to manage a large protest and she felt that their lives 
were in danger. These are classic situations where the police tend to use excessive force.  
 
A further challenge of using members who are on rest days has been raised by Public Order 
Policing members from Bethlehem. This was also alluded to by the Provincial Head of the 
Public Order Policing who indicated the lack of funds to pay these members for their 
overtime duties. He (Provincial Head of the Public Order Policing) further stated that the 
shortage of manpower mostly affects Northern and Eastern Free State and reinforcements are 
deployed from Bloemfontein which has a bigger manpower. Figure 9 below indicates the 
incidence of unrests in various parts of the province from 2014-04-01 to 2015-03-31. 
  
Figure 9: Unrest related Protests in the Free State. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (South African Police Service, Iris 2015) 
 
According to Capazario (2016:6), the South African Police Service management has admitted 
that they do not have enough Public Order Policing personnel to deal with escalating violence 
in protest marches. The police did indicate that 600 members of Public Order Police units 
have been deployed in hotspot areas in the country but added that there are not enough 
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members to cater for additional challenges. In 2014, the South African Police Service 
requested an additional R3,3 billion to beef up the numbers of the Public Order Policing 
members but the request was denied by Treasury. An allocation of nearly R600 million was 
granted this year (2016) which will be spent for this purpose. This indicates that the 
management of the South African Police Service is aware of the difficulties that are 
encountered by the Public Order Policing. 
 
5.4 CONCLUSION   
The researcher can deduce that the policing in the Free State underwent many changes since 
the 1800s. In comparison, the one that stands out is the dominant white policemen whose 
mandate then was to protect the government and its controversial laws and policies, and 
today the police are dominated by African personnel who are mandated by the government to 
serve its people in the democratic South Africa. 
 
Although there was change in the personnel but the findings reveal that actions of the police 
have not really changed towards the public which could be attributed to the nature and 
number of incidents of violence in South Africa. Service delivery is largely caused by the 
failure of the government at different levels to address challenges highlighted by the 
community or to deliver services to the community. The researcher found that the very 
government the police today answers to are themselves failing to deliver basic services to its 
people. The poor service delivery is due to poor management from within local government 
who are expected to improve the lives of citizens by providing better services. Failure by the 
local government has led to widespread protest actions which in most instances turns violent.  
 
Although the police are answerable to the government, it is the view of the researcher that 
failure on the part of government is one of the contributing factors, more especially local 
government. Local government in failing to coordinate Section 4 meetings and failure to 
address protesters or having political agendas make it difficult for the police in policing 
violent crowds. The protesters therefore see the police as an obstacle and vent their anger on 
the police who are forced to act in order to quell the violence. 
 
Police blame the demand placed on them for the number of service delivery incidents that 
takes place in the province compared to the lack of manpower; this also does not allow them 
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to have tolerance as expected from them. The lack of manpower does not allow police to use 
correct techniques that they were trained in and therefore the situation dictates that they 
escalate the level of force. They are of the view that training employed from international 
countries is appropriate, but should be flexible according to the threats that South Africa is 
faced with. The POP also complains about the resources or lack thereof, for example going 
into a volatile situation with soft top vehicles cause police to use excessive force in order to 
protect themselves.  
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CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION  
6.1  INTRODUCTION  
This chapter focuses on the recommendations and conclusions based on the research findings, 
taking into account the summary of all chapters. The recommendations are based on the 
research question and objectives. The research question focuses on whether service delivery 
protests are policed appropriately in the Free State Province. Linked to this, are the objectives 
that are designed to determine whether the police are using the appropriate level of force 
when managing service delivery protests. The researcher has concluded that this is not the 
case in both instances. Research conducted in the form of interviews informs us that the 
police face a number of challenges that prevents them from managing protests effectively and 
this leads them to use force that is not commensurate with the amount of threat and resistance 
that they encounter for them to achieve their objective of restoring order. Based on the 
research findings and the challenges encountered, the researcher formulated 
recommendations discussed hereunder. 
 
6.2 SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS  
In order for the Public Order Policing to conduct its duties as expected it will need a 
concerted effort from all sectors. The government needs to prioritise this by investing more 
resources in the Public Order Policing sector to ensure that they have sufficient manpower 
and logistical resources. This also applies to the training that the police should get as better 
trained police officers who are continually engaged in regular refresher training courses will 
manage protests better. To link the recommendations directly to the findings of the study in 
order to indicate how the recommendations could address the shortcomings that are identified 
by the study, the next section categorises the recommendations according to the topics that 
are used in the findings.  
 
Policing of unplanned protests: It is now a common understanding that the police will have 
to deal with unplanned protests from time-to-time as a result of the sporadic occurrence of 
these protests. It is therefore recommended that the Public Order Policing should develop 
contingency measures of dealing with these regular occurrences.  
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Section 14 (1) of the National Instruction 4 of 2014 (South Africa, 2014) is clear that police 
station members should monitor and contain the protest situation until the arrival of the 
Public Order Policing members. Based on the reality that some of the areas where protests 
erupt are geographically far from the areas where Public Order Policing are situated;  
meaning that the police station members will spend longer time dealing with protests before 
the arrival of the Public Order Policing members. Taking into account that it could take just a 
few minutes for a peaceful protest to erupt into a violent protest, there is a need for the station 
members be properly trained in  public order policing (just like the members of the Public 
Order Policing) and have regular refresher courses for them to be more effective as first-time 
responders.  
 
For this to be possible, cluster stations should have a permanent stand-by group working on 
one shift so that they can respond as a collective during sporadic protests in their area. This is 
the group that could be utilised for crime prevention activities when there are no protests in 
their area and this could minimise the current situation where the already overworked Public 
Order Policing members are being time and again called for crime prevention duties.  
 
It is also noted that station commanders are not fully aware of the responsibility of the police 
station members in the policing of public protests in terms of the National instructions 4 of 
2014 that has been dealt with above. There is therefore a need for the National and Provincial 
offices to embark on information/awareness sessions to make the station commanders and 
cluster commanders aware of this.  
 
Role of Crime Intelligence: The saying goes “prevention is better than cure”.  It is therefore 
recommended that Crime Intelligence be part of section 4 meetings so that they analyse 
threats and keep the operational commanders informed on a regular basis including before, 
during and after the event. Crime Intelligence should also be instrumental in early warning 
signals by placing the relevant informers on the ground to monitor possible unplanned 
protests; in this way Public Order Policing units could be better prepared for any 
eventualities. It is also recommended that Crime Intelligence facilitate meetings when 
information is received in order to negotiate with the conveners with the intention of avoiding 
violent protest action. 
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The Role of the Tactical Response Team: By requesting the Tactical Response Team to 
respond to a crowd management situation, it creates the impression that all avenues have 
been exhausted and this creates the space or reason for the excessive use of force. It is 
therefore recommended that the Tactical Response Team should not be used in any crowd 
management activities because they were trained to deal with high risk situations and as they 
do not have the tolerance level that is required in crowd management.  
 
Communication: Information managers as the support role of Crime Intelligence play a 
crucial role in Public Order Policing. It is evident from the interviews that information 
managers are not empowered by way of formal training which is crucial. It is therefore 
recommended that the head office training division research the relevant training needs in 
order to empower the information managers. The idea of using the information managers like 
the Dialogue Police in Sweden as discussed earlier in the literature study should be 
considered as this enhances communication and cooperation with the protesters. The other 
advantage of this type of policing strategy is the civilian dress code of the Dialogue Police 
which avoids the military presence style which can be provocative, and thus the protesters 
could perceive the information managers as their friends and this could enhance cooperation. 
 
Training: It is recommended that the current training of the Public Order Policing be 
revisited. The training employed from overseas countries should be remodelled to suit the 
threats faced in South Africa. A planning committee is therefore recommended to help 
facilitate the remodelling of training. Members and trainers who normally work on ground 
level should therefore be part of a planning committee because they have first-hand 
knowledge on the threats and challenges in dealing with public protests. This planning 
committee should consider establishing a training camp designed according to the South 
African terrain where violent protests are prevalent. Earlier literature gives the example of the 
Hounslow Training Camp layout in London which is designed for the threats using real-life 
situations experienced by the police there. In doing so, better tactical methods designed for 
threats faced in South Africa should be employed on how to deal with protests so that 
minimum force is used.  
 
To ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of the Public Order Policing units, the criteria to 
recruit members to this unit should include age, fitness and psychometric evaluations. There 
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is a need to recruit members between the ages of 24 to 35. There should also be an exit 
strategy for older members because they will not be able to cope with the training and 
demands of the Public Order Policing work at ground level as they grow old. 
 
It is expected that the police should maintain a high level of tolerance and spend time on 
negotiations with various role players. It is therefore recommended that members undergo 
psychometric evaluations and training in negotiating skills in order to develop levels of 
tolerance. This will enable them to be good negotiators as this is the skill that they need when 
dealing with the conveners of protesters. This is important taking into consideration the 
findings in this study. Training members in negotiation skills encourages dialogue which 
could encourage a high level of tolerance.  
 
Shortage of Manpower and the Use of Force: Although levels of police brutality are 
reduced as compared to before, the SAPS still seem to carry the legacy of apartheid where 
excessive force is a norm (Zondi, 2014:578). The findings have indicated that this is still the 
case facing policing in South Africa. One of the major factors contributing to this is the 
shortage of manpower. It is therefore recommended that adequate manpower that is capable 
of policing crowds should be addressed as a matter of urgency as members cannot use the 
appropriate techniques with minimum manpower because these techniques require a specific 
number of members in order to be executed successfully.  
 
The shortage of manpower leaves the police with limited options and it therefore forces them 
to resort to the escalated level of force. It also raises a concern with regard to the number of 
members versus the number of protesters which leaves members in a situation where they 
need to protect their lives therefore resorting to escalated levels of force. As indicated in one 
of the interviews by members of Bethlehem Public Order Police that they were only six in 
number approaching a volatile crowd and due to the fact that they were outnumbered they 
had felt that their lives were  in imminent danger.  
 
The advantage of having sufficient manpower will also enable members to be patient as they 
will only concentrate on fewer protests and they will have adequate rest period between 
protests. According to Cruywagen (2016:04), it was announced by the Divisional 
Commissioner of training in the South African Police Service that there will be  a radical 
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change in the training of 5 019 new recruits such that  the training programme is cut down to 
eight  months compared to the previous twenty four  months. This is evident of the fact that 
the South African Police Service management is aware of this crisis from a manpower point 
of view. 
 
Cooperation in planning the policing of protests: Strong ties with communities will 
increase acceptance and respect for the police. This in turn can minimise violence against 
police and increase morale (William & Pruitt, 2010:138). It is therefore recommended that 
the police find a way to get the community to play a positive role to enhance better policing. 
In order to get the community to play a positive role during protests it is recommended that 
station commissioners provide a platform where the community can be heard and also be 
informed. The South African Police Service currently has a mechanism in place called the 
Community Police forums (CPF) where concerns can be voiced. There could be a separate 
agenda at the CPF where the local municipality can address service delivery issues and keep 
the community informed because this has an impact when it comes to the policing of protests. 
The police can also use this forum to address the community at large and also the role players 
in order for them to understand the policies of protests and demonstrations and be guided 
accordingly so that all parties can have a common understanding. 
 
It is noted that the cooperation from local municipality is also lacking. It is therefore 
recommended that the Provincial Commissioner of the South African Police Service engages 
with the municipal managers to address these issues, failing which the Provincial 
Commissioner should prioritise the matter and request the intervention from the national 
Cooperate Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) Department that oversees the 
activities of the municipalities. 
 
Policies: According to Bruce (2005:158) South Africa is supposed to uphold the South 
African Constitution and this means protecting human life, including the life of police. The 
SAPS should therefore revisit its policies and improve systems to control the use of force. As 
indicated in 2007 by Omar (2007: X) that the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 is a 
14 year old policy, and that although this policy is a useful piece of legislation, there are gaps 
in identifying the clear roles and responsibilities of different role players.  
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Although the National Instruction 4 of 2014 has addressed some of these gaps, section 14 (5) 
of the National Instruction 4 of 2014 (South Africa, 2014) also indicates that the use of sharp 
ammunition is prohibited but the police still sees the need to carry live ammunition for their 
protection, due to the threats they tend to be faced with during the protests. This therefore 
does not avoid the use of lethal force in crowd management situations which is becoming a 
common problem in South Africa. These policies therefore need to be reviewed to 
accommodate these threats and at the same time avoid the use of lethal force in crowd 
management situations. The policies should be clear and understood by all role players.  
 
It is also recommended that Cluster Commanders and station commissioners attend courses in 
crowd-management in order for them to understand the policies and the role of the Public 
Order Policing. There should also be workshops conducted by the police training division in 
order for the municipal officials and the public to understand crowd management policies. 
Printed booklets can also be distributed to the public so that they are being educated in this 
regard. The police can also use the local print and electronic media to communicate what is 
expected from the community as to what the policies dictate. 
 
Effectiveness and efficiency: There are various other factors that should be considered that 
are affecting members from being efficient and effective on the ground. This includes 
members being old, inexperienced commanders appointed, members not well rested and 
interferences from outside personnel. It is therefore recommended that there be an entry and 
exit strategy which was mentioned earlier. This will ensure that members are fit and that old 
members are placed elsewhere. 
 
Members should be well rested when there is no service delivery protests and they should not 
be used for crime prevention unless in the case of intelligence-driven operations. Public 
Order Policing responsibilities should largely be dealt with by the Public Order Policing 
commanders. It is recommended that the Divisional Commissioner responsible for the Public 
Order Policing unit and the Provincial Commanders sensitise senior officers in this regard to 
avoid interfering with the duties of the Public Order Policing members. 
 
Lack of Resources: The Public Order Policing needs more bullet-resistant vehicles, and 
water cannons in each unit as this will minimise the use of force. Each vehicle should be 
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equipped with a screamer “Erat” as mentioned by the Provincial Head of Public Order 
Policing during the interview because this has proven to be effective in Israel. 
 
Considering the fact that the Public Order Policing units have a serious challenge due to the 
shortages of specialised vehicles such as the Nyalas, water cannons, crowd management 
equipment and protective gear, it is recommended that the Provincial Office prioritise this 
matter and bring this to the immediate attention of the National Office requesting a bigger 
budget to ensure the availability of the required vehicles and equipment. 
 
6.3 GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
Police officials have a number of concerns especially on the workload issue compounded by 
the fact that they have to deal with the lack of resources that are needed to the effective and 
efficient in the policing of public protests. It is therefore recommended that the members be 
given a platform in order that they address these issues. Understandably, the members would 
address these concerns with their immediate commanders who are also well aware of these 
concerns, but it is the view of the researcher that these issues should be heard by the National 
Office. It is the function of National Office to give instructions which are filtered through to 
members on the ground and it would be fair to say that these members be given that 
opportunity of being heard by the National Office. In this way National Office can get 
positive inputs from members on the ground, who are dealing with matters on the first-hand 
basis. 
 
The other recommendation is that the Public Order Policing unit should have its own garages 
for the specialised vehicles with mechanics that specialise in the maintenance of these 
vehicles. This will ensure better maintenance of these vehicles leading to cost-effectiveness 
and time-saving rather than the current situation where these vehicles spend a long time in 
private garages being fixed and maintained at a high cost.  
 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
The study gives a background on how protests were policed during the apartheid era 
compared to the policing of protests in a democratic country. South Africa has come a long 
way in respect of protests and their policing thereof. The failure of delivery of services due to 
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discrimination and subjugation led to violent protests which were policed by the apartheid 
police who demonstrated their brutal approach. The majority of South Africans would expect 
that the situation would change in a democratic South Africa, but the lack of service delivery 
coupled with corruption had fuelled this issue and the communities still vent their anger by 
engaging in protest actions. The Public Order Policing is tasked to monitor protests and is 
still being criticised for their policing tactics comparing this to the apartheid style of policing. 
 
The democratic government saw the need to change the approach of the policing of protests 
and they therefore sought best practices from international countries. Although various 
techniques were employed from international countries to help with the better policing of 
protests, the police are still being criticised for their militant approach. The study also 
revealed that some of the techniques employed do not suit the South African situation due to 
the fact that protests are often in non-urban areas, whereas these techniques are largely for 
urban combat. 
 
Research conducted in the Free State indicates that most international techniques employed 
can be useful but police officers have identified various challenges that prevent them from 
dealing with protest action appropriately. The main challenge indicated was the lack of 
manpower as compared to the demands placed on members of the Public Order Policing. The 
fact that members were continuously called to perform crime prevention duties during non-
protests periods compounds this challenge. 
 
It is the view of the researcher that literature has identified some good practices from 
international countries that can be adopted. What has stood out in the study is the tolerance 
level of the police which was demonstrated in the Tamil protest that took place in London. 
The Sweden Dialogue Policing can also be regarded as a good practice. It is the view of the 
researcher that South Africa needs to adapt and adopt these two good practices. 
 
Most democratic countries are faced with the challenge of managing protest actions and they 
need to find a clearly defined way to deal with such demonstrations without compromising 
the rights of citizens. According to du Plessis and Louw (2005:442), coordination between 
departments is something governments across the world strive for. With this in mind the 
researcher is of the view that until all sectors play their part, South Africa will have these 
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challenges which will not be overcome anytime soon. What has come out abundantly clear, is 
that the lack of essential resources aids the propensity to make the police to use excessive 
force. 
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ANNEXURES: 
Annexure A: Map of South Africa 
 
 
Sourcehttp://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/za_provinces_map2.htm 
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Annexure B: Map of the Free State Province 
 
 
Source:http://www.roomsforafrica.com/dest/south-africa/free-state.jsp 
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Annexure C: Interview Questionnaire  
QUESTIONS TO THE PROVINCIAL HEAD OF PUBLIC ORDER POLICING AND 
PUBLIC ORDER POLICING COMMANDERS:  
 
1. How many POP members do you manage and where are these units situated? 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
2. Which areas in the Free State are protests prevalent? 
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
3. Mention common types of protests in Free State? 
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
4. Mention the challenges that you are encountering in the policing of public 
protests. 
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
5 How do you deal with spontaneous and unplanned protests? 
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
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6. What community support/assistance do you get when dealing with protests? 
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
7. Outline the training that POP members receive in crowd control? 
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
i. How often do they go on refresher courses? 
………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………… 
ii. What is the criteria used in recruiting the POP members? 
………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………… 
iii. What types of vehicles do you utilise to manage crowds and do you 
think they are appropriate? 
………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………… 
iv. What is your view on the current crowd management techniques 
used? 
………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………… 
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v. What types of equipment and protective gear do members use and 
do you think that they are appropriate? 
………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………… 
vi. During protest action, what line of communication is there between 
commanders that will assist in decision-making? 
………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………… 
vii. When there are challenges in a certain area and members cannot 
manage, what type of extra support do you provide? 
………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………… 
viii. What is your view on the current crowd management policies? 
………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………… 
ix. How are you informed on the type of force to be used? 
………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………… 
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x. As seen by the media, POP members are being criticised for using 
excessive force. In your view what might be the factors that 
contribute to this? 
………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………… 
xi. What do you do to curb factors that you indicated above?  
………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………… 
xii. How will criminally charging members who are found to have 
used excessive force affect members who are involved in the 
policing of protests? 
……………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………… 
 
xiii. What is the role of Crime Intelligence in the policing of public 
protests? 
……………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………… 
 
xiv. What cooperation and support do you get from the local 
municipality officials who are responsible to facilitate section 4 
meetings? 
……………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………… 
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xv. What could be done to avoid the unnecessary use of force? 
……………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………… 
 
xvi. What is the rationale for using TRT (Tactical Response Teams) in 
crowd- management situations because they are trained on a 
different level and their level of tolerance might be limited? 
……………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………… 
 
xvii. In your view what do you think you could change during crowd-
management activities, in respect of policies, equipment, training, 
and so forth? 
……………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
QUESTIONS TO STATION COMMANDERS 
 
1. How do you normally get to know about public protests in your area? 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
2. How responsive is POP in the policing of protests in your area? 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
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3. How is the station policing of public protests done? 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
4. Are members at the station trained in crowd control? 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
5. If members are trained, are they properly equipped to deal with crowd 
management? 
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
6. Station members might be the first on the scene during spontaneous protests and 
most of the time they carry live ammunition for normal duties. What is being done 
to ensure that they use the correct level of force? 
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
7. Do station members understand the policies and procedures in crowd 
management? 
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
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8. What can be done to ensure that station members play a more effective role in 
managing crowds? 
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
9. How do you engage the public on public protests? 
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
10. What support/cooperation do you receive from community leaders and local 
councillors? 
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
11. What influence do political parties have on service delivery protests? 
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
12. Is there any other information that you want to add in the policing of public     
protests? If so, please give details. 
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Annexure D: Informed consent letter 
Informed Consent letter 
Topic: “An analysis of the policing of service delivery protests in the Free State”. 
 
Dear Respondent. 
You have been invited to participate in a research study. The research involves the Policing 
of Service delivery protests in the Free State. I am interested in hearing about your 
experiences in the policing of protests. 
The research will require about 30 to 60 minutes of your time, during which you will be 
asked questions regarding your experience on Policing of Protests in The Free State, 
By participating in the research you will assist in identifying key aspects regarding 
challenges, policies, and techniques used including your approach during the policing of 
protests. 
The interview is tape-recorded - and recordings will be destroyed once information is 
transcribed. All information given during the interview is strictly confidential. 
Your participation is voluntary and you may withdraw from the interview at any stage if you 
feel uncomfortable. 
Please feel free to ask the researcher anything you do not understand before signing this 
document. A copy of this document will be given to you with the researcher’s contact details. 
I have read all the above information in this research study regarding the policing of service 
delivery protests and consent to participate in this study. 
______________________________      (Print Name)   
 _______________________________       (Designation) 
________________________________     (Contact Details) 
________________________________     (Signature)    
________________________________      (Date).   
D. Pillay (Unisa Student) 
Cell:  0824160313 
Office: 051 4117055 
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Annexure E: Letter from Provincial Commissioner Granting permission to do research
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Annexure F:  Ethical clearance from Unisa  
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